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ABSTRACT  
 
Simply put, Crown liability doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada is a mess. Demonstrably, there 
are fiduciary-based duties, fiduciary-based principles, an over-arching honour of the Crown principle, 
Crown honour-based duties, and a constitutional Crown/Aboriginal “reconciliation” imperative. How 
the various pieces are meant to fit together is atypically unclear. In this project, Ronald Dworkin’s rights 
thesis is invoked as a conceptual tool in an attempt to help bring some order to the disarray.  
 
It is argued that the Supreme Court of Canada made a fundamental (Dworkinian) mistake in the manner 
in which they adopted fiduciary concepts into the core of Crown/Aboriginal Law; that this mistake has 
led to a dysfunctional doctrine; and that the Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged their error and 
are now in the process of incrementally mending their materially flawed doctrine. Crown liability 
doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada is now centrally organized around the principle that the 
honour of the Crown must always be upheld in applicable government dealings with Aboriginal peoples. 
Enforceable Crown honour-based “off-shoot” duties operate to regulate the mischief of Crown dishonour 
in constitutional contexts. The Supreme Court has now stated that a (non-conventional and fundamentally 
unresolved) Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary obligation is one such “off-shoot” duty.   
 
This emergent “essential legal framework” is meant to protect and facilitate the over-arching project of 
reconciling the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the de facto sovereignty of the Crown, which 
reconciliation project, it is argued here, is to be fundamentally undertaken by the executive and 
legislative branches of government working collaboratively with Aboriginal peoples. The judicial branch 
of government is then largely limited to the more modest task of regulating the mischief of constitutional 
Crown dishonour. 
 
This project ultimately purports to theorize this relatively new Crown honour-based  framework, and to 
conceptualize what residual role there is for fiduciary accountability to play in applicable 
Crown/Aboriginal contexts moving forward. It is concluded there is likely only a narrow jurisdiction 
remaining for fiduciary accountability in Crown/Aboriginal contexts, which jurisdiction appears destined 
to take the form of conventional fiduciary doctrine which, as will be demonstrated, has itself been 
fundamentally reconfigured in recent years. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“There is a great need for a different kind of legal analysis related to Aboriginal 
issues which explicitly focuses on Crown obligations. The reciprocal relationship 
between Aboriginal rights and Crown obligations remains under-theorized and 
largely unrecognized. This needs to change...” 
- John Borrows1 
 
By the time the Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)2 litigation came before 
the Supreme Court of Canada, our high Court was evidently of the view that the sui generis 
foundation they had first chosen for their Crown liability doctrine in “Crown/Aboriginal Law”3 
was materially unstable. Previously structured around a foundation of non-conventional fiduciary 
concepts, Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada was fundamentally redesigned in Haida Nation 
around the principle that the honour of the Crown must always be upheld in applicable 
government dealings with Aboriginal peoples.  
The Supreme Court stated that this central legal principle operates doctrinally to give rise to 
enforceable “off-shoot” Crown legal obligations. Three primary types of Crown obligation have 
been explicitly identified to date as flowing from the honour of the crown principle: (a) the duty 
to consult and, where indicated, accommodate applicable Aboriginal interests prior to acting in a 
manner adverse to those interests,4 (b) the duty to bring a demonstrably purposive and diligent 
                                                            
1  “Let Obligations Be Done” in Hamar Foster, Jeremy Webber & Heather Raven, eds., Let Right Be Done: 
Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) at 204-205. 
2 [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 245 D.L.R. (4th) 33 [Haida Nation cited to S.C.R.]. 
3 I use the phrase “Crown/Aboriginal Law” in this project to encapsulate all constitutional-based contexts in which 
relationships between a Crown entity (or entities) and an Aboriginal group are legally regulated in Canada.  
4 As will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter Two, this duty was recognized through a trilogy of decisions in 
2004 and 2005; Haida Nation, supra note 2; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project 
Assessment Director), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550, 36 B.C.L.R. (4th) 370, [Taku River cited to S.C.R.]; and Mikisew Cree 
First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, 259 D.L.R. (4th) 610, [Mikisew cited 
to S.C.R.]. For general commentary on this duty, see Dwight G. Newman, The Duty to Consult: New Relationships 
with Aboriginal Peoples” (Saskatoon: Purich, 2009).  
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approach to the fulfillment of constitutional obligations owed applicable Aboriginal peoples,5 
and (c) the (residual and, as will be shown, fundamentally unresolved) fiduciary duty to act “with 
reference to the best interests of” a First Nation, Inuit, or Metis community in circumstances 
where the Crown has assumed a sufficient measure of discretion over cognizable legal interests 
of that community.6 The first two developed at common law as direct progeny of the honour of 
the Crown principle; the third preceded development of the modern honour-based principle but 
was also vaguely reconceptualised in Haida Nation.  
In this project, I seek to theorize the doctrinal fundamentals of this emergent legal framework, 
this new foundation for Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada. I have chosen to employ Ronald 
Dworkin’s promontory “rights thesis” as my primary conceptual tool for this analysis (and a 
working summary of that thesis is set out at the end of this introductory chapter). Dworkin’s 
account of the operative dynamics of legal doctrine in common law systems is used here to 
contextualize the key structural components of Canadian Crown/Aboriginal Law. His influential 
thesis is widely cited and accepted as a comprehensive and helpful model for understanding how 
law, essentially, works. Notably, the Supreme Court of Canada, for their part, relied on 
Dworkin’s thesis in several cases in the 1980s where conceptualizing constitutional rights post-
1982.7  
Primarily conceived with individual rights as the focal point, Dworkin has made clear he 
intended his thesis to explain how both individual and collective rights are interpreted and 
enforced judicially, 8  thus rendering it appropriate for study in the context of Canadian 
                                                            
5 This duty was acknowledged and articulated in Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 
2013 SCC 14, 355 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Manitoba Metis Federation cited to D.L.R.]. 
6 As articulated in Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 18. 
7 See, e.g., Attorney General of Quebec v. Grondin [1983] 2 S.C.R. 364, 4 D.L.R. (4th) 605 [Grondin cited to 
D.L.R.]; R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, [1986] S.C.J. No. 70 (Q.L.); and R. v. Therens, 
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30 (Q.L.). See, also, Re Residential Tenancies Act, [1981] 1 SCR 714, 123 
D.L.R. (3d) 554 [cited to D.L.R.]; and R. v. Paré, [1987] 2 SCR 618, 45 D.L.R. (4th) 546. 
8 The rights thesis is largely constructed against a certain branch of political philosophy (American liberalism), but 
is intended to be transportable to other constitutional contexts; the application of the thesis simply takes a modified 
form under the arrangement of a different political theory. As he notes in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977) at 91, the thesis is also meant to apply to those contexts where 
the prevailing constitutional theory “counts special groups like racial groups as having some corporate standing 
within the community [and] therefore speak of group rights.”. He often refers to “group rights” synonymously with 
individual rights as both constituting the same type of individuated political aims the rights thesis promotes. 
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Crown/Aboriginal Law (i.e. where Aboriginal and treaty rights are generally conceived as being 
held collectively rather than by individual persons9).  
I do, however, adopt Dworkin’s rights thesis here mindful of some potential limitations 
regarding its use in this unique area of law. For instance, in conceptualizing the nature of law and 
the relationship between law and citizens generally, Dworkin’s theory explicitly assumes that 
citizens in applicable liberal democracies (i.e. such as Canada) have effectively “consented” to 
being governed by the laws of their respective countries. 10  However, in the context of 
Aboriginal-related issues in Canada, there are real and live questions about (a) the legitimacy of 
Crown sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples,11 and (b) the extent to which it may be said that 
Aboriginal peoples have effectively consented to existing power structures.12 And, of course, a 
(very much incomplete) constitutional reconciliation process inches along. 13  Such general 
limitation, however, does not pose a problem regarding the use of Dworkin’s thesis in the current 
project. Such fundamental constitutional questions are not taken up; rather, Dworkin’s thesis is 
used here only for discreet doctrinal analysis (i.e. conceptualizing the doctrinal frameworks that 
the Supreme Court of Canada is choosing to develop and employ in this area to regulate Crown 
                                                            
9 Cf Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26, 357 D.L.R. (4th) 236 at para 35: “despite the critical 
importance of the collective aspect of Aboriginal and treaty rights, rights may sometimes be assigned to or exercised 
by individual members of Aboriginal communities, and entitlements may sometimes be created in their favour. In a 
broad sense, it could be said that these rights might belong to them or that they have an individual aspect regardless 
of their collective nature.” On collective rights, see, generally, Dwight G. Newman, Community and Collective 
Rights: A Theoretical Framework for Rights Held by Groups (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
10 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) at 104-105. 
11 The Supreme Court has acknowledged as much by explicitly conceding that the nature of Crown sovereignty over 
Aboriginal lands and peoples in Canada is merely “de facto” in nature: Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 32.  
12 Walters has powerfully argued that Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada may not be imbedded with the reciprocal 
relationship of respect between the Canadian state and Aboriginal peoples required for that system to be more than a 
mere exercise of force or power, indeed for it to be meaningfully “legal” in nature. See Mark D. Walters, “The 
Morality of Crown/Aboriginal Law” (2006) 31 Queen’s L.J. 470. See, also, Jeremy Webber and Colin M. Macleod 
eds., Between Consenting Peoples: Political Community and the Meaning of Consent (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2011). 
13 The Supreme Court often refers to an over-arching constitutional reconciliation project, specifically noting that 
the main goal of this area of law is the ultimate reconciliation of “the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the 
sovereignty of the Crown”: Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193 
[Delgamuukw cited to D.L.R.] at para 186. For commentary on the nature of this reconciliation project, and the 
various, differing ways in which the Supreme Court has described it, see, e.g., Dwight G. Newman, “Reconciliation: 
Legal Conception(s) and Faces of Justice” in John D. Whyte ed., Moving Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and 
Aboriginal Justice, (Saskatoon: Purich, 2008); Mark D. Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: Aboriginal 
Rights in Canada” in Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir eds., The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Sonia Lawrence and Patrick Macklem, “From Consultation to 
Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights and the Crown’s Duty to Consult” (2000), 79 Can. B. Rev. 252.  
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misconduct in applicable Aboriginal contexts, separate and apart from any question regarding its 
authority to do so). 
Centrally, I advance the following contentions in this project: 
1) The modern honour of the Crown “core precept” – effectively germinated in Haida 
Nation – is, in jurisprudential form, a Dworkinian “abstract principle” meaning that it 
exerts “gravitational force” in adjudicative analyses (i.e. by grounding or helping to 
ground applicable obligations and rights) but does not by itself dictate specific results, 
which is to say that, practically, it is not a cause of action per se;  
2) Specific Crown obligations flowing from the honour of the Crown principle (e.g. the 
Haida Nation “duty to consult” and the Manitoba Metis Federation “duty to purposively 
and diligently discharge constitutional obligations”) are Dworkinian “concrete 
obligations” which operate, in rule form, to specify essential facts which, if established, 
mandate liability (i.e. in Crown dishonour), and which is to say they are, practically, 
causes of action per se; 
3) On the basis of early returns, 14  it appears that Haida Nation may well be 
Crown/Aboriginal Law’s equivalent to Donoghue v. Stevenson15 (which, of course, was 
the seminal Tort Law case). Both decisions, each exceedingly Dworkinian in nature, 
articulate an abstract principle intended to centrally organize an entire area of common 
law doctrine and to act as a fount of supporting concrete obligations; (a) in Tort Law, 
specific legal frameworks have gradually developed around concrete legal obligations 
(i.e. torts) that function to regulate against violations of the neighbour principle (the 
principle that we are to avoid injuring our neighbour), and (b) now in Crown/Aboriginal 
Law, specific legal frameworks are developing around concrete legal obligations (i.e. 
actionable Crown honour-based duties) that function to regulate against violations of the 
principle that the Crown is to avoid dishonouring Aboriginal and treaty rights holders; 
4) This new “essential legal framework” 16  for Crown/Aboriginal Law is set against a 
backdrop of, among other things, the central constitutional objective of reconciling pre-
                                                            
14 See, e.g., Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103,  326 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Little 
Salmon/Carmacks cited to S.C.R.] and, principally, Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5. 
15 Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] All E.R. Rep 1, [1932] A.C. 562. 
16 Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 14 at para 69 
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existing Aboriginal societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty. This oft-noted 
“reconciliation” mandate 17  takes the Dworkinian form of a (constitutional) “policy” 
objective (i.e. the central, implicit mandate in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 198218). 
According to Dworkin’s account, policy objectives are (a) typically inapplicable to a 
judge’s primary task (i.e. enforcing rights in specific factual circumstances) and (b) 
liemore within the jurisdiction of legislators, whose primary task is to work in support of 
broader community goals and community welfare. 
5) The Crown honour-based framework has eclipsed the doctrinal space previously 
occupied by the Supreme Court of Canada’s non-conventional fiduciary-based 
framework (i.e. its initial, now effectively discarded, central doctrinal construct), leaving 
only a vague, residual (off-shoot) specific fiduciary obligation, the doctrinal function and 
content of which are unclear; 
6) The Supreme Court of Canada’s sui generis Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine took 
the form of a classic Dworkinian mistake and, in recent decisions, the Court is 
undertaking a delicate project of mending a materially flawed doctrine, and even 
reorganizing and reaffirming previous precedent under a new legal principle (i.e. that the 
honour of the Crown must always be upheld); and 
7) Finally, in Manitoba Metis Federation, the significant, residual defects of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s non-conventional Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine are brought 
into particularly stark relief. The Supreme Court has effectively cornered itself, and the 
following conclusions about a future, residual role for fiduciary accountability in 
Aboriginal contexts in Canada appear irresistible:  
a. Despite the Supreme Court’s suggestion to the contrary in both Haida Nation and 
Manitoba Metis Federation, there is no meaningful, residual doctrinal role in 
Crown/Aboriginal Law for the Supreme Court’s (still non-conventional) off-shoot 
fiduciary duty, as conceived; and 
b. There is only residual doctrinal space – regarding Crown fiduciary accountability 
in Crown/Aboriginal contexts – for the independent operation of conventional 
                                                            
17 See supra note 13. 
18 The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11. 
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fiduciary doctrine (which is to say that Crown honour accountability now, 
effectively, covers the field in Crown/Aboriginal Law). 
In order to place my analysis into its proper historical and cross-cultural (constitutional) context, 
some initial background commentary is necessary. First, the Supreme Court of Canada has long-
acknowledged a history of constitutional injustice regarding the treatment of Aboriginal peoples 
generally since European settlers first arrived in what is now Canada. An apt example is a 
passage from the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Sparrow19 where, using the language of 
“honour,” it was stated that “there can be no doubt that over the years the rights of the Indians 
were often honoured in the breach” and that “we cannot recount with much pride the treatment 
accorded to the native people of this country.”20 
Prior to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 1973 in Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of 
British Columbia, 21  Aboriginal groups in Canada were not widely recognized as having 
independent, enforceable legal rights. The Crown in Canada, likewise, was generally not seen as 
owing enforceable legal obligations to Aboriginal groups and, therefore, there was no 
constitutional Crown liability doctrine to speak of in the Aboriginal context. 22  In Calder, 
however, the Supreme Court stated, in an explicit pronouncement of first instance, that 
Aboriginal peoples do possess independent legal rights.23 That key finding set in motion events 
that ultimately led to the enactment of section 35 of our Constitution Act, 1982 which 
“recognized and affirmed” the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights held by First Nation, Inuit, 
and Metis collectives in Canada.  
As it is a doctrinal axiom that rights have corresponding obligations,24  section 35 may be 
described as having enshrined constitutional Crown obligations owed to Aboriginal groups in 
                                                            
19 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Sparrow cited to S.C.R.]. 
20 Ibid at 1103. 
21 [1973] S.C.R. 313, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 1. 
22 See, e.g., St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1887), [1887] S.C.J. No. 3 (Q.L.), [1887] 13 
S.C.R. 577 at 649 [St. Catharines Milling cited to S.C.R.] (the Crown’s legal obligation towards Aboriginal lands 
and peoples is described as “a sacred legal obligation, in the execution of which the state must be free from judicial 
control.”); and St. Ann’s Island Shooting and Fishing Club Ltd. V. The King,  [1950] 2 D.L.R. 225, [1950] S.C.R. 
211 at 219 (Aboriginal peoples are defined here as “wards of the State, whose care and welfare are a political trust 
[i.e. non-enforceable] of the highest obligation.”). 
23 Calder, supra note 21. 
24 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Morality of Freedom (Chicago: Clarendon Press, 1988) at 167. 
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Canada just as much as it enshrined Aboriginal and treaty rights. The attendant common-law 
Crown liability doctrine, however, was slow to develop after the repatriation of the constitution 
in 1982.  A major reason for this was that there was substantial uncertainty as to the nature of the 
rights that were “recognized and affirmed” by section 35. The mechanism that was to provide the 
critical constitutional fleshing out of the nature of section 35 rights ultimately failed. That is, the 
oft-forgotten section 37 of the Constitution Act, 1982 called for a series of constitutional 
conferences, to take place between 1982 and 1987, wherein section 35 rights were to be 
fundamentally defined (it was easy enough to understand what was meant by “treaty rights” cited 
in section 35, but “Aboriginal rights” was a new term and, essentially, a new and undefined 
concept). Unfortunately, the various parties involved in those conferences could not find 
common ground, the process fatally broke down, and no further constitutional guidance or 
clarification was presented.25 As such, it fell to the judicial branch of government, most often the 
Supreme Court of Canada, to gradually develop legal frameworks for the definition and 
enforcement of Aboriginal and treaty rights, which they have done (and continue to do) through 
a series of key decisions.26   
That all said, as the doctrinal nature of section 35-guaranteed “Aboriginal and treaty rights” has 
been gradually developed by the courts since 1982, the underlying doctrinal nature of 
corresponding Crown obligations, likewise, has gradually taken some form. This latter project 
began with the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Guerin27 where a non-conventional form of 
Crown fiduciary accountability was first described in an Aboriginal context. Later decisions, 
prominently Sparrow and Delgamuukw, further developed a “general guiding principle” for 
                                                            
25 For commentary on aspects of this important period in Canadian history, see generally: James Youngblood 
Henderson, First Nations Jurisprudence and Aboriginal Rights: Defining the Just Society (Saskatoon: University of 
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2006) [“First Nations Jurisprudence”] at 25-44. See, also, Ochapowace Ski 
Resort Inc., supra note 25at para 64 [Ochapowace Ski Resort cited to C.N.L.R.]:    
The conferences ended in failure. The provinces were not prepared to endorse a broad undefined right as 
the First Ministers wanted a definition of self government and other aboriginal rights. Their view was that 
the rights box is presently empty, and enquired what was to be put into it? This became known as the 
“empty box” theory. The Indian representatives pushed for a “full box” theory, which is that the self 
government box already contains all necessary rights and only needs recognition.  
For commentary on this “ box” metaphor, see infra note 161. 
26 Including: Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 390 [Simon]; R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R.,  70 
D.L.R. (4th) 427 1025; Sparrow, supra note 19; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507,  137 D.L.R. (4th) 289 [Van 
der Peet cited to S.C.R.]; Delgamuukw, supra note 13; R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, 255 
D.L.R. (4th) 1; R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686, 274 D.L.R. (4th) 75. 
27 Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [Guerin cited to D.L.R.]. 
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Crown/Aboriginal Law mandating that the Crown was always to act in “a fiduciary capacity” in 
their relationships with Aboriginal and treaty-rights holders28 (which, for the Crown in this 
context, came to effectively mean acting fairly and honourably in their dealings with Aboriginal 
peoples).29 Specific fiduciary duties owed by the Crown to Aboriginal peoples were defined in 
context, and understood as flowing from this general guiding principle.  
The doctrinal fundamentals of this non-conventional fiduciary-based construct (i.e. developed as 
the core construct for Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada) slowly began to mutate into various, 
conflicting forms through a serious of doctrinally inconsistent Supreme Court pronouncements in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. 30  Moreover, as conventional fiduciary doctrine operates 
predominantly (if not exclusively) to strictly prohibit conflicts of interest, its application in 
Crown/Aboriginal contexts had to be stretched well beyond its conventional boundaries (i.e. 
since the Crown would so often find itself in inherent conflicts of interest; its essential role 
typically involving the balancing and reconciling of interests).31 It was often acknowledged 
(explicitly or implicitly) that this non-conventional form of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary 
accountability would need to be able to “tolerate conflicts of interest”32 (i.e. tolerate the very 
mischief that a conventional fiduciary obligation functions to prohibit).   
In its decision in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 33  the Supreme Court effectively 
commenced a project of, as noted above, mending a materially-flawed doctrine. In Wewaykum, 
Justice Binnie was at pains to elucidate the doctrinal consequences of the fact that the Crown 
                                                            
28 Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1108: “In our opinion, Guerin, together with R. v. Taylor and Williams … ground a 
general guiding principle for s.35(1). That is, the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity 
with respect to aboriginal peoples.” 
29 See, e.g., Delgamuukw, supra note 13 at para 190 per La Forest J. in the minority decision he wrote (“the Crown 
is subject to a fiduciary obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly”) and Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 
2001 SCC 33 [Mitchell cited to S.C.R.] at para 9 (“an obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably, 
and to protect them from exploitation, a duty characterized as ‘fiduciary’”). 
30 See infra notes 395-406 and surrounding text.  
31  For instance, in a recent Supreme Court of Canada case where a group of elder care-home residents 
unsuccessfully claimed that the Alberta Crown was in breach of fiduciary accountability owed to them to act in their 
best interests, Chief Justice McLachlin noted as follows: “Compelling a fiduciary to put the interests of the 
beneficiary before their own is … essential to the [fiduciary] relationship. Imposing such a burden on the Crown is 
inherently at odds with its duty to act in the best interests of society as a whole…”: Alberta v Elder Advocates of 
Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261 at para 44 [Elder Advocates cited to S.C.R.]. 
32 Squamish Indian Band v. Canada (2000), 2001 FCT 480, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1568 (Q.L.) (F.C.T.D.) at para 473 
[Squamish Indian Band]. 
33 Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245, 220 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Wewaykum cited to S.C.R.]. 
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“can be no ordinary fiduciary” in light of the “many hats” it typically wears.34 He stressed that 
not all obligations owed in a fiduciary relationship are themselves fiduciary in nature. 35 
However, in the absence of a replacement principle on which to found concrete obligations in 
Aboriginal contexts, he continued to define the nature of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary 
accountability in that case in a distinctly non-conventional manner, indeed in effectively the 
same generalised manner it had been applied in previous decisions.36 
In 2004, and prior to the release of the Supreme Court’s decision in Haida Nation, Professor 
Robert Flannigan (a leading commentator on conventional fiduciary theory) delivered a searing 
critique of the Supreme Court’s (mis) use of fiduciary doctrine in the Aboriginal context, arguing 
it was demonstrably, fundamentally based on a “conceptual error,” that the Court’s 
Crown/Aboriginal doctrine essentially involved “a fiduciary analysis in name only,” and that this 
non-conventional approach had the (presumably unintended) consequences of “contaminating” 
the conventional doctrine.37 
In Haida Nation, Chief Justice McLachlin installed a replacement principle to constitute the core 
of Crown/Aboriginal Law – the legal principle that the honour of the Crown must always be 
upheld in dealings with the holders of Aboriginal and treaty rights – and she directed that 
applicable concrete Crown obligations are to be sourced directly to that principle, and not to an 
over-arching, non-conventional fiduciary principle. In so doing, she effectively discarded (or, to 
use the applicable Dworkinian term, “disqualified”) the non-conventional fiduciary-based 
principle that had come before it, though this fact was not acknowledged in her decision (nor has 
it been subsequently38). 
Ultimately, then, the current project aims to bring badly-needed conceptual clarity to this 
important area of constitutional law, the fundamentals of which seem to prove perpetually 
“elusive” to lower court judges.39 Whether the installation of the honour of the Crown principle 
                                                            
34 Ibid at para 96 
35 Ibid at paras 83 and 92. 
36 Ibid at paras 98-104.  
37 Robert Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability” (2004) 83 Can. B. Rev. 35 at 63, 65, 67. 
38 See, however, Justice Deschamps’ note in her minority decision in Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 14 at para 
105, that the honour of the Crown principle has “over time” been “substituted” in for the Crown’s fiduciary duty. 
39  For instance, in a post-Haida Nation decision, Kwakiutl Nation v. Canada (Attorney General) (2006), 152 
A.C.W.S. (3d) 552 at para 26, 2006 BCSC 1368,  Satanove J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court states as 
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and the jettisoning of non-conventional Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine will effectively 
advance or retard the over-arching Crown/Aboriginal “reconciliation” project is not the focus.40 
Rather, the central objective here is to conceptually unpack and clarify unclear (and 
demonstrably dysfunctional) doctrine. I would stress, however, that the honour of the Crown as 
an effectively original legal principle brings with it neither the doctrinal baggage nor restrictions 
that came with the imported fiduciary concepts41 and, at least on that basis, there is reason for 
optimism.  
It should also be noted that there is some potential disadvantage, if one takes the viewpoint of the 
class of potential Aboriginal litigants, in releasing sui generis fiduciary concepts from the core of 
Crown/Aboriginal Law. That is, remedies for breaches of fiduciary obligations are the most 
powerful known to law.42 Without getting granular (as to do so would be beyond the scope of 
this project, which is essentially confined to applicable liability dynamics in Crown/Aboriginal 
Law), remedial precepts that attend a fiduciary breach, based in equity, are both restitutionary 
and punitive. A beneficiary need not prove damages (i.e. the applicable remedy can be gain-
based as opposed to damages-based) and windfalls to a beneficiary are permissible because 
furtherance of the “overriding deterrence objective” takes priority.43  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
follows: “It must be recognized that just as aboriginal rights are sui generis, aboriginal rights litigation is also 
unique. It involves hundreds of years of history and sometimes unconventional techniques of fact finding. It 
involves lofty, often elusive concepts of law such as the fiduciary duty and honour of the Crown.” (emphasis added). 
See, also, Callihoo v Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2006 ABQB 1, [2006] 6 
W.W.R. 660 at para 77 where Hillier J. effectively laments and resists the honour of the Crown-based legal 
framework: “the Plaintiffs’ use of terminology such as “honour of the Crown” neither creates nor enhances an 
arguable case on this point. That doctrine, if it is one, cannot modify or reverse the rights freely exercised by — as 
distinct from denied to — band members under the Indian Act.” 
40 Note, however, that on this question, one leading commentator expressed initial skepticism; having remarked 
shortly after the Haida Nation decision was released that the honour of the Crown principle will constitute a less 
than “full surrogate” for a plenary fiduciary principle. See Gordon Christie, “Developing Case Law: The Future of 
Consultation and Accommodation” (2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 139 at (Q.L.) para 61. Christie appears to interpret 
Haida Nation as potentially mandating a ‘softening’ of the standard of Crown conduct mandated by the honour of 
the Crown principle as compared to that ostensibly flowing from a fiduciary principle.  
41 This fact was recently acknowledged by Deschamps J. in her minority opinion in Little Salmon/Carmacks at para 
105:  “This Court has, over time, substituted the principle of the honour of the Crown for a concept — the fiduciary 
duty — that, in addition to being limited to certain types of relations that did not always concern the constitutional 
rights of Aboriginal peoples, had paternalistic overtones.” 
42 See infra note 280 and surrounding text. 
43 Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 142, 167 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at para 30 [Cadbury cited 
to S.C.R.] citing M. (K.) v M.(H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6, 96 D.L.R. (4th) 289 per McLachlin J (as she then was). 
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To the extent it is appropriate to utilize these types of remedial dynamics in Crown/Aboriginal 
Law (and I would certainly posit that in many different scenarios it is44), such a construct could 
surely be developed, in sui generis fashion, without maintaining non-conventional fiduciary-
based liability concepts within the core of Crown/Aboriginal Law. And in any event, it is of 
course doctrinally inappropriate to pervert doctrinal liability dynamics for the sole purpose of 
taking advantage of more generous remedial dynamics. 
The current project is structured around two chapters. In Chapter Two, I undertake a substantial 
theoretical examination of the modern honour of the Crown principle (i.e. the prevailing 
foundation of Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada). In Chapter Three, and against the backdrop of 
the conceptual parameters for Crown honour accountability first set out in Chapter Two, I 
investigate towards conceptual parameters for the residual role of fiduciary concepts in the 
regulation of applicable Crown/Aboriginal relationships. 
In Chapter Two, more specifically, I begin by taking an inventory of the various (limited) 
instances where the honour of the Crown concept was utilized by judges prior to Haida Nation. 
As is demonstrated, it was primarily used historically as a principle of interpretation in both 
statute and treaty contexts; in both types of scenarios, it was employed to, essentially, protect 
against interpretations that would ignoble the Crown.  
In the second part of Chapter Two, I examine the Haida Nation litigation in significant detail in 
light of its transformative significance for Crown liability doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal Law. As 
will be shown, Chief Justice McLachlin’s judgment in that case is exceedingly Dworkinian in 
nature; she searches the Crown/Aboriginal “novel” to date, locates a moral principle evidently 
underlying this complex area of constitutional law (i.e. the honour of the Crown principle which 
mandates, in accordance with her interpretation, that the Crown is legally bound to honourable 
dealings generally with Aboriginal and treaty rights-holders) and ultimately interprets that moral 
principle to be legal in nature, and to effectively be the fount of positive, enforceable Crown 
obligations in this context.  
                                                            
44 In Guerin, supra note 27 at 356-363, for instance, the Supreme Court was clearly of the view that the facts of the 
case compelled an equity-based remedy, with more flexibility than would have been possible without recourse to 
equitable or sui generis remedial dynamics.   
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I then go on to place the following, various components of the core legal framework articulated 
in Haida Nation into applicable Dworkinian context (some of which are noted above, where I set 
out the central contentions of this project): 
 The reconciliation mandate is the central policy objective of section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, to be effected largely by the legislative branch of government;  
 The honour of the Crown concept is the central, organizing “abstract principle” for 
Crown/Aboriginal Law which mandates against applicable Crown dishonour, and which 
(a) is to be enforced largely by the judicial branch of government, and (b) serves to 
protect and facilitate the (legislative) reconciliation mandate;  
 Concrete Crown obligations are sourced from, and operate in support of, the honour of 
the Crown principle; and 
 Enforceable rights to judicial relief flow to applicable Aboriginal communities when one 
of these Crown obligations is breached (which rights are of a different doctrinal varietal 
from the applicable, underlying section 35 rights45). 
In the final part of Chapter Two, I provide an overview of the various ways in which the 
Supreme Court has further developed the doctrinal fundamentals of its new, Crown honour-
based “essential legal framework”46  post Haida Nation. The main theme in the subsequent 
jurisprudence is confirmation of Crown honour accountability as now constituting the doctrinal 
“core” or “anchor” of Crown/Aboriginal Law, having been effectively “substituted” in for the 
(non-conventional) Crown fiduciary accountability-based framework that came before it. The 
most significant and substantial commentary by the Supreme Court, post Haida Nation, 
                                                            
45 Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 14 at para 44: 
The respondents’ submission, if I may put it broadly, is that because the duty to consult is “constitutional”, 
therefore there must be a reciprocal constitutional right of the First Nation to be consulted, and 
constitutional rights of Aboriginal peoples are not subject to abrogation or derogation except as can be 
justified under the high test set out in Sparrow … The trouble with this argument is that the content of the 
duty to consult varies with the circumstances. In relation to what Haida Nation called a “spectrum” of 
consultation (para 43), it cannot be said that consultation at the lower end of the spectrum instead of at the 
higher end must be justified under the Sparrow doctrine. The minimal content of the consultation imposed 
in Mikisew Cree (para 64), for example, did not have to be “justified” as a limitation on what would 
otherwise be a right to “deep” consultation. The circumstances in Mikisew Cree never gave rise to anything 
more than minimal consultation. The concept of the duty to consult is a valuable adjunct to the honour of 
the Crown, but it plays a supporting role, and should not be viewed independently from its purpose. 
Cf Mikisew, supra note 4 at para 57: “Treaty 8 … gives rise to Mikisew procedural rights (e.g. consultation) as well 
as substantive rights (e.g. hunting, fishing and trapping rights).”  
46 Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 14 at para 69. 
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regarding the fundamentals of this new framework comes in their recent Manitoba Metis 
Federation decision. I will examine that decision in some detail, specifically conceptualizing the 
new Crown honour-based duty that the Supreme Court recognized and enforced therein (i.e. the 
Crown duty to bring a demonstrably purposive and diligent approach to the discharge of 
applicable constitutional obligations owed to Aboriginal peoples). 
In Chapter Three, and in my attempt to conceptualize the doctrinal role that fiduciary doctrine 
has played in Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada and the role we may expect it to play moving 
forward, I start with a detailed examination of conventional fiduciary doctrine, undertaken for 
the specific purpose of ultimately conceptualizing both (a) where the Supreme Court went wrong 
in its attempts to utilize fiduciary concepts as part of the core of Crown/Aboriginal Law, and (b) 
the residual doctrinal space for the regulation of fiduciary accountability in Crown/Aboriginal 
contexts post Haida Nation.47  
Put plainly, the Supreme Court of Canada’s non-conventional Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary 
doctrine developed in a conceptual vacuum. Inexplicably, no judicial authority was cited in 
either of the two seminal decisions (i.e. Guerin and Sparrow) in support of importing fiduciary 
concepts into the doctrinal core of Crown/Aboriginal Law.48 Likewise, academic commentators 
in this area have largely avoided recourse to conventional fiduciary theory in their attempts to 
elucidate Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine, 49  even implicitly cautioning against such 
                                                            
47 The work of Professor Leonard Ian Rotman is particularly notable here, as he is seemingly the one theorist who 
has examined in substantial detail the conceptual nature of conventional fiduciary theory while commenting on the 
Supreme Court’s novel approach to fiduciary doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal Law. See, e.g., Parallel Paths: 
Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). 
Rotman’s work in this area is examined in detail in Chapter Three.   
48 Rather, they cited only one academic article, specifically: Ernest J. Weinrib, “The Fiduciary Obligation” (1975) 
25 U.T.L.J. 1. It has been argued elsewhere that Dickson J. actually misinterpreted Weinrib’s article in Guerin: see 
Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 63. In Guerin, Dickson J. did cite two 
lower court decisions in support one discreet principle related to fiduciary doctrine, but none in support of its main 
doctrinal fundamentals as he interpreted them therein. See, Guerin, supra note 27 at 384-385. 
49 See, e.g., the following instances of commentary from Crown/Aboriginal Law specialists on the nature of the 
Supreme Court’s Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine: Rotman, Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-
Native Relationship in Canada, supra note 47; Brian Slattery, “First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of 
Trust” (1992) 71 Can B Rev 261; the various chapters in In Whom We Trust: A Forum on Fiduciary Relationships 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), particularly at 81-113 and 269-293; R.H. Bartlett, “The Fiduciary Obligation of the 
Crown to the Indians” (1989), 53 Sask. L. Rev. 301; W.R. McMurtry and A. Pratt, “Indians and the Fiduciary 
Concept, Self-Government and the Constitution; Guerin in Perspective, (1986) 3 C.N.L.R. 19; James Reynolds, 
“The Spectre of Spectra: The Evolution of the Crown’s Fiduciary Obligation to Aboriginal Peoples Since 
Delgamuukw” in Maria Morellato, QC, ed., Crown/Aboriginal Law Since Delgamuukw (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 
2009); Kent McNeil, “The Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations in the Era of Aboriginal Self-Government” (2009) 88 Can 
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endeavour. To this end, I note Professor Brian Slattery’s caution that recourse to general 
fiduciary law principles is “not always helpful” in this context50 and Professor James [Sakej] 
Youngblood Henderson’s similar caution that Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine “should not 
be confused with common law doctrines of fiduciary duties.”51   
There are at least two possible reasons for the fact that both the Supreme Court and applicable 
commentators have avoided recourse to the conventional doctrinal fundamentals of fiduciary law 
when addressing Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary accountability. The first is that the fundamentals of 
fiduciary law were unresolved when the Supreme Court sought to import them into 
Crown/Aboriginal Law. This argument has been made elsewhere.52 Certainly, there were some 
conflicting pronouncements at the highest levels in fiduciary law in Canada pre-Guerin, as will 
be demonstrated in Chapter Three. The second and arguably more significant reason is that our 
“constitutional morality” (a Dworkinian term elaborated upon below53) post-1982 was such that 
there was a generally-observed need for the development of a legal framework for Crown 
liability doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal Law that would strictly and bluntly restrain the Crown’s 
discretionary powers in instances where Aboriginal or treaty rights infringements were 
threatened. Ostensibly, aspects of fiduciary theory fit the bill.  
Regarding Slattery and Henderson’s cautions against conventional fiduciary doctrinal analyses in 
the Crown/Aboriginal context (i.e. something I have chosen to do here), my contention is that 
they were likely predicated on what is now arguably an anachronistic concern. That is, prior to 
Haida Nation, Crown liability doctrine was lacking an explicit legal principle to ground the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Bar Rev 1; and J. Timothy S. McCabe, The Honour of the Crown and its Fiduciary Duties to Aboriginal Peoples 
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2008). Where these commentators make reference to conventional fiduciary 
doctrine in this context, it is notably perfunctory and disproportionately limited to references to the decisions of 
Justice La Forest (who, as is demonstrated in Chapter Three, see infra note 314 and surrounding text, effectively 
sought to fundamentally reconceive conventional fiduciary doctrine based on the non-conventional manner in which 
it was conceived in the Crown/Aboriginal context); such commentary typically (and mistakenly) assumes the 
fundamental content of a conventional fiduciary duty is a mandate to act in the best interest of another.   
50 Slattery, “First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust,” ibid at 275. 
51 James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, I.P.C., Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada, (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2007) at 897. See, also, James Sakej Youngblood Henderson, “Commentary” in In Whom We Trust: A 
Forum on Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 49 at 90: “The sui generis framework and the fiduciary obligations it 
imposes on the Crown are different from the common law standards of fiduciary obligations in public and private 
law. Little understanding of the Crown-Aboriginal relationship can be made by reference to standard legal books of 
trust or fiduciary relationship.” 
52  See, e.g., Mark L. Stevenson and Albert Peeling, “Probing the Parameters of Canada’s Crown-Aboriginal 
Fiduciary Relationship” in In Whom We Trust: A Forum on Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 49 at 22. 
53 See infra note 99 and surrounding text. 
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requisite Crown obligations corresponding Aboriginal and treaty rights, bind the Crown to a high 
standard of moral dealing, and operate to generally conceptualize and organize doctrine in this 
area. And (again) it was primarily to this end, and to fill this gap, that the Supreme Court 
configured its non-conventional fiduciary-based construct. However, as has been shown, the 
Supreme Court has now instituted its (re-oriented) honour of the Crown principle in this “core” 
doctrinal position previously inhabited by their non-conventional fiduciary construct. 
Moreover, in my analysis of the Supreme Court’s conventional fiduciary law, then, I specifically 
examine three incidents of the doctrine: (1) the function of fiduciary law; (2) the general content 
of fiduciary accountability (specifically, the nature of fiduciary obligations and fiduciary 
breaches); and (3) the specific trust-based contexts in which fiduciary accountability arises.   
Generally speaking, in conventional fiduciary law, doctrinal frameworks develop in the context 
of each applicable relationship category at issue (e.g. agent-principal, director-shareholder, 
doctor-patient). However, the doctrinal fundamentals are static and not mutating; their 
application differs depending on context. Specifically, and although there are a host of rhetorical 
meanderings in the jurisprudence, the implicit function of conventional fiduciary law, as will be 
shown, is the protection of beneficiary interests in trust-like contexts against the singular 
mischief of self-interested conduct by their fiduciary.  
Furthermore, the content of a conventional fiduciary obligation typically involves a strict and 
absolute prohibition against putting one’s own interests in conflict with those applicable, 
entrusted interests of a beneficiary. While the Supreme Court diverted its doctrine away from 
this strict prohibition where they, temporarily, adopted the non-conventional approach to 
fiduciary doctrine, developed in Crown/Aboriginal Law, they have now returned to, or are near a 
full return to, the strict prohibition against self-dealing as constituting the entirety of the content 
of fiduciary accountability. 
Regarding the trust-like contexts that give rise to fiduciary accountability, the Supreme Court has 
recently adopted an essentialist test (i.e. one where essential pre-conditions are necessary for 
fiduciary accountability to arise). Effectively, fiduciary accountability in Canada now arises 
where one undertakes to act exclusively in regard to critical interests of another (i.e. a person or 
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class of persons), having assumed or been assigned a specific discretionary power in relation to 
the management of those interests such that there is attendant vulnerability in the arrangement.54 
In order to understand the distinction between the conventional approach to fiduciary doctrine 
and the non-conventional approach incubated in Guerin and Sparrow (aspects of which, as 
noted, were then adopted as part of the conventional doctrine for a period of time), I devise some 
terminology for conceptual assistance, again using Dworkinian theory. When referring to the 
dynamics of this non-conventional approach, commentators often speak in terms of it having 
constituted an “expansive” approach to fiduciary doctrine; as having expanded the conventional 
doctrinal boundaries.55 In my view, the fundamental distinction between the two approaches is 
actually not one of degree (i.e. of just how much the boundaries expand) but is, rather, one of 
jurisprudential form. That is, the conventional approach is a rule-based construct while the non-
conventional approach is a principle-based construct. More specifically, the conventional 
approach is organized around a fiduciary obligation in rule form (i.e. a singular rule against self-
interested conduct in applicable scenarios) and the non-conventional approach is organized 
around a fiduciary obligation in principle form (i.e. the principle that a “fiduciary” is to generally 
act honestly, fairly, and honourably in applicable scenarios, which principle can then give rise to 
a wide range of specific rule-based obligations, tailored to context and of potentially limitless 
form).  
Prior to Guerin, conventional fiduciary doctrine was a rule-based construct.56 Subsequent to 
Guerin, it became a demonstrably confused blend of the rule-based and principle-based 
constructs (i.e. of the conventional and the non-conventional approaches to fiduciary doctrine). 
Professor Leonard Rotman, whose doctoral thesis presented a comprehensive normative 
                                                            
54 The most recent articulation by the Supreme Court of the prevailing test is in Elder Advocates, supra note 31 at 
para 36. 
55 See e.g., Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 36: “The divergent judicial 
views [on the nature of fiduciary doctrine] move in both directions, potentially contracting or expanding the 
traditional boundaries.”   
56 See, generally, Midcon Oil & Gas Ltd. v. New British Dominion Oil Co., [1958] S.C.R. 314, 12 D.L.R. (2d) 705 
[Midcon cited to S.C.R.]; Peso Silver Mines Ltd. v. Cropper, [1966] S.C.R. 673, 58 D.L.R. (2d) 1 [Peso Silver Mines 
cited to S.C.R.]; Hawrelak v. City of Edmonton, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 387, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 45 [Hawrelak]. As noted in 
Robert Flannigan, “Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada” 36 Advocates Q. 431 at 447: “Guerin is widely 
recognized as the decision that signaled the Canadian departure from conventional accountability, and the 
subsequent struggle to articulate boundaries.” 
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statement on Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine, 57  embraced the “wonderfully enigmatic” 
nature of fiduciary theory, and became a leading proponent of the full-dress adoption of a 
principle-based construct for conventional fiduciary law. 58  According to his account, 
conventional fiduciary theory is effectively capable of recognizing and maintaining a central, 
overarching fiduciary principle and applicable off-shoot fiduciary rules.59 
However, and as will be shown, the Supreme Court seems to have given up on this 
“experiment,” this doctrinal journey into a new paradigm for fiduciary law. That is, again, the 
conventional rule-based construct has now been largely resurrected in Canada in a recent line of 
Supreme Court decisions.60 And the effect of these decisions appears to be that the principle-
based construct, which was a Canadian invention (subsequently rejected and explicitly maligned 
elsewhere as devoid of practical utility and doctrinally unsound61), has arguably been effectively 
released from the Canadian jurisprudence.   
Materially for present purposes, the notion that it is a fiduciary obligation to act in the “best 
interests” of another (this is, of course, how the content of fiduciary accountability was, and still 
is, described in the Crown/Aboriginal cases) has now been rejected by the Supreme Court in, 
effectively, all but the Crown/Aboriginal context.62 An undertaking to act in the “best interests” 
of another is now actually one of the three main pre-conditions in the Supreme Court’s current 
governing framework required for conventional fiduciary accountability to arise.63  
Strangely, however, in the recent Manitoba Metis Federation case, the majority decision of the 
Supreme Court held that a Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary obligation could arise in either this 
                                                            
57 “Solemn Commitments: Fiduciary Obligations, Treaty Relationships and the Foundational Principles of Crown-
Native Relations in Canada“ (1998) S.J.D. Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of Law. Also, he based this book 
off of his thesis: Rotman, Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada, supra 
note 47. 
58 See, generally, Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005). 
59 See infra note 388 and surrounding text. 
60 See K.L.B. v. British Columbia, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 403, 2003 SCC 5 [KLB cited to S.C.R.]; Galambos v. Perez, 2009 
SCC 48, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 247 [Galambos cited to S.C.R.]; Elder Advocates, supra note 31. 
61 See infra notes 258 and 291 and the text surrounding each. 
62 See, e.g., KLB, supra note 59 at para 45-46 where an alleged fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of another 
was rejected as lacking practical utility, and as failing to provide a “workable (legal or justiciable) standard by which 
to regulate conduct,” and as mandating a doctrinally inappropriate type of result-based analysis. Also, the 
undertaking to act exclusively in one’s best interest is now a fundamental pre-condition to fiduciary accountability 
arising in Canada: see, e.g., Elder Advocates, supra note 31 at para 36; the implication being that such an 
undertaking is not also the consequent fiduciary obligation itself. 
63 See, e.g., ibid. 
18 
 
conventional manner – the first time that the Court directly applied conventional fiduciary 
doctrine per se in a Crown/Aboriginal context – or in accordance with the (still sui generis) test 
articulated in Haida Nation (i.e. that a Crown fiduciary obligation to act in the “best interests” of 
an Aboriginal community could arise in applicable scenarios). 64  
Here we start to see just how confused Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary jurisprudence remains. Its 
fundamentals are doctrinally unsound and incongruent. In one of the two ways in which 
fiduciary accountability may now arise in the Crown/Aboriginal context (i.e. the conventional 
and the non-conventional), a Crown undertaking to act in the “best interests” of an applicable 
Aboriginal community is a precondition to there being a fiduciary obligation owed; in the other, 
acting in the “best interests” of the Aboriginal community is the potential fiduciary obligation 
itself. These circular doctrinal dynamics are further detailed and unpackaged in Chapter Three. 
As I do with my analysis of conventional fiduciary doctrine, I examine the Supreme Court’s non-
conventional Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine by addressing its three primary incidents: (1) 
its function, (2) its content, and (3) the contexts in which it arises. Generally, I conclude that its 
function is entirely unclear, the honour of the Crown principle having usurped the doctrinal 
function it previously served (i.e. regulating the mischief of Crown dishonour in Aboriginal 
contexts). It is difficult to conceptualize, that is, a meaningful functional distinction between a 
duty to act honourably towards another and a duty to act with reference to another’s best interest; 
and Supreme Court clarification is required here. 
In terms of the specific content of the non-conventional Haida Nation-framed Crown/Aboriginal 
fiduciary obligation, it is explicitly a positive obligation which, once triggered, mandates the 
Crown to act “with reference to the best interests” of an applicable Aboriginal community. I 
posit three possible ways in which to interpret this mandate, drawing from both conventional and 
non-conventional (i.e. Crown/Aboriginal) jurisprudence, and conclude ultimately that the 
Supreme Court likely intended this mandate to be read as a rule that the Crown must act 
exclusively in the best interests of an Aboriginal community (or communities) in applicable 
scenarios. 
                                                            
64 Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5 at paras 46-50.   
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As for the contexts in which this rule is intended to apply, I note that the current, applicable test 
is as follows: non-conventional Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary accountability will arise when the 
Crown assumes a sufficient amount of discretion over sufficiently-specific Aboriginal interests. 
The interest in question must be “cognizable” and the Crown’s assumption of discretion over that 
interest must be such that it “invokes responsibility in the nature of a private law duty.”65 I 
examine the various components of this test in turn. 
In the final part of Chapter Three: (a) I frame the Supreme Court’s (past and present) approach to 
fiduciary doctrine in the Crown/Aboriginal context as a classic Dworkinian mistake, both in its 
demonstrable misconception of conventional doctrine and in the way it arguably reinforces 
existing Crown/Aboriginal sovereignty imbalance, and (b) I articulate a conceptual synthesis of 
the narrow sphere of doctrinal space evidently remaining for the regulation of fiduciary 
accountability in Crown/Aboriginal contexts moving forward; that of a singular, conventional 
rule against a particularized type of mischief – self-interested conduct – unlikely to arise often 
(e.g. when a Crown agent translates his access to Aboriginal interests to personal gain). 
Before moving on to Chapter Two, I conclude this introductory chapter by setting out, below, an 
extensive working summary of Dworkin’s rights thesis, components of which are then picked up 
in various places throughout my analysis. 
Working Summary of Dworkin’s Right’s Thesis 
 
Ronald Dworkin’s “rights thesis” as initially set out in Taking Rights Seriously66 and further 
developed in subsequent works, principally Law’s Empire, 67  espoused a fundamental 
paradigmatic shift, in relation to the manner in which we conceptualize the nature of the 
adjudicative task, away from one primarily focussed on rule application (the applicable legal 
positivism paradigm) towards one primarily focussed on rights determination. This central 
aspect of the rights thesis has had a profound and enduring influence on how contemporary 
jurisprudential theorists conceptualize adjudication.  
                                                            
65 Wewaykum, supra note 33 at para 85. 
66 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 10. 
67 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986). 
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More specifically, the rights thesis advocates abandoning the positivistic notion that what judges 
do in adjudication of hard cases (those where no clear, governing rule applies) is exercise 
discretion. As his alternative, Dworkin proposes that “even when no settled rule disposes of the 
case, one party may nevertheless have a right to win,” and that “[i]t remains the judge’s duty, 
even in hard cases, to discover what the rights of the parties are, not to invent new rights 
retrospectively.”68 He conceptualizes rights determination in these types of “hard cases” as a 
process of creative (or constructive), but meaningfully constrained interpretation.  
To explain his phenomenon of creative, constrained interpretation, Dworkin invents a 
hypothetical judge, Hercules, and endows him with “superhuman skill, learning, patience and 
acumen.”69  He then constructs the notion of a legal “chain novel” of sorts that a judge is to pick 
up mid-novel and draft as his contribution (the adjudicative task) the next best chapter, “teasing 
out the various dimensions of value” in the earlier chapters of the novel.70  The notion is that a 
“group of novelists” (judges) are all participants in this process, each vowing to write their 
chapter with complete deference to the key structural and thematic tenets of the novel to date.  
Dworkin insists that there both is and ought to be “articulate consistency” in the unfolding 
narrative (indeed, in the law itself).71 
In relation to the facts of a particular case, the novelist (judge) is to consider all possible 
interpretations of what could count (in terms of enforcing or denying a claimed right) as the next 
best chapter in the novel. It is said that an “eligible interpretation” must “fit” with the earlier 
chapters (precedents), in the sense that they must count as continuing the novel and not 
“beginning anew.”72 In order to conceptualize whether or not a given interpretation may be 
eligible, he “must take up some view about the novel in progress, some working theory about its 
characters, plot, genre, theme, and point”73 (a general political theory in relation to the rights 
claimed, the institutional character of the political community in which these rights are enjoyed, 
and the prevailing morality of the community).  
                                                            
68 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 10 at 81. 
69 Ibid at 105. 
70 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 66 at 228. 
71 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 10 at 88. 
72 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 66 at 230. 
73 Ibid. 
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Where more than one “eligible interpretation” is available, the judge is to then have recourse to 
“substantive aesthetic judgments, about the importance or insight or realism or beauty of 
different ideas the novel might be taken to express.” 74  The superior interpretation among 
eligibles (i.e. the “right answer”) will be that which has the highest degree of “substantive 
appeal” not to the adjudicator but to the novel as a whole,75 all things considered. Dworkin 
describes adjudication as a process of “hunting” for that “best interpretation.”76 And ultimately, 
this interpretation will for Dworkin be the “right answer” in a particular case. 77  Indeed, 
conceptualized in this manner, there is for Dworkin one right answer to any given legal issue.  
A key element of this phenomenon is that all the characters in the chain novel (or citizens in the 
community) have consented to be governed by the chapters of its authors (or judges), by the 
unfolding narrative of the applicable chain novel.  For conceptual purposes, Dworkin analogizes 
legal adjudication to the resolving of disputes by a referee in a chess game: 
The hard case puts, we might say, a question of political theory.  It asks what it is 
fair to suppose that the players have done in consenting … The concept of a 
game’s character is a conceptual device for framing that question. It is a contested 
concept that internalizes the general justification of the institution so as to make it 
available for discriminations within the institution itself.  It supposes that a player 
consents not simply to a set of rules, but to an enterprise that may be said to have 
a character of its own; so that when the question is put – To what did he consent 
in consenting to that? – the answer may study the enterprise as a whole and not 
just the rules.78 
                                                            
74 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 66 at 231. 
75 See, e.g., ibid. at 126: “Hercules’ theory of adjudication at no point provides for any choice between his own 
political convictions and those he takes to be the political convictions of the community at large.  On the contrary, 
his theory identifies a particular conception of community morality as decisive of legal issues…” 
76 Law’s Empire, supra note 66 at viii-ix. 
77 See, e.g., ibid at 280. 
78 Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 10 at 104-105. 
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Dworkin concedes that this portrayal of the adjudicative process is a “fanciful reconstruction of a 
calculation that will never take place”79 and that real judges are not Herculean. So what he 
presents is an ideal that adjudicators perpetually work towards, but never reach.   
He notes that many previous chapters in the unfolding novel will not be valid or compelling; 
some will contradict others, and some will be outright mistakes. He says, for instance, that a 
judicial decision is a mistake if it “leaves unexplained some major structural aspect of the text, a 
subplot treated as having great dramatic importance or a dominant and repeated metaphor.”80 
And he states that mistakes are inherently “disqualified.”81 
Moreover, Dworkin provides that the “gravitational force” of a precedent will vacillate with the 
moral convictions of the community, 82  that their force depends on their “sense of 
appropriateness” being sustained as part of the prevailing community morality. If this “sense of 
appropriateness” erodes significantly with respect to a given precedent, Dworkin notes that it 
will “no longer play much of a role in new cases.”83 
Further, in order to meaningfully intersect Dworkin’s vision of the adjudicative function with the 
applicable fundamentals of Crown liability doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal Law, it is important to 
have a general familiarity with some of his specific terminology, namely the specific meaning of 
and distinction between: rights and obligations; abstract rights and concrete rights; rules and 
principles (or, put another way, rule and non-rule standards – both for Dworkin a meaningful 
part of the law); arguments of principle and arguments of policy (the latter for Dworkin typically 
inapplicable to a judge’s primary task, as being more within the jurisdiction of legislators); 
individuated and non-individuated political aims (or specific rights and community goals); 
gravitational force and enactment force (i.e. of precedent); and “popular morality” and 
“community morality.” 
First, upon Hercules having arrived at his “right” answer, the practical result will involve the 
recognition of an individual or group right (typically belonging to the plaintiff), and the 
                                                            
79 Ibid at 104. 
80 Law’s Empire, supra note 66 at 230. 
81 Ibid. 
82 See, e.g., Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 10 at 94. 
83 Ibid at 40. 
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enforcement of an applicable, corresponding obligation (typically owed by the defendant).  The 
fundamental assertion of the rights thesis is that “judicial decisions enforce existing political 
rights.”84   
Dworkin defines rights themselves as a type of political “trump”; stating that, generally, a right is 
held by a person or group if the “state of affairs” in which that right is enjoyed is “advanced” or 
“protected” by its recognition and enforcement (even if other political considerations are 
disserviced), and likewise, if its non-enforcement would “retard” or “endanger” that same “state 
of affairs.”85 
Differentiating further between classes of legal rights (and principles), Dworkin distinguishes 
abstract/background rights (and principles), on the one hand, from concrete/institutional rights 
(and principles) on the other.  According to the rights thesis, judicial decisions enforce the latter 
which (essentially) arise as a result of the former.  In making this further distinction, Dworkin 
notes that rights (and principles) have a key dimension of degree: 
The most important of the distinctions … is the distinction between two forms of 
political rights: background rights, which are rights that hold in an abstract way 
against decisions taken by the community or the society as a whole, and more 
specific institutional rights that hold against a decision made by a specific 
institution.  Legal rights may then be identified as a distinct species of a political 
right, that is, an institutional right to the decision of a court in its adjudicative 
function.86 
… 
This is a distinction of degree … an abstract right is a general political aim the 
statement of which does not indicate how that general aim is to be weighed or 
compromised in particular circumstances against other political aims.  The grand 
rights of political rhetoric are in this way abstract.  Politicians speak of a right to 
                                                            
84 Ibid at 87. 
85 Ibid at 91. 
86 Ibid at (Introduction), xii. 
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free speech or dignity or equality, with no suggestion that those rights are 
absolute, but with no attempt to suggest their impact on particular complex social 
situations. Concrete rights, on the other hand, are political aims that are more 
precisely defined …  Abstract rights … provide arguments for concrete rights, but 
the claim of a concrete right is more definitive than any claim of abstract right 
that supports it.87   
Furthermore, while his thesis is a stated attack upon legal positivism’s “model of rules,” 
Dworkin does not discard the concept of a “rule.”  He recognizes that the applicable legal novel 
to date will indeed include numerous rules (whether constitutional, legislative, or common law in 
nature) and that judges do legitimately create rules as part of their creative interpretation (and 
enforcement) of rights.  However, for Dworkin (unlike for legal positivism), the novel in 
progress consists of much more than just rules, and it is overly simplistic or naïve, he argues, to 
suggest otherwise.  For Dworkin, the novel (the available body of law) consists of standards of 
both a rule and a non-rule varietal.  The non-rule standard is related to but distinct from the rule 
standard.  Dworkin explains that a rule goes beyond the language of its reasons; that underlying 
particular rules is an un-stated “scheme of principles” (the non-rule standards) that justifies those 
rules, some written and some implicit.  He says that judges do (and ought to) consider such 
principles as part of the governing law. 
For Dworkin, there is a meaningful distinction between rules and principles. He distinguishes 
rules from principles primarily by notions of force, explaining that rules will typically have 
“enactment force,” principles only “gravitational force.” 88  He describes rules as legal 
propositions with a type of “all or nothing” dimension, and principles, in contrast, as having a 
dimension of weight.  As this distinction is important to Dworkin’s thesis, it is helpful to look 
closer at what he says here: 
The difference between legal principles and legal rules is a logical distinction.  
Both sets of standards point to particular decisions about legal obligation in 
particular circumstances, but they differ in the character of the direction they give.  
                                                            
87 Ibid at 93-94. 
88 See, e.g., ibid at 318. 
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Rules are applicable in all-or-nothing fashion.  If the facts a rule stipulates are 
given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be 
accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision.89  
… 
Principles have a dimension that rules do not – the dimension of weight or 
importance. When principles intersect (the policy of protecting automobile 
consumers intersecting with principles of freedom of contract, for example), one 
who must resolve the conflict has to take into account the relative weight of 
each.90  
… 
Words like ‘reasonable’, ‘negligent’, ‘unjust’, and ‘significant’ often … makes 
the application of the rule which contains it depend to some extent upon 
principles or policies lying beyond the rule …91 
… 
Only rules dictate results, come what may. When a contrary result has been 
reached, the rule has been abandoned or changed.  Principles do not work that 
way; they incline a decision one way, though not conclusively, and they survive 
intact when they do not prevail.92  
Another important distinction Dworkin draws is between arguments of principle and arguments 
of policy; he insists that common law decisions are to be founded upon the former.93 He explains 
                                                            
89 Ibid at 24. 
90 Ibid at 26. 
91 Ibid at 28. 
92 Ibid at 35. 
93 Note that Dworkin’s Hercules does at times consider arguments of policy, but only in a limited manner, and only 
when interpreting legislative rules – see, e.g., Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 10 at 111 (footnote 1): “When he 
interprets statutes he fixes to some statutory language, as we say, arguments of principle or policy that provide the 
best justification of that language in the light of the legislature’s responsibilities.  His argument remains an argument 
of principle; he uses policy to determine what rights the legislature has already created. But when he ‘interprets’ 
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that any applicable common law rule may be justified by various arguments of principle, written 
or unwritten, and that a future author (judge) is entitled to have (creative) recourse as a matter of 
law to any such arguments.  He provides this distinction to differentiate the judicial function 
from the legislative function, explaining that both involve political decisions but that only the 
legislative function involves justifying those decisions according to arguments of policy. The 
difference between principle and policy, for Dworkin, is that principles are standards that 
describe rights, and policies are standards that describe goals.  Rights, as noted above, are 
individuated political aims, while goals are non-individuated political aims.94 The legislators 
then, our elected officials, are tasked primarily with making political decisions based on specific 
considerations of future community welfare. Judges, on the other hand, do not legislate in this 
sense; they do not make decisions meant to primarily serve community goals for the future, but 
rather to enforce existing political rights of a particular claimant against one particular set of 
facts.95 
This is not to suggest that judges, in accordance with the rights thesis, are to be blind to the 
consequences of their decisions or to the community welfare generally.  To the contrary, a judge 
is, when taking up his role in the “chain novel” process, to consider as one element of his task 
“what his successor will want or be able to add.”96  He is not to be seen as writing a concluding 
verse, that is to say, but one of many, in an unfolding, interpretive narrative.  The process 
involves fixing upon both the “forward looking” dimension of precedent, and the value of 
adjudicating towards “an honourable future.”97 
Finally, Hercules does not make decisions based on any notion of majority rule or “popular 
morality,”98  but rather makes decisions by taking up a theory of “community morality” or 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
judicial enactments he will fix to the relevant language only arguments of principle, because the rights thesis argues 
that only such arguments acquit the responsibility of the ‘enacting’ court.”  
94 Ibid at 91. 
95 Dworkin emphasizes the importance of conceptualizing this distinction between policies and principles (and 
between the adjudicative and legislative roles) while conceding the distinction is not absolute or water-tight; stating 
at the outset that it can be “collapsed” but cautioning that “the distinction has uses which are lost if it is thus 
collapsed”: Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 10 at 22-23. 
96 Law’s Empire, supra note 6 at 229. 
97 Ibid. 
98 See, e.g., ibid at 126: “Hercules’ techniques may sometimes require a decision that opposes popular morality on 
some issue.” 
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“constitutional morality” 99  evident in the abstract rights and principles the community has 
committed itself to (themselves evident in constitutional, legislative, or common-law dictates) 
and then enforces or denies rights in accordance with that particular conception of the applicable 
governing morality. 
To summarize, the rights thesis holds that judges decide “hard cases” by denying or enforcing (as 
legal rights) concrete political rights which typically flow from abstract political (and legal) 
rights and principles.  They do so by essentially choosing the most applicable and morally 
compelling arguments of principle (which arguments typically underlie and justify the applicable 
authorities) and generate a creative interpretation of the claimed rights and corresponding 
obligations which counts as the next best chapter in the applicable legal “novel.”  The task is not 
to decide which interpretation is the most compelling to them personally, but rather which is 
most compelling to the novel as a whole.  In order to do so, they take up a general political 
theory (again, not their own) that best describes the institutional character of the novel and the 
community morality evident in the novel to date.   
  
                                                            
99 Ibid at 126. 
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II. CROWN HONOUR ACCOUNTABILITY IN CANADIAN CROWN/ABORIGINAL 
LAW 
 
 
“…to know of any injury and to redress it are inseparable in the royal breast …” 
- Lord Blackstone100 
 
The intriguing notion that Crown dishonour in Aboriginal contexts in Canada may attract legal 
consequence was first indicated in early-days Supreme Court of Canada decisions,101 though in a 
context where Aboriginal communities were generally seen as having no enforceable legal 
rights, constitutional or otherwise.102 That notion was later acknowledged by the Supreme Court 
in the post-1982 Sparrow decision,103 and then incrementally expanded and transformed by, 
principally, the R. v. Badger, 104  R. v. Marshall,105  and Haida Nation courts. While under-
theorized, it is now, as noted at the outset, explicitly the central organizing principle for 
Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada.106   
Anecdotally, one jurist appears uniquely responsible for the fact the honour of the Crown 
principle now occupies such a core doctrinal position. As Associate Chief Justice of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, the late Bert James MacKinnon pronounced in R. v. Taylor and Williams that 
“the honour of the Crown is always involved” in the process of treaty interpretation in Canada.107  
This was an argument he, in his days as a practitioner, had advanced on behalf of his client 
Calvin George in litigation that saw the first twentieth century-invocation by the Supreme Court 
of Canada of the honour principle in an Aboriginal context (and the only such invocation prior to 
                                                            
100 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England; in Four Books, Thomas Cooley, ed., (Chicago: 
Callaghan and Cockraft, 1871) Book 3, c.17 at paras 254-255 [Blackstone Commentaries], cited in Thomas Isaac, 
Crown/Aboriginal Law: Commentary and Analysis, (Saskatoon: Purich, 2012). 
101 Province of Ontario v. Dominion of Canada and Province of Quebec; In re Indian Claims, [1895] S.C.J. No. 96 
(Q.L.), (1895) 25 S.C.R. 434 at 512 [cited to S.C.R.]; R. v. George (1966), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386, [1966] S.C.R. 267 
[George cited to S.C.R.]. 
102 See, e.g., supra note 21 and surrounding text. 
103 Supra note 19 at 1108. 
104 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, [1996] 2 C.N.L.R. 77 [Badger cited to S.C.R.]. 
105 (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 513, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [Marshall No. 1 cited to S.C.R.]. 
106 Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5.  
107 [1981] 3 C.N.L.R. 114, 34 O.R. (2d) 360 [Taylor and Williams cited to C.N.L.R.]. 
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Taylor and Williams).108 MacKinnon A.C.J.O’s pronouncement in Taylor and Williams was then 
ultimately adopted in Sparrow.109 
In Haida Nation, again, the honour of the Crown “precept” was elevated to the status of being 
the central organizing principle in this area.110 Where honour may have been judicially invoked 
previously as explicit acknowledgment of non-binding political or moral-only obligations,111 
Crown dishonour in applicable Aboriginal contexts is now legally actionable in Canada (i.e. 
through enforcement of the specific off-shoot Crown duties flowing from the honour of the 
Crown principle). Chief Justice McLachlin’s decision in Haida Nation also suggests that this 
new or reconfigured theory of Crown liability doctrine is intended to both reorient previous 
doctrine in the area112 and spawn new doctrinal frameworks.   
Unfortunately, however, substantial doctrinal uncertainty persists. For instance, some lower 
courts have noted the “elusive” nature of the new legal construct while others have entirely mis-
conceived it.113 This doctrinal opacity appears a manifestation of prevailing uncertainty as to the 
nature and scope of residual and parallel applicability of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine.  
Furthermore, as one leading commentator recently put it in relation to the honour principle, “a 
complete understanding of this important legal principle … is in its infancy.”114   
Strangely, and with some notable exceptions,115 there is also a dearth of commentary on this new 
theory, particularly as regards the post-Haida Nation doctrinal intersection between Crown 
honour accountability and Crown fiduciary accountability. 
                                                            
108 George, supra note 100 at 102. 
109 Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1108. 
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111 See, e.g., infra note 126 and surrounding text. 
112  As but one example, in Mitchell, supra note 29 at para 9, the fundamental nature of Crown fiduciary 
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113 Supra note 39. 
114 Isaac, Crown/Aboriginal Law, supra note 99 at 312. 
115 See, e.g., Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433; Isaac, 
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It is this prevailing doctrinal confusion in the lower courts and dearth of applicable academic 
commentary that inspires the current project. Doctrinal clarity in this area is both lacking and 
imperative. In the remainder of this chapter, I will attempt to develop a more fulsome 
conceptualization of both the historical pedigree of the honour principle and its contemporary 
doctrinal parameters, as discernible at this early stage in its development. 
a. The ‘Honour of the Crown’ as a Legal Principle  
 
Early commentary on the nature of the principle suggests it arose in Britain as a principal of 
equity in the context of an imperial constitution premised on plenary Crown immunity and 
largely unfettered Crown prerogatives. It appears the principle, where (seldom) invoked, 
protected against the Crown inadvertently and unduly exercising its prerogative powers to the 
detriment of private interests:    
…the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury; for, being created for 
the benefit of the people, it cannot be exerted to their prejudice … Whenever 
therefore it happens that, by misinformation, or inadvertence, the crown hath been 
induced to invade the private rights of any of its subjects, though no action will lie 
against the sovereign … yet the invasion, by informing the king of the true state 
of the matter in dispute: and, as it presumes that to know of any injury and to 
redress it are inseparable in the royal breast, it then issues as of course, in the 
king’s own name, his order to his judges to do justice to the party aggrieved.116 
More recently, in two separate pieces,117 David Arnot provides a colourful historical account of 
the practical application of the honour of the Crown principle during times of imperial kingship.  
On the seriousness with which Crown agents approached the honour mandate, he said this: 
                                                            
116 Blackstone Commentaries, supra note 99 at paras 254-255, cited in Isaac, Crown/Aboriginal Law, supra note 99 
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117 David M. Arnot “The Honour of the Crown”, (1996), 60 Sask. L. Rev. 339; and David Arnot, “The Honour of 
First Nations – The Honour of the Crown: The Unique Relationship of First Nations with the Crown” in Jennifer 
Smith and D. Michael Jackson eds., The Evolving Canadian Crown, (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
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This convention [the honour of the Crown principle] has roots in pre-Norman 
England, a time when every yeoman swore personal allegiance to the king and 
anyone who was charged with speaking or acting on behalf of him bore an 
absolute personal responsibility to lend credit to the king’s good name. Should he 
fail in this responsibility or cause embarrassment, he was required to answer 
personally to the king with his life and fortune.118 (emphasis added) 
This account betrays a normative ethic of behaviour observed by Crown agents, literally 
motivated by fear of death, that is unrealistic in a contemporary constitutional democracy like 
Canada, despite Arnot’s contemporary plea that “[i]n every action and decision the women and 
men who represent the Crown in Canada should conduct themselves as if their personal honour 
and family names depended on it.”119  This is not to say that the honour of the Crown principle is 
necessarily inapposite for Canadian Crown/Aboriginal Law but rather to say that contextual 
historical analogy will be of relatively limited value moving forward.  The development of the 
honour of the Crown doctrine in Canada is and will be a novel, contemporary project.  That said, 
and as will become clear, the analysis is incomplete and impoverished without some recourse to 
the applicable historical jurisprudence, which now follows. 
i. Prior to Haida Nation  
 
Tracing the early common law evolution of the honour of the Crown principle is not a 
particularly arduous task; there are mere handfuls of notable cases prior to Haida Nation.  That 
said, there is a discernible evolution, a worthwhile doctrinal story to be told.   
A review of the jurisprudence reveals three doctrinal threads and I propose to deal with each in 
turn: 
1) The earliest thread, centuries old, involves the invocation of the principle, typically in 
non-Aboriginal contexts, in scenarios involving contractual and statutory interpretation. It 
was invoked in such contexts as a shield against technical interpretations that would 
otherwise ignoble the Crown;   
                                                            
118 Arnot, The Unique Relationship, ibid at 161. 
119 Ibid at 162. 
32 
 
2) The second thread, now over a century old and given its fullest expression in the Badger 
and Marshall courts, involves those cases where the honour of the Crown principle is 
used as a principle of treaty interpretation in Aboriginal contexts in Canada; and   
3) The third, most recent thread, that with which the current project is primarily concerned, 
includes those cases where the honour principle is used to source, and to fundamentally 
inform the nature of positive, prescriptive (constitutional) legal obligations owed by 
Canadian Crown to Aboriginal peoples (i.e. in contrast to the mere proscriptive manner in 
which it is used in the first two threads). Obviously, we see the high-water mark in terms 
of Crown liability doctrine under this third thread in Haida Nation (the duty to consult 
and accommodate) and Manitoba Metis Federation (the duty to purposively and 
diligently fulfill constitutional obligations). That said, and as will be demonstrated below, 
there were seeds of this thread of jurisprudence in some pre-Haida Nation Decisions. 
To the first thread, the honour of the Crown as a legal principle goes back at least to the 
seventeenth century English decisions rendered in Earl of Rutland’s Case120 and The Case of the 
Churchwardens of St. Saviour in Southwark.121  In the latter, it was stated in context that if:  
… two constructions may be made of the King’s grant, then the rule is, when it 
may receive two constructions, and by force of one construction the grant may 
accordingly to the rule of law be adjudged good, and by another it shall be 
adjudged void: then for the King’s honour and for the benefit of the subject, such 
construction shall be made, that the King’s charter shall take effect, for it was not 
the King’s intent to make a void grant…122 (emphasis added) 
While this early reference to the honour of the Crown principle does not set out a particularly 
robust legal proposition – i.e. Crown honour requires the avoidance of a technical interpretation 
that a Crown grant is not actually a Crown grant – there are signs in later jurisprudence under 
this thread of a general proposition to the effect that the honour of the Crown is to be generally 
upheld in applicable contractual and statutory interpretations.  For instance, the Upper Canada 
Court of Appeal in their 1852 decision in Doe d. Henderson v. Westover states that applicable 
                                                            
120 (1608), 77 E.R. 555, 8 Co. Rep. 55a. 
121 (1613), 77 E.R. 1025, 10 Co. Rep. 66b a 67b [cited to E.R.]. 
122 Ibid at 1027. 
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incidents of Crown instruments “shall always, for the honour of the Crown be allowed most 
strongly in favour of the grantee.”123  In a more recent instance, and in an Aboriginal context, the 
Supreme Court of Canada used the honour of the Crown principle to deliver an equitable 
interpretation of a tax-related provision of the Indian Act that would otherwise have operated to 
effect an Indian Band being “disposed of … [certain statutory] entitlements.”124  
As a bit of an aside, it is noteworthy that in certain other instances, the honour of the Crown 
principle has at times been invoked not as a principle of law or equity but more as a judicial 
acknowledgement of perceived governance ethics. To this end, note that prior to the Calder 
decision in 1973 and the subsequent constitutionalization of Aboriginal and treaty rights in 1982, 
“rights” held by Aboriginal peoples were commonly regarded as being entirely “dependent on 
the good will of the sovereign.”125 This notion of the “good will of the Sovereign” as something 
expected in a political context but non-enforceable, closely resembles the honour principle as 
articulated in such early invocations.   
One such early invocation is found in the decision in Ontario Mining Co. Ltd. v. Seybold.126   
This case involved a dispute between two mining companies each of whom wanted to develop 
portions of surrendered reserve lands.  At issue was the effect of the Indian Act-based surrender 
of the lands to Canada. It was held that the surrender implicated Ontario in subsequent ownership 
and administration dynamics. In his decision, Lord Davey of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council observed that upon the surrender, Ontario “came at least under an honourable 
engagement” to set aside certain portions of the tract for the use and benefit of the Indians in 
question (e.g. for hunting and fishing) and that “they could not without plain disregard of justice 
take advantage of the surrender and refuse to perform the condition attached to it.”127  
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127 Seybold at 81 and 82.  
34 
 
The significance of this dictum from Seybold is that it is the first time in Canadian jurisprudence 
there is an instance of Crown honour described as sourcing something close to a positive Crown 
obligation in an Aboriginal context (non-legal though the obligation may have been).  
Moving to the second doctrinal thread, the honour of the Crown has become an important 
principle of equity in the context of Aboriginal treaty interpretation in Canada. The first 
jurisprudential indication of an applicable honour mandate in the context of Crown/Aboriginal 
treaties is found in an 1895 dissenting decision by Gwynne J. (who, it seems, was not necessarily 
embraced by his colleagues for his progressive views on such matters128). In Province of Ontario 
v. Dominion of Canada and Province of Quebec; In re Indian Claims he states that: 
…what is contended for and must not be lost sight of, is that the British 
sovereigns, ever since the acquisition of Canada, have been pleased to adopt the 
rule or practice of entering into agreements with the Indian nations or tribes in 
their province of Canada, for the cession or surrender by them of what such 
sovereigns have been pleased to designate the Indian title, by instruments similar 
to these now under consideration to which they have been pleased to give the 
designation of “treaties” with the Indians in possession of and claiming title to the 
lands expressed to be surrendered by the instruments, and further that the terms 
and conditions expressed in those instruments as to be performed by or on behalf 
of the Crown, have always been regarded as involving a trust graciously assumed 
by the Crown to the fulfilment of which the Indians the faith and honour of the 
Crown is pledged, and which trust has always been most faithfully fulfilled as a 
treaty obligation of the Crown.129 (emphasis added) 
More than seventy years after this decision from Gwynne J. issued, the Supreme Court of 
Canada next invoked the honour of the Crown principle in one of the earliest instances of an 
Aboriginal litigant seeking judicial protection of treaty rights against the effects of Canadian 
domestic law. In George, Calvin George had been charged and later acquitted in the lower courts 
of acting in contravention of applicable provincial law by hunting off-season on his Band’s 
                                                            
128 In ibid at 82, Lord Davey referred to Gwynne J. as “that learned and lamented judge.”  
129 Supra note 100 at 511-12. 
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reserve lands. At issue was the effect of the Band’s treaty hunting rights on the scope of 
application of the provincial law under which Mr. George was charged, and on the meaning of 
section 87 of the Indian Act of the day (section 88 today)  which otherwise made Indians subject 
to provincial laws of general application. After citing the passage from Churchwardens, set out 
above, Cartwright J. (again in a dissenting judgment, as Mr. George was ultimately unsuccessful 
in his challenge) said:  
We should, I think, endeavour to construe the treaty of 1827 and those Acts of 
Parliament which bear upon the question before us in such manner that the honour 
of the Sovereign may be upheld and Parliament not made subject to the reproach 
of having taken away by unilateral action and without consideration the rights 
solemnly assured to the Indians and their posterity by treaty.130 
The use of the Honour of the Crown principle here (referenced as “honour of the Sovereign”) 
was in the context, again, of treaty and statutory interpretation and was invoked towards 
preventing certain treaty rights from being unilaterally delimited by the Crown.   
Interestingly, when the matter in George first came before the High Court of Ontario, the Chief 
Justice of that Court invoked the concept of “a breach of our national honour” in the following 
statement:  
I wish to make it quite clear that I am not called upon to decide, nor do I decide, 
whether the Parliament of Canada by legislation specifically applicable to Indians 
could take away their rights to hunt for food on the Kettle Point Reserve.  There is 
much to support an argument that Parliament does not have such power.  There 
may be cases where such legislation, properly framed, might be considered 
necessary in the public interest but a very strong case would have to be made out 
that would not be a breach of our national honour.131  (emphasis added) 
The Chief Justice here was arguably implicitly following something like the rationale in 
Churchwardens or Westover, but it is nonetheless an interesting early example of a collective 
                                                            
130 George, supra note 100 at 279. 
131 Regina v. George, [1964] 1 O.R. 24, 41 D.L.R. (2d) 31 at (O.H.C.J.) 37. 
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concept of honour in an Aboriginal context being invoked in broad terms and in the form of a 
general restraint on Parliamentary power. 
Some fifteen years after George, and shortly before the coming into force of The Constitution 
Act, 1982, we see the honour principle’s next rise, the seminal pronouncement by MacKinnon 
A.C.J.O. in Taylor and Williams, that “[i]n approaching the terms of a treaty … the honour of the 
Crown is always involved and no appearance of sharp dealing should be sanctioned.”132 
This oft-cited passage, as noted above, was first adopted at the Supreme Court of Canada 
level in a non-treaty context (in Sparrow, as discussed in more detail below) and then 
grounded in Badger and Marshall as a key, accepted principle of treaty interpretation.  
The main applicable passage from Badger reads as follows: 
..the honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealings with Indian people.  
Interpretations of treaties and statutory provisions which have an impact upon 
treaty or aboriginal rights must be approached in a manner which maintains the 
integrity of the Crown.  It is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its 
promises. No appearance of ‘sharp dealing’ will be sanctioned.133 
The honour of the Crown principle was invoked in Badger (as animated by the directives 
in this passage) as one principle among many informing a larger process of interpreting 
the scope of a specific treaty right, namely whether a hunting right extended to include 
hunting on private lands. General Crown/Aboriginal Law jurisprudence was, at the time 
of Badger, marked by a growing judicial sensitivity to the need for a “generous” and 
“liberal” interpretation of Crown/Aboriginal treaties in Canada,134 however doctrinally 
sourced, against the backdrop of growing recognition of historical injustice in 
Crown/Aboriginal relationships.135 
                                                            
132 Taylor and Williams, supra note 106 at 367. 
133 Badger, supra note 103at para 41. 
134 See, e.g., Nowegijick v The Queen (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 193, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29 at 37: “…treaties and statutes 
relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians.”  
135 See, e.g., supra note 134 and surrounding text. 
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A few years later, in Marshall, Justice Binnie appeared to further elevate the honour of 
the Crown principle to a more central, doctrinal role in treaty interpretation matters, 
referring to it repeatedly in his decision, and expressly applying it not only to interpret 
written provisions but to supply perceived deficiencies in the treaty at issue.  At the outset 
of his decision he said: 
I would allow this appeal because nothing less would uphold the honour and 
integrity of the Crown in its dealings with the Mi’kmaq people to secure their 
peace and friendship, as best the content of those treaty promises can now be 
ascertained.  In reaching this conclusion, I recognize that if the present dispute 
had arisen out of a modern commercial transaction between two parties of 
relatively equal bargaining power … it would have to be concluded that the 
Mi’kmaq had inadequately protected their interests.136 
Interestingly, where he reads “implied” rights into the applicable treaty following earlier 
Supreme Court precedent (namely Simon137 and R. v. Sundown138), he interprets his 
mandate to do so, novelly, as flowing principally from the honour of the Crown,139 which 
to some extent had the effect of re-orienting the doctrinal underpinnings of those previous 
decisions. As will be shown when I discuss Haida Nation in the next section, this was 
precisely the type of (doctrinal) reorientation effected there. 
Strangely, however, and despite the doctrinal consistency between the dicta of Binnie J. in 
Marshall and the later judgment of McLachlin C.J. in Haida Nation, McLachlin J. (as she then 
was) wrote a dissenting decision in Marshall which conspicuously under-emphasized the 
relevance of the honour of the Crown principle in treaty interpretation, referring to it in a manner 
more resembling incantation than anything substantive. She disagreed that the honour of the 
Crown, or any other doctrinal mandate, gave rise to the implied treaty rights recognized by 
Binnie J., and as to the doctrinal nature of the honour principle, where she took occasion to 
articulate a lengthy set of treaty interpretation principles purporting to be comprehensive, she 
                                                            
136 Marshall No. 1, supra note 104 at para 4. 
137 Supra note 26. 
138 R v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393, 170 D.L.R. (4th) 385. 
139 Marshall No. 1, supra note 104. 
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said only this “[i]n searching for the common intention of the parties, the integrity and honour of 
the Crown is presumed …”140 
If, as appears to be the case, an inclination against an expanded doctrinal scope for the honour 
principle underlay her decision in Marshall, her decisions in Haida Nation and Manitoba Metis 
Federation (the latter co-authored with Karakatsanis J.) betrays a marked change of heart, as I 
will illustrate below. 
I move now to the final thread of pre-Haida Nation jurisprudence on the honour of the Crown 
principle. This third line of case law is distinct from the first two which saw the principle used in 
applicable processes of interpreting Crown grants, statutes, and treaties. Here, I track the initial 
development of the principle as it is ultimately interpreted in Haida Nation: as an independent, 
conceptual source of positive constitutional obligations owed by the Crown to Aboriginal 
peoples in Canada. The distinction to the first two threads of case law is drawn, partly for 
conceptual convenience, on the basis that the applicable Crown obligations sourced by the 
honour principle in those threads were in a form that may be described as both negative and 
largely technical in nature; i.e. obligations not to interpret instruments in a manner ignobling the 
Crown.   
The watershed decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sparrow is the key decision in this 
third doctrinal thread.  It was in this decision that the Supreme Court first confirmed that 
constitutional Aboriginal and treaty rights operate to constrain Crown power generally and may 
not be unjustifiably infringed by the Crown.  And in so doing, as will be shown, they engaged 
the honour principle. 
Prior to the Sparrow decision, the Supreme Court had determined, in Guerin, that in at least 
some contexts the Crown is legally obligated to act in accordance with a certain (quite 
undeveloped) high standard of conduct in its dealings with Aboriginal people. In Guerin, as I 
discuss in greater detail in the next chapter when I examine Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary 
accountability, the dispute involved the manner in which the Crown dealt with Musqueam 
reserve lands that had been surrendered in accordance with the Indian Act and for a defined 
                                                            
140 Ibid at para 78. 
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purpose. There, and from a doctrinal perspective, the Court inaugurated a sui generis fiduciary 
obligation owed the Musqueam141 (making no reference to the honour of the Crown principle) 
but left unclear the scope of that obligation in terms of its future application in Crown/Aboriginal 
Law.   
Then in Sparrow, another decision involving the Musqueam, the dispute centred on a claim that 
the federal Crown had unconstitutionally regulated the Musqueam’s Aboriginal fishing rights.  
While the decision has vital and numerous implications for various doctrinal components of 
Crown/Aboriginal Law, I will only focus here on the way in which it interpreted the honour of 
the Crown principle. 
It is axiomatic that wherever there are rights, there are corresponding obligations.142 And in 
Sparrow, the Court was undertaking, as an endeavour of first instance, to conceptualize the 
doctrinal nature of Crown obligation that corresponds  to the newly-constitutionalized Aboriginal 
and treaty rights.  In a crucial passage from the perspective of doctrinal analysis in this area, and 
after generally acknowledging a history of Crown dishonour in Canada in respect of the 
treatment of Aboriginal peoples,143 they said this: 
 In our opinion, Guerin [fiduciary obligations], together with R. v. Taylor and 
Williams [the honour of the Crown principle]… ground a general guiding 
principle for s.35(1).  That is, the Government has the responsibility to act in a 
fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples.144 (emphasis added) 
Several observations may be drawn here. First, the Court twinned the honour principle with the 
fiduciary mandate to source and forge a central guiding principle purporting to restrain and 
govern Crown conduct in the context of Aboriginal and treaty rights.  Second, the standard of 
conduct contemplated under this directing principle was for the Crown to generally act “in a 
fiduciary capacity” in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples.  As made clear in the next chapter, 
                                                            
141 See infra, note 363 and surrounding text. 
142 See supra note 24. 
143 Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1103: “we start by looking at the background of s.35(1) …there can be no doubt that 
over the years the rights of the Indians were often honoured in the breach…we cannot recount with much pride the 
treatment accorded to the native people of this country.” (citations omitted) 
144 Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1108. 
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what it means generally to act “in a fiduciary capacity” was (and, to substantial extent, still is) 
unresolved. 
Regarding this second observation, the Court, later in the decision, speaks of the importance of 
“holding the Crown to a high standard of honourable dealing with respect to the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada as suggested by Guerin.”145 Here, since a reference to Guerin is clearly a 
reference to the applicable fiduciary concept, the Court’s emerging theory in Sparrow as to the 
doctrinal foundation of Crown obligations in the s.35 context, and certainly that picked up on in 
later decisions146 and in academic commentary,147 is that there was observed to be a over-arching 
and generalized fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to Aboriginal peoples which obligation 
mandated, as a minimum, the upholding of Crown honour (to some undeveloped “high 
standard”). 
This conceptualization is consistent with another important passage in Sparrow where the Court 
states: 
…we find that the words “recognition and affirmation” [from s.35(1)] incorporate 
the fiduciary relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on the 
exercise of sovereign power … federal power must be reconciled with federal 
duty …148 (emphasis added) 
As an aside, and as picked up below, my contention is that this and other applicable portions of 
the Sparrow decision have been meaningfully re-oriented; that Haida Nation suggests that 
                                                            
145 Ibid at 1109. 
146 See, e.g., Delgamuukw, supra note 13 at 162-168; R. v. Gladstone, (1996), 137 D.L.R. (4th) 648, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 
723 at para 54 [Gladstone cited to S.C.R.]; Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2002] 2 
C.N.L.R. 121 at para 36, 99 B.C.L.R. (3d) 209 at 36 [Haida Nation BCCA No. 1 cited to B.C.L.R.] (“the trust-like 
relationship and its concomitant fiduciary duty permeates the whole relationship between the Crown, in both of its 
sovereignties, federal and provincial, on the one hand, and Aboriginal peoples on the other.”) 
147 Rotman, for instance, interpreted Sparrow as grounding an entirely plenary type of obligation, that it applies to 
“virtually every aspect of relations between the Crown and aboriginal peoples.”: Rotman, Parallel Paths: Fiduciary 
Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada, supra note 47 at  11. 
148 Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1109. 
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section 35(1) now incorporates the honour of the Crown principle, and not “the fiduciary 
relationship.”149 
Moving on, one way to view the doctrinal outcome (and the jurisprudential wake) of Sparrow is 
that there emerged a competition of sorts between competing principles (i.e. as between fiduciary 
and honour-based accountability) and that while in Sparrow the Court explicitly married the two 
instead of choosing one over the other, they also appeared to stake out an early preference for the 
fiduciary notion as the emerging, doctrinal centrepiece of Crown liability in Crown/Aboriginal 
Law, describing it as essentially absorbing the honour principle. 150  That preference was 
effectively confirmed and adopted in subsequent decisions.151 As will be developed in detail in 
the next section, however, they reverse course in Haida Nation.  
Subsequent Supreme Court of Canada decisions under this thread interpret Sparrow as standing 
for the proposition that the Crown’s sui generis fiduciary obligation owed “at large”152  to 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada was the over-arching, core principle in Crown/Aboriginal Law; the 
obligation to uphold Crown honour being an effective offshoot of that principle. In R. v. Van der 
Peet, for instance, Chief Justice Lamer explained that “[t]he Crown has a fiduciary obligation to 
Aboriginal peoples with the result that in dealings between the government and Aboriginals, the 
honour of the Crown is at stake.”153 Likewise, in Mitchell, Chief Justice McLachlin spoke of “an 
obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably, and to protect them from 
exploitation, a duty characterized as ‘fiduciary’”154 (emphasis added). 
I move now to examine how the Supreme Court fundamentally re-oriented these doctrinal 
dynamics in Haida Nation. 
ii. As Fundamentally Reoriented in Haida Nation 
                                                            
149 As one example, among many, of the Supreme Court reorienting its doctrine in this manner, see, e.g., supra note 
111. 
150 As discussed in the next chapter, a fiduciary obligation to act honourably towards another is non-conventional. 
Cf, however, Meinhard v Salmon (1928), 164 N.E. 545, 249 N.Y. 458 at 465 (New York C.A.) where Cardozo J. 
describes fiduciary accountability as follows: “A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the 
marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive is then the standard of behavior.” 
151 See, e.g., Delgamuukw, supra note 13 at para 162-168; and Gladstone, supra note 146 at para 54. 
152 Guerin, supra note 27 at 355 per Wilson J.   
153 Van der Peet, supra note 26 at para 24. 
154 Supra note 29 at para 9. 
42 
 
 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s decision in Haida Nation is a seminal decision in Canadian 
Crown/Aboriginal Law, following in a thread of other transformative decisions such as Calder, 
Guerin, Sparrow, Van der Peet, and Delgamuukw.  Installing the “duty to consult and 
accommodate” as a primary (dialogical155) Crown obligation – as the Haida Nation decision did 
together with Taku River and Mikisew –  has entirely transformed the face of litigation in this 
area.156  
Consultation and accommodation obligations are now recognized categories of specific Crown 
obligations in Aboriginal contexts in Canada.  Conversely, rights to honourable consultation and 
(where applicable) accommodation are now explicit. And the foundational doctrinal principle is 
that applicable infringement of such rights will constitute actionable Crown dishonour.  
Doctrinal frameworks governing the discharge of Crown consultation and accommodation 
obligations have been substantially animated since Haida Nation.157  However, development of 
the conceptual nature of their theoretical underpinnings is a project still in its early stages,158 a 
fact that, as indicated, fuels the current project. 
I move now to a detailed examination of the Haida Nation litigation, specifically focussed on the 
manner in which the three respective Courts sourced or denied the applicable consultation and 
accommodation-related legal obligations claimed.  From a theoretical perspective, the decisions 
are each quite fascinating, and informative for this project generally.  And an analysis of each 
                                                            
155 Henderson, “Dialogical Governance: A Mechanism of Constitutional Governance,” (2009) 72(1) Sask. L. Rev. 
29. 
156 On the duty to consult and accommodate generally, see: Newman, The Duty to Consult, supra note 4. 
157 See, generally, Newman, The Duty to Consult, supra note 4; Isaac, Crown/Aboriginal Law, supra note 99 at 302-
382; and Maria Morellato, “The Crown’s Constitutional Duty to Consult and Accommodate Aboriginal and Treaty 
Rights,” National Centre for First Nations Governance Research Paper (Feb. 2009). The Supreme Court of Canada 
decisions to meaningfully address Crown consultation and accommodation obligations post Haida Nation are: Taku 
River, supra note 4; Mikisew, supra note 4; Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 14; and Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. 
Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650 [Carrier Sekani]. 
158 Isaac, Crown/Aboriginal Law, supra note 99 at 312: “a complete understanding of this important legal principle 
as it applies to s.35 and Aboriginal peoples is in its infancy.” See, also, Newman, The Duty to Consult, supra note  4 
at 15-23. Newman advances several different potential bases on which to conceptualize the duty to consult. Where 
he speaks to the honour of the Crown principle specifically, he says this:  
One might suggest that the judges, in the duty to consult context, simply draw on a long-standing concept 
of the ‘honour of the Crown,’ but this does not displace the need to develop a broader theoretical account of 
the duty to consult in order to understand it. The early doctrinal foundations of the ‘honour of the Crown’ 
consist of a concept that gave rise to a principle of interpretation that Crown grants should be interpreted in 
a manner such that they were not void. Without further development of the concept this doctrine has no 
immediate application in the context of the duty to consult.  (footnotes omitted) 
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will serve my subsequent project of articulating a Dworkinian conceptualization of the 
fundamentals of the honour of the Crown-based legal construct.  
Haida Nation Litigation – Background 
For more than a hundred years, the Haida Nation (the “Haida”) have claimed title to the lands of 
Haida Gwaii and the surrounding waters, which claim has not been either adjudicated on its 
merits or reconciled through any completed process of negotiation with British Columbia or 
Canada.  The Haida lived on these lands long prior to confederation, were never conquered or 
displaced (as expressly recognized by McLachlin C.J.159), and have never signed a treaty with 
the Crown.  
In 1961, the British Columbia Ministry of Forests granted a permit to MacMillan Bloedel to 
harvest portions of Haida Gwaii.  Over time the permit was replaced, and later transferred to 
Weyerhaeuser (in 2000).  The latter transfer (as well as some of the preceding replacements) was 
made after and in the face of express objections advanced by the Haida.  
The Haida brought a judicial-review petition seeking, among other claims for relief, a declaration 
that British Columbia stood in a fiduciary relationship with the Haida and was therefore 
obligated to consult regarding applicable Haida interests with an intention of seriously 
addressing those interests prior to making any decisions regarding the management of the timber 
resource on Haida Gwaii. 
The Haida also argued that the honour of the Crown was “brought into question” by the 
provincial Crown’s failure to meaningfully consult in this instance. For its part, the provincial 
Crown emphasized the fact it had a responsibility to manage the timber resource for the welfare 
of all citizens of British Columbia, and that it should not be rendered impotent pending formal 
reconciliation of Aboriginal rights claims. It argued that no fiduciary obligation could arise in 
these types of scenarios absent proven Aboriginal rights.   
The Haida Aboriginal title assertion is a claimed section 35 right, one that was essentially 
(assuming eventual formalization) recognized and affirmed by the supreme law of Canada, the 
                                                            
159 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 69. 
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Constitution Act, 1982, more than two decades ago. The chambers judge noted a “reasonable 
probability” that the Haida would eventually prove its claim at law.160 
The Haida Nation litigation, therefore, tasked the chambers judge, and the appellate judges to 
follow with determining certain consultation and accommodation-related rights, an endeavour of 
first instance in the case of the Supreme Court of Canada, against a backdrop of claimed 
constitutional rights that arguably (though not inevitably) already existed but had yet to be 
formally accepted or defined.161 
Of course, the legal duty to consult in these types of “pre-proof” scenarios was ultimately 
recognized by McLachlin C.J. Established was a type of interim framework162 for applicable 
consultation and accommodation duties in the context of asserted but unproven Aboriginal 
rights.  Though I will not be examining the nature of this specific framework in fulsome detail, 
mostly restricting my analysis in this chapter to the manner in which the honour of the Crown 
principle is interpreted in the decision, it is helpful to the analysis to consider at this point a brief 
summary. 
The Crown Duty to Consult and Accommodate 
 
                                                            
160 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2001] 2 C.N.L.R. 83 at para 47, 2000 BCSC 1280 
[Haida Nation BCSC cited to C.N.L.R.]. 
161 A metaphor sometimes used to differentiate two different conceptual interpretations of this aspect of section 35 is 
that of an “empty box” (i.e. that section 35 rights are potential rights that would only come into being once formally 
recognized by the Crown) contrasted with that of a “full box” (i.e. section 35 rights already exist regardless of 
Crown formalities). Richard Daly, Our Box Was Full: An Ethnography for the Delgamuukw Plaintiffs (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2005); Walkem, Ardith and Halie Bruce, eds., Box of Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty Years of Section 
35 (Vancouver: Theytus, 2003). See, also, Ochapowace Ski Resort, supra note 27 at para 64.  Obviously, this 
conceptual context is loaded from a jurisprudential standpoint: legal positivists whether, for example, J.L. Austin 
followers or H.L.A. Hart followers, may argue that, notwithstanding the “existing” language in section 35, such 
rights do not exist until specifically established and that section 35 was in essence only a promise or a guarantee that 
certain rights would be established in the future. It might be noted that this type of dichotomy – that as between 
finding and inventing law and rights – is one that Ronald Dworkin’s thesis expressly deplores as unhelpful to 
jurisprudential analysis: see, e.g., Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 66 at 228.  
162 This framework, of course, was later confirmed (as modified accordingly for context) in the context of treaties, 
both historical and modern. See Mikisew, supra note 4 (historical treaties) and Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 
14 and Quebec (Attorney General) v. Moses, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 557, [2010] 1 R.C.S. 557 [Moses cited to S.C.R.] 
(modern treaties). In these contexts, the Crown consultation/accommodation framework is not properly 
conceptualized as an interim framework but rather one that independently regulates Crown conduct generally in the 
context of potential infringements to established (treaty) rights (i.e. as an independent form of regulation that 
governs in addition to, and as supplementary to, any specific treaty rights). 
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Generally, in the pre-proof claim context, before authorizing or undertaking conduct that may 
adversely affect interests of an Aboriginal community related to claimed section 35 rights, the 
Crown must honourably and meaningfully consult that community regarding such interests.  The 
obligation arises when the Crown has knowledge of the rights claim and is contemplating action 
that may adversely affect it. The consultation is to take place as early as possible in the project's 
planning stages, and the extent of the obligation will be proportionate to (1) the strength of the 
case supporting the claimed rights and (2) the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect 
(McLachlin C.J. invoked the concept of a spectrum in this regard to be used in any such 
assessment). 
It is to be anticipated that the consultation process may reveal a duty to accommodate.  The 
substance of any accommodation will depend on the circumstances. The duty to accommodate is 
said to involve the amending of a planned Crown (or industry) initiative in accordance with a 
process of balancing interests and minimizing adverse impacts.163 Subsequently, other forms of 
substantive accommodation such as applicable employment or business development 
opportunities or direct economic compensation will sometimes be appropriate.164 The controlling 
question in all scenarios is: “what is required to maintain the honour of the Crown and to effect 
reconciliation between the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples with respect to the interests at 
stake?”165 The obligation, owed by both provincial and federal Crowns,166 lies with the Crown 
alone; there is no independent duty on third parties, since the honour of the Crown may not itself 
                                                            
163 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at paras. 47, 49-50. The doctrinal nature of the specific “duty to accommodate” 
remains largely embryonic in these types of contexts. See, generally, Newman, The Duty to Consult, supra note 5 at 
58.  
164 See, e.g., ibid; and Musqueam Indian Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Sustainable Resource Management) 
2005 BCCA 140, (2005), 37 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 at paras 97 and 98. Also, note as an example of a government policy 
directive on this Crown obligation that the Government of Saskatchewan has stated that “financial compensation” is 
an appropriate form of Crown accommodation in instances where a “significant, unavoidable infringement on Treaty 
and Aboriginal rights” is contemplated: see Government of Saskatchewan, First Nation and Metis Consultation 
Policy Framework at 13, available online at: 
<http://www.gr.gov.sk.ca/Consultations/Consultation-Policy-Framework>. 
165 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 45. 
166 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 59. Note that the British Columbia Court of Appeal recently held that 
municipalities effectively do not owe constitutional Crown obligations and, further, that applicable provincial 
governments (i.e. the Crown) are also not responsible if any of their municipalities act in a manner that infringes 
Aboriginal or treaty rights: Neskonlith Indian Band v. Salmon Arm, [2012] 4 C.N.L.R. 218, 2012 BCCA 379. This 
line of jurisprudence is very likely to evolve. 
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be delegated to non-Crown entities.167 However, the Crown may delegate “procedural aspects” 
of consultation to a project proponent.168 
The Aboriginal community in question must also consult in good faith, must not frustrate the 
Crown's efforts to consult, and will not generally hold a veto in relation to the uses to which 
contested lands may be put.169   
Much more could be said about this framework and the manner in which it has been interpreted 
and applied in subsequent cases,170 but the foregoing summary will suffice for the analysis to 
follow.   
British Columbia Supreme Court  
The chambers judge in Haida Nation dismissed the judicial-review petition denying the assertion 
that the claimed legal consultation obligations exist at law in pre-proof claim scenarios.  
Engaging the paradigm of the Sparrow justification test (which, as indicated above, provides that 
infringements of Aboriginal rights may be justified in certain circumstances), Halfyard J. decided 
that since the claimed Haida right to Aboriginal title had not been conclusively determined, and 
since “the law does not presume the existence of Aboriginal rights,”171 questions of infringement 
of such rights were speculative and, as a result, questions of applicable justification (and of the 
scope of the applicable fiduciary duty or any duty to consult) could not be framed or determined 
with any certainty.   
Despite his acknowledgement that British Columbia owed a generic legal fiduciary obligation (in 
some form) to the Haida,172 Halfyard J. drew a sharp distinction between the nature of moral and 
legal obligation, and ultimately held that British Columbia, in the circumstances of the case, had 
come under a moral but not a legal obligation to assess the strength of the Haida claim, and to 
                                                            
167 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 53. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid at para 48. Contrast this lack of a veto for Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian context with the notion of 
“free, prior and informed consent” that forms part of the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, available online at  
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf>.  
170 For commentary on post-Haida Nation case law, see generally the sources cited at supra note 156. 
171 Haida Nation BCSC, supra note 159 at para 17. 
172 Ibid at para 23. 
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consult proportionately, prior to granting applicable regulatory approvals. He cited, as apparent 
authority for his distinction between moral and legal duties, the dictum of Lamer C.J. from 
Delgamuukw that the Crown likely has a “moral, if not a legal, duty” to negotiate Aboriginal 
land claims in good faith.173   
In support of his finding that British Columbia owed a duty (though moral only) to consult the 
Haida, he noted the relative strength of the Haida claim to Aboriginal title, the “reasonable 
probability” that the claim would eventually be successful, and the fact that the claim therefore 
goes “far beyond” mere assertion.174  He also cited portions of applicable governmental (British 
Columbia) consultation policies, which mandated some measure of consultation of Aboriginal 
interests in pre-proof claim situations, and noted it was “arguable that the Crown … failed to 
comply with its own guidelines, in refusing to consult with the Haida.”175 
It is unclear what purpose he intended his articulation of the existing moral duties to serve, in 
light of his ultimate finding that such duties are not enforceable at law.  The answer to this 
question may have something to do with his treatment of the honour of the Crown principle, to 
which end he states that:   
… although I have expressed the opinion that the Crown has a moral duty to 
consult with the Haida concerning the Minister's decision to replace T.F.L. 39, I 
am not satisfied that the honour of the Crown has been diminished by the past 
failure to fulfill such moral duty. But I think the honour of the Crown will be 
called into question if this failure continues.176  (emphasis added) 
He appears to have been (awkwardly) suggesting that moral transgressions of the kind addressed 
are relevant for they may in a future instance reach some threshold level of degree so as to 
somehow, in combination with the application of the honour of the Crown principle, morph into 
a type of legally-enforceable moral transgression.  
British Columbia Court of Appeal  
                                                            
173 Ibid at para 61.  
174 Ibid at at para 50. 
175 Ibid at para 58. 
176 Ibid at para 64. 
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On appeal, Justice Lambert reversed the decision of Halfyard J. and held that there is a legal duty 
to consult Aboriginal interests in the pre-proof claim context.  Like Halfyard J., Lambert J.A. 
recognized the existence of an at-large fiduciary relationship as between the federal and 
provincial Crowns, on the one hand, and all Aboriginal peoples in Canada on the other.  He 
described it as a trust-like relationship, sourcing back to the Royal Proclamation, 1763,177 that 
“is now usually expressed” in Canadian courts as fiduciary in nature.178  He held that the duty to 
consult flows from this fiduciary relationship and is itself fiduciary in nature.179   
He looked at the authorities in relation, principally, to the nature of the fiduciary relationship and 
then determined that the legal duty to consult is justified by the fact that it would offend “the 
general guiding principle” set out in Sparrow to deny the legal consultation duty in these 
circumstances.  Specifically, he said this: 
The trust-like relationship is now usually expressed as a fiduciary duty owed by 
both the federal and Provincial Crown to the aboriginal people. Whenever that 
fiduciary duty arises, and to the extent of its operation, it is a duty of utmost good 
faith. … So the trust-like relationship and its concomitant fiduciary duty 
permeates the whole relationship between the Crown, in both of its sovereignties, 
federal and provincial, on the one hand, and the aboriginal peoples on the other. 
One manifestation of the fiduciary duty of the Crown to the aboriginal peoples is 
that it grounds a general guiding principle for s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1982. … It would be contrary to that guiding principle to interpret s. 35(1) … as if 
it required that before an aboriginal right could be recognized and affirmed, it first 
had to be made the subject matter of legal proceedings; then proved to the 
satisfaction of a judge of competent jurisdiction; and finally made the subject of a 
declaratory or other order of the court. That is not what s. 35(1) says and it would 
                                                            
177 R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No.1. 
178 Haida Nation BCCA, supra note 145 at para 34. 
179 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2002 BCCA 462, 216 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at para 63 [Haida 
BCCA No. 2]. 
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be contrary to the guiding principles of s. 35(1), as set out in R. v. Sparrow, to 
give it that interpretation.180 
Lambert J.A. also commented on the finding of the chambers judge that there were only moral 
duties owed in this instance. He disputed both the reasoning that Lamer C.J.’s dictum from 
Delgamuukw supported such a finding, as well as the “relevance” in any event of the concept of 
a moral duty to these proceedings.181 
Lambert J.A. did not specifically engage the honour of the Crown principle. 
Supreme Court of Canada  
Chief Justice McLachlin upheld Lambert J.A.’s ruling that there is a legal duty to consult in pre-
proof claim scenarios. However, she described the applicable founding doctrine in a manner 
significantly distinct from his dicta.  Following intervening precedent,182 she adopted a position 
contrary to both the chambers judge and Lambert J.A. on the issue of whether a fiduciary duty is 
owed at large by the Crown to all Aboriginal peoples in Canada, stating that this duty only arises 
in relation to “sufficiently specific” interests, and does not exist at large.183   
McLachlin C.J. held that both the legal duty to consult and the legal duty to accommodate 
(assuming the latter is revealed through appropriate consultation) exist as progeny of the “core 
precept” that the honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples.  
Further, she sourced this underlying precept in two observable ways: (1) as a practical result of 
the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown over the Haida lands184 and (2) as a corollary 
of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.185   
                                                            
180 Haida Nation BCCA No. 1, supra note 145 at paras 34-37. 
181 Ibid at para 23. 
182 The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Wewaykum, supra note 34, was released after the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal issued its decision in Haida Nation BCCA, supra note 145. 
183 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 18. 
184 Ibid at para 32. 
185 Ibid at para 20.   
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She explained that section 35 constitutes a “promise of rights recognition,” describing Aboriginal 
rights as “potential rights,”186 and stating that during the (long) ongoing processes of negotiation, 
rights determination, and reconciliation, the Crown must honourably respect the interests that 
inhere in such potential rights.187  
Of particular relevance to the current project, she described the doctrinal intersection between 
Crown honour accountability and fiduciary accountability (and the emergent centrality of the 
honour principle) as follows: 
The government's duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their 
interests is grounded in the honour of the Crown. The honour of the Crown is 
always at stake in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples … It is not a mere 
incantation, but rather a core precept that finds its application in concrete 
practices. … The honour of the Crown gives rise to different duties in different 
circumstances. Where the Crown has assumed discretionary control over specific 
Aboriginal interests, the honour of the Crown gives rise to a fiduciary duty … As 
explained in [Wewaykum], at para. 81, the term "fiduciary duty" does not connote 
a universal trust relationship encompassing all aspects of the relationship between 
the Crown and Aboriginal peoples: 
... “fiduciary duty” as a source of plenary Crown liability covering 
all aspects of the Crown-Indian band relationship .... overshoots 
the mark. The fiduciary duty imposed on the Crown does not exist 
at large but in relation to specific Indian interests. 
Here, Aboriginal rights and title have been asserted but have not been defined or 
proven. The Aboriginal interest in question is insufficiently specific for the 
honour of the Crown to mandate that the Crown act in the Aboriginal group's best 
                                                            
186 On this notion of section 35 constituting only a “promise” of rights to come, as opposed to recognition of rights 
that already exist, see supra note 25. 
187 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at paras 20 and 67. 
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interest, as a fiduciary, in exercising discretionary control over the subject of the 
right or title.188 
As noted above, McLachlin C.J. describes the nexus between Crown honour and fiduciary 
accountability in a manner that fundamentally reverses earlier doctrine. Recall that she herself in 
Mitchell referred to the Crown honour mandate as “a duty characterized as fiduciary,”189 and 
recall, further, that Lamer C.J. in Van der Peet likewise stated that “[t]he Crown has a fiduciary 
obligation to Aboriginal peoples with the result that in dealings between the government and 
Aboriginals, the honour of the Crown is at stake.”190 Here, however, McLachlin C.J. states that 
(in applicable circumstances) “the honour of the Crown gives rise to a fiduciary duty.”191   
Furthermore, though she reconceptualises the honour of the Crown principle as the broader or 
over-arching source of obligation – the fiduciary duty an off-shoot of this broader constitutional 
source – she does so (unfortunately) without acknowledging that fundamental doctrinal 
reorientation was at play, and that structural conceptual components of previous doctrine were 
effectively discarded. 
On the general content of the honour of the Crown principle, and in contrast to any applicable 
“off-shoot” fiduciary obligation which she describes as involving a mandate to act “with 
reference to the best interests” of a given Aboriginal community,192 McLachlin C.J. explains 
that: 
[p]ending settlement, the Crown is bound by its honour to balance societal and 
Aboriginal interests in making decisions that may affect Aboriginal claims. The 
Crown may be required to make decisions in the face of disagreement as to the 
adequacy of its response to Aboriginal concerns. Balance and compromise will 
then be necessary.193 
                                                            
188 Ibid at para 18. 
189 Mitchell, supra note 29 at para 9. 
190 Van der Peet, supra note 26 at para 24. 
191 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 18. 
192 Ibid at para 18. 
193 Ibid at para 45. 
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As will become clear in the next chapter when I examine the general nature of fiduciary 
obligation, notions of balancing the interests of one’s beneficiary against those of others and 
having discretion to compromise a beneficiary’s interests, run counter to the core of conventional 
fiduciary doctrine which singularly purports to guard against precisely such behaviour.  
I will now change course and intersect Dworkin’s rights thesis with Haida Nation’s honour of 
the Crown construct so as to provide added clarity as to the doctrinal nature of this construct and 
its potential as the central doctrinal framework for Crown/Aboriginal Law. 
1. A Dworkinian Conceptualization 
 
We know that in Haida Nation, the Haida argued that the Crown owes a specific legal obligation 
to meaningfully consult regarding Haida interests. We know McLachlin C.J. ultimately 
recognized this Crown obligation, which she sourced to the honour of the Crown.  We know that 
for Dworkin a legal obligation corresponds with some legal right. So, as a starting point, note 
that what the Haida were claiming (and indeed what was enforced) was a right to be honourably 
consulted prior to the granting of any such permits (even though enforcement of that right 
constituted a disservice to the political rights of others – Weyerhaeuser for instance).  
This right to consultation is meaningfully distinct from the Haida’s asserted right to 
constitutional Aboriginal title; while the latter (the asserted section 35 right to Aboriginal title) is 
clearly relevant to the interpretation and enforcement of the former (the right to be honourably 
consulted), it was not in any way itself enforced in this case. The asserted section 35 right to 
Aboriginal title, is simply one part of the novel in progress; a dominant structural component of 
the applicable theoretical, constitutional story, but indeed only one component among many.   
The affirmed Haida right to be honourably consulted by the provincial Crown in these 
circumstances is, in accordance with Dworkin’s account, a type of “political trump”; a concrete, 
institutional legal right, substantially defined so as to be capable of adjudication (i.e. as an 
independent cause of action), the enforcement of which enhances and protects the overall “state 
of affairs” in which it is enjoyed. The applicable “state of affairs” in Haida Nation – i.e. the 
theoretical constitutional story as a whole evincing our “constitutional morality” (a conception of 
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which theory, mirroring the dictates of Dworkin’s rights thesis, was taken up by and articulated 
by McLachlin C.J.) – included, among others, the following aspects: the Constitution Act, 1982 
recognizes and affirms certain Aboriginal rights (in section 35); identification and definition of 
many such rights has yet to occur (partly due to the failure of the constitutional mechanism, 
section 37, for defining those rights194) and is an ongoing, organic process;195 the Haida have a 
“reasonable probability” of making out such a right but have not yet done so, and; a denial of the 
claimed legal duty to consult in these circumstances could have the effect of significantly 
robbing the “potential” section 35 right of much of its intended benefit prior to its even being 
established.   
Moreover, this right (to be honourably consulted) therefore exists for the reason that its denial 
would “retard” or “endanger” the context in which the potential section 35 right is anticipated. 
Let us now apply Dworkinian theory to specific instances of how the three respective judges 
reasoned in the Haida Nation litigation. Recall that the chambers judge drew a distinction 
between moral and legal obligation and ultimately held that the Crown owed only a moral duty 
to the Haida. Here, Dworkinian theory may lead us to conclude that Halfyard J. erred in his 
reliance upon a false distinction, and that he ought to have enforced the obligation he recognized 
as existing. Recall that for Dworkin, a fundamental dimension of adjudication is the (legal) 
animation of aspects of “community morality” (i.e. those that have a demonstrably sufficient 
“fit” with applicable aspects of the “novel to date”).196  
Lambert J.A., for the Court of Appeal, ruled in a manner much more consistent with Dworkin’s 
rights thesis.  He looked at the applicable authorities, noted the indication, from Guerin and 
Sparrow, of an abstract principle (itself a manifestation of the fiduciary nature of the relationship 
at large between the Crown and all Aboriginal peoples in Canada), said to be a “general guiding 
                                                            
194 See supra note 25. 
195  On Aboriginal rights as themselves “organic” in nature, see Brian Slattery, “The Generative Structure of 
Aboriginal Rights” (2007) 38 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 595.  In this article, Professor Slattery describes a “new constitutional 
paradigm” that conceptualizes “generic” Aboriginal rights that have the ability to renew themselves, to grow and 
change over time (i.e. in contrast to the old paradigm – one, he argues, that is in the process of being discarded by 
the Supreme Court of Canada – where Aboriginal rights were seen as merely “historical” in nature). See also: Brian 
Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown,” supra note 114 at 436 where he talks about Haida 
Nation and Taku River effectively confirming this paradigm for Crown/Aboriginal Law (i.e. where section 35 itself 
constitutes a “generative constitutional order”). 
196 See supra notes 74, 81, and 98, and the text surrounding each. 
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principle” for section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and then interpreted the claimed right (i.e. 
to honourable consultation) in accordance with the spirit of that principle, the applicable, 
community morality.  
McLachlin C.J., however, was faced with the fact that after Lambert J.A.’s decision issued, the 
Supreme Court of Canada, in Wewaykum, ruled conclusively on the issue of whether or not a 
fiduciary relationship exists at large as between the Crown and all Aboriginal peoples. Where 
Binnie J. expressly noted in that decision that the at-large fiduciary relationship does not exist, 
this had the effect of undercutting the finding to the contrary by Lambert J.A.  Recall that the 
“general guiding principle” relied upon by Lambert J.A. was held to be a specific manifestation 
of the fiduciary relationship which now, in light of Wewaykum, could no longer be assumed to 
exist (i.e. at large).  
However, McLachlin C.J. was evidently of a similar mind to Lambert J.A. in relation to the 
content and implications of the applicable Dworkinian “community morality,” since after her 
review of the authorities (indeed, as noted above, after taking up a general theory in relation to 
the applicable “constitutional morality”), she focused upon an additional abstract principle, that 
the Crown must always act honourably in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples (which principle, 
perplexingly and as noted above, was initially used to co-source the “general guiding principle” 
articulated in Sparrow), and interpreted this principle as determinative and as the foundation of 
the claimed, concrete right of the Haida to be consulted and to have its interests accommodated 
in relation to ongoing forestry on Haida Gwaii.  Indeed, this decision was, in accordance with the 
Dworkinian account presented, in the form of the next (best) chapter for the novel in progress, all 
things considered.  
What then of the legal rule that was established by McLachlin C.J. in this case?   
Recall that for Dworkin, rules are a type of “all or nothing” proposition that dictate specific 
results: “if the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the 
answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not…”.  Principles, on the other hand, take a 
different form and “incline a decision one way, though not conclusively, and they survive intact 
when they do not prevail.”   
55 
 
The principle, therefore, that the Crown must always act honourably in its dealings with 
Aboriginal peoples is clearly a Dworkinian abstract principle. 
The Dworkinian rule espoused in Haida Nation was simply that if the Crown has knowledge of 
an asserted Aboriginal right and it is contemplating conduct that may impact that right, it must 
honourably consult the community asserting the right in accordance with the legal framework set 
out in the case. This is an “all or nothing” proposition that dictates specific results, and it 
therefore carries “enactment force.” Underlying this rule then, as expressly referred to in the rule 
itself by the word “honourably”197 is this principle that the honour of the Crown is always at 
stake.  The principle does not dictate specific results, but rather, as McLachlin C.J. explains in 
Haida Nation, “finds its application in concrete practices.”198 Further, this principle then must 
only exert a type of “gravitational force” (i.e. on future judges) in accordance with the rights 
thesis, which notion (again) is consistent with McLachlin C.J.’s dictum in Haida Nation.   
Surely, however, something more doctrinally profound was generated here inherent in the nature 
of McLachlin C.J.’s “core precept”. One certainly senses that she gave it an interpretation that 
transformed its nature and function.199 In accordance with Dworkin’s account, however, we may 
conclude that McLachlin C.J. simply altered (probably dramatically) the degree of “gravitational 
force” that this principle is to have on any future author of the unfolding chain novel, even 
though in light of its form this degree could not reach that of enactment force since it does not by 
itself dictate specific results. She also, of course, reconceptualised its ultimate source; where it 
was previously held that the honour of the Crown principle flowed from the fact that 
Crown/Aboriginal relationships were deemed to be fiduciary relationships, McLachlin C.J. 
reasoned in Haida Nation that it actually flows principally from section 35 itself and from the 
reality of de facto Crown sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples and lands.200 
                                                            
197 Recall also that McLachlin C.J. stated in Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 45, that the “controlling question” 
for the Crown when consulting with Aboriginal peoples about potential impact to their rights is “what is required to 
uphold the honour of the Crown?”    
198 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 16. 
199 See, e.g., McCabe, The Honour of the Crown and its Fiduciary Duties to Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 49 at 
57: “Early in the post-1982 period the Supreme Court made extensive use of the fiduciary concept in aid of the 
reconciliation imperative. Latterly it has concentrated on the idea of the honour of the Crown as a more 
comprehensive principle on which to found conclusions…” 
200 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at paras 20 and 32. 
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Furthermore, the Haida Nation decision makes it much more likely that the honour of the Crown 
will be addressed by future judges; that unlike other principles, this one must now always be 
considered as part of any legal adjudication in Canada involving at least those instances where 
there is an allegation of an infringement of an Aboriginal or treaty right (since Crown honour is 
“always” at stake in such dealings).201   
Moreover, in the specific scenario where a judge is addressing the issue of whether or not an 
instance of consultation and accommodation is legally sufficient (i.e. honourable), when he or 
she is interpreting, that is, the claim of a particularized concrete consultation right, the honour of 
the Crown principle is indeed part of the applicable rule. 
From a doctrinal perspective, and as noted at the outset, organizing an entire area of law around 
an abstract principle is not novel. For conceptual assistance, one may contrast the honour of the 
Crown principle to the neighbour principle that similarly founds and organizes tort law.  The 
neighbour principle, grounded as part of the applicable “community morality” in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson,202 that mandates we must not injure our neighbour (contrast with the principle that the 
Crown must always act honourably in its dealings with Aboriginal people) was, in nature, a 
Dworkinian abstract principle both before and after Donoghue v. Stevenson. 
In Haida Nation then, it may be observed that there was (arguably) no legal doctrine available 
(particularly since Justice Binnie, in Wewaykum, had jettisoned the notion of an applicable at-
large fiduciary relationship between the Crown and all Aboriginal peoples) to govern the claimed 
consultation rights at issue since no (established) constitutional rights were explicit.  So indeed, 
Hercules had no choice (in terms of recognizing the claimed concrete consultation rights) but to 
locate an applicable abstract principle within the “constitutional morality” from which to source 
the claimed rights. This is, in effect, a Dworkinian conceptualization of the adjudication 
endeavour in Haida Nation in terms of the specific development of the honour of the Crown 
principle. 
                                                            
201 Note that in Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5, which is discussed in greater detail in the next subsection, 
the Supreme Court recognized the honour of the Crown principle as triggering in a (constitutional) context where no 
section 35 rights were at issue, on the basis that the “reconciliation project” was itself at issue in light of the fact that 
the case involved issues related to the assertion of Crown sovereignty in southern Manitoba, and the manner in 
which the Crown sought to “reconcile” that assertion with interests of applicable Metis people living in the region at 
that time. 
202 Supra note 15. 
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Finally, it is important for present purposes to situate the ubiquitous “reconciliation” mandate 
within my (Dworkinian) account presented.203 In Haida Nation, the Chief Justice explained that 
the reconciliation “of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the 
Crown” is an over-arching “goal” that section 35 “demands”204 (and, of course, she made the 
important concession in this case that Crown sovereignty over Aboriginal lands and peoples is 
“de facto” only at present, meaning it is something less than fully legitimate at law205). What 
then are we to make of the Dworkinian form of this over-arching reconciliation goal? 
Recall that Dworkin distinguishes principles from policies, explaining that (a) judges principally 
deal in the former in enforcing (“individuated”) rights, while (b) legislators principally deal in 
the latter in promoting (“non-individuated”) community goals. He further suggests that 
“arguments of policy” (i.e. as opposed to “arguments of principle”) are typically inapplicable to a 
judge’s primary task in recognizing and enforcing (or not) a particularized right being alleged.206  
Ultimately, then, the “reconciliation” mandate, described in Haida Nation as a “goal”, takes the 
form of a Dworkinian non-individuated Canadian, constitutional policy objective; that is, the 
Supreme Court clearly understands this reconciliation mandate to be the central policy dictate 
implicit in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In Haida Nation, McLachlin C.J. goes to 
some length to distinguish the reconciliation mandate from the honour of the Crown principle 
and its off-shoot duties. She states that Crown/Aboriginal reconciliation is neither “a final legal 
remedy in the usual sense” nor a “distant legalistic goal.”207 Rather, she describes it as an 
ongoing constitutional process that is best achieved outside the courtroom (e.g. though 
“negotiations”). 208  And she conceptualizes the mandate of Crown honour (i.e. enforceable 
judicially) as serving a protective and facilitative role in relation to the (policy-oriented) 
reconciliation goal, stating that legally binding the Crown to honourable conduct in particular 
scenarios regarding alleged (and individuated) rights and obligations both (a) helps move us 
                                                            
203 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 14. 
204 Ibid at para 14, 35, and 38. 
205 Ibid at para 32. 
206 This conceptual framework of Dworkin’s differentiating principles from policies has been explicitly adopted for 
contextual use by the Supreme Court in more than one instance: see, e.g., Grondin, supra note 7 at 375, and in Re 
Residential Tenancies Act, supra note 7 at 736. 
207 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 32 and 33 
208 Ibid at para 38.  
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“further down the path of reconciliation” 209  and (b) is effectively required as part of the 
community and constitutional morality acknowledged in Haida Nation; that is, that honourable 
conduct is “required if we are to achieve” the strived-for Crown/Aboriginal constitutional 
reconciliation.210 
iii. As Further Developed Post Haida Nation 
 
In the wake of Haida Nation’s transformation of the fundamentals of Crown/Aboriginal Law, 
detailed in the preceding section, lower courts have been at substantial pains to properly 
conceptualize the prevailing doctrinal construct.211 In their defence, and as I contend centrally in 
this project, the Supreme Court’s transformation of its doctrine is not yet complete; they are 
incrementally mending a materially flawed (and dysfunctional) doctrine whose fundamentals are 
presently incongruent, and are working to re-orient years of jurisprudence under a new construct. 
They are doing so without (yet) having explicitly acknowledged either the mistake they made in 
importing fiduciary concepts into the core of Crown/Aboriginal Law or the fundamental 
doctrinal reversal that Haida Nation effected;212 they have not yet jettisoned those concepts 
entirely, leaving significant doctrinal uncertainty and overlap. It is indeed difficult to 
conceptualize a meaningful distinction between a duty to act honourably towards another and a 
duty to act with some reference to another’s best interest; and hence confusion in the lower 
courts. 
That all said, there have been some notable developments specifically regarding the doctrinal 
fundamentals of the Supreme Court’s modern honour of the Crown principle. The majority of the 
jurisprudence in Crown/Aboriginal Law since Haida Nation has been centrally focussed on the 
honour of the Crown’s (off-shoot) duty to consult and accommodate. The legal framework 
governing that important duty, and how it applies in both treaty and non-treaty contexts, has been 
                                                            
209 Ibid at paras 45 and 49.  
210 Ibid at para 17. 
211 See supra note 39. 
212 See, e.g., supra notes 188 and 189 and the text surrounding each. The closest they have come was in the 
comment of Deschamps J. in her minority decision in Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 14 at para 105 where she 
noted with implicit approval the fact that Crown honour accountability had been, in applicable recent decisions, 
“substituted” in for Crown fiduciary accountability.  
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animated substantially.213 As already indicated, this specific Crown obligation has been, by far, 
the most litigated in Crown/Aboriginal Law in recent years. 
Comparatively little guidance or clarification, however, has been provided in applicable 
decisions in terms of the fundamental nature of the honour of the Crown principle itself (and its 
conceptual nexus with Crown fiduciary obligations). The most significant addition to the law in 
this latter regard came in the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in Manitoba Metis 
Federation.214  In that decision, the Supreme Court recognized what is effectively the second 
explicit progeny of the honour of the Crown principle, the duty to purposively and diligently 
fulfill applicable constitutional obligations. The nature of that specific duty, as developed in that 
case, is discussed shortly.  First, I will comment on some of the general clarifications that the 
Supreme Court has made post Haida Nation regarding its modern honour of the Crown principle. 
One of the major themes emanating from the post-Haida Nation decisions in this area is the 
confirmation of the doctrinal centrality of the honour of the Crown principle in 
Crown/Aboriginal Law, and the doctrinal usurpation by that principle of the jurisdiction 
previously taken up by the Supreme Court’s generalized fiduciary principle. In Little 
Salmon/Carmacks, for instance, Justice Binnie describes the new doctrinal construct (i.e. the 
honour of the Crown and its applicable off-shoot Crown obligations) as, effectively, the 
“essential legal framework” for Crown liability doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal Law. He confirms, 
consistent with the Dworkinian account presented above, that within this framework, the honour 
of the Crown concept itself operates doctrinally as a “principle” (indeed a “constitutional 
principle”), further describing it, conceptually, as an “important anchor” for this area of the 
law.215   
Interestingly, in a minority decision in Little Salmon/Carmacks, Deschamps J. described the 
honour of the Crown principle in particularly lofty terms as one of five core principles 
underlying constitutionalism generally in Canada. Specifically, she stated as follows: 
                                                            
213 See, e.g., the sources cited in supra note 156. 
214 Supra note 5. 
215 Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 14 at para 42. 
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In Reference re Secession of Quebec … this Court identified four principles that 
underlie the whole of our constitution and of its evolution:  (1) constitutionalism 
and the rule of law; (2) democracy; (3) respect for minority rights; and (4) 
federalism. These four organizing principles are interwoven in three basic 
compacts: (1) one between the Crown and individuals with respect to the 
individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms; (2) one between the non-
Aboriginal population and Aboriginal peoples with respect to Aboriginal rights 
and treaties with Aboriginal peoples; and (3) a “federal compact” between the 
provinces. The compact that is of particular interest in the instant case is the 
second one, which, as we will see, actually incorporates a fifth principle 
underlying our Constitution:  the honour of the Crown.216 
Notably, Deschamps J. also acknowledged that the honour of the Crown principle has effectively 
replaced the Supreme Court’s previous fiduciary-based doctrinal construct. This is the first 
instance of the Supreme Court explicitly conceding the doctrinal transformation that has been 
effected.  In doing so, Deschamps J. implicitly endorses this transformation on the basis that the 
previous construct was both paternalistic and doctrinally limited: 
This Court has, over time, substituted the principle of the honour of the Crown for 
a concept — the fiduciary duty — that, in addition to being limited to certain 
types of relations that did not always concern the constitutional rights of 
Aboriginal peoples, had paternalistic overtones …217 
Additionally, and still speaking in relation to the centrality of the honour of the Crown principle, 
several other Supreme Court decisions since Haida Nation provide statements confirming the 
transformed and honour-based construct as the new doctrinal core of Crown/Aboriginal Law, 
each in slightly differing but effectively similar doctrinal conceptualizations.218   
                                                            
216 Ibid at para 97. 
217 Ibid at para 105. 
218 See, e.g., Taku River, supra note 4 at paras 24-25 (per McLachlin C.J.):   
The duty of honour derives from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty in the face of prior Aboriginal 
occupation. It has been enshrined in s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which recognizes and affirms 
existing Aboriginal rights and titles. Section 35(1) has, as one of its purposes, negotiation of just settlement 
of Aboriginal claims. In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, the Crown must act honourably, in 
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Another notable doctrinal clarification regarding the honour of the Crown principle provided by 
the Supreme Court, in its majority decision in Manitoba Metis Federation, is that the honour of 
the Crown principle is not, by itself, an independent cause of action. 219  This is a logical 
conclusion of my conceptualization, above, of the honour of the Crown “precept” as a 
Dworkinian “abstract principle.” Recall that Dworkinian abstract principles do not dictate 
results; rather they incline decisions one way or another and can give rise to concrete obligations. 
Concrete obligations, for their part, do dictate results and may constitute independent causes of 
action.  
Comparatively, the neighbour principle (again, an abstract Dworkinian principle) in Tort Law is 
not by itself an independent cause of action; rather it gives rise to specific “torts” such as the tort 
of negligence (of which there are also sub-varietals), the tort of nuisance, or the tort of trespass 
(just to name a few); these types of specific torts are Dworkinian concrete obligations and 
independent causes of action. 
Moreover, some other notable findings made by the Supreme Court relating to the nature of the 
honour of the Crown principle post Haida Nation include: (a) that it sources back to the Royal 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
accordance with its historical and future relationship with the Aboriginal peoples in question. The Crown’s 
honour cannot be interpreted narrowly or technically, but must be given full effect in order to promote the 
process of reconciliation mandated by s. 35(1). …  The obligation to consult does not arise only upon proof 
of an Aboriginal claim, in order to justify infringement. That understanding of consultation would deny the 
significance of the historical roots of the honour of the Crown, and deprive it of its role in the reconciliation 
process.; 
Mikisew, supra note 4 at para 51 (per Binnie J.): 
The duty to consult is grounded in the honour of the Crown, and it is not necessary for present purposes to 
invoke fiduciary duties.  The honour of the Crown is itself a fundamental concept governing treaty 
interpretation and application that was referred to by Gwynne J. of this Court as a treaty obligation as far 
back as 1895, four years before Treaty 8 was concluded: Province of Ontario v. Dominion of Canada 
(1895), 25 S.C.R. 434, at pp. 511-12 per Gwynne J. (dissenting).  While he was in the minority in his view 
that the treaty obligation to pay Indian annuities imposed a trust on provincial lands, nothing was said by 
the majority in that case to doubt that the honour of the Crown was pledged to the fulfilment of its 
obligations to the Indians. This had been the Crown’s policy as far back as the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
…The honour of the Crown exists as a source of obligation independently of treaties as well, of course.; 
Moses, supra note 161 at para 116 (per LeBel and Deschamps JJ, dissenting): 
the honour of the Crown infuses both the making of treaties and, ultimately, the interpretation of treaties by 
the courts … The honour of the Crown requires it, in the treaty‑making process, to try to reconcile 
Aboriginal rights and interests with those of the public more generally, because the Crown must be mindful 
of Aboriginal interests but must also consider the public interest. Modern agreements thus reflect a mixture 
of rights, obligations, payments and concessions that have already been carefully balanced. (footnotes 
omitted) 
219 Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5 at para 73. 
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Proclamation (1763)220; (b) that it applies in the context of modern treaties as well as historical 
treaties (operating both in an interpretive role221 and in the context of supplying deficiencies to a 
written modern treaty222); that it may not be contracted out of223; that it will at times compel a 
relaxing of procedural defences that may otherwise be available to litigants;224 that specific 
Aboriginal-held rights that correspond the duties flowing from the honour of the Crown principle 
(e.g. the right to be consulted, where applicable) are likely not themselves section 35 Aboriginal 
or treaty rights but rather play “a supporting role”;225 and that despite the various rhetorical 
pronouncements in multiple Supreme Court decisions that the honour of the Crown is “always at 
stake” when Crown representatives are dealing with Aboriginal peoples, it is only actually 
engaged in the context of constitutional-related matters.226 
Finally, regarding the doctrinal function of the honour of the Crown principle, the Supreme Court 
recently stated in its majority decision in Manitoba Metis Federation that “the ultimate purpose 
of the honour of the Crown [principle] is the reconciliation of pre-existing Aboriginal societies 
with the assertion of Crown sovereignty.”227 (emphasis added) Note that this conceptualization 
of the doctrinal intersection between the honour of the Crown principle and the oft-referenced 
reconciliation mandate is, to some extent, at odds with the Dworkinian account presented in the 
previous section. That is, the reconciliation mandate fits best, in the Dworkinian account, 
conceptualized as the fundamental purpose of section 35 (as has been explicitly noted by the 
Supreme Court elsewhere228) and not, that is, a purpose of the honour of the Crown principle 
itself. As indicated above, the reconciliation mandate, in Dworkinian form, is more of a policy-
oriented objective (or community goal) and, therefore, falls more into the jurisdiction of the 
                                                            
220 Mikisew, supra note 4 at para 50. 
221 Moses, supra note 161 at para 118. 
222 Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 14. 
223 Ibid. 
224 See, e.g., Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5 at paras 136-144. 
225 See supra note 14 at para 14. 
226 Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5 at para 66. 
227 Ibid at para 66. 
228 See, e.g., Taku River, supra note 4 at para 24: “Section 35(1) has, as one of its purposes, negotiation of just 
settlement of Aboriginal claims … The Crown’s honour … must be given full effect in order to promote the process 
of reconciliation mandated by s.35(1)”; Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 45: “consultation and accommodation 
before final claims resolution, while challenging, is not impossible, and indeed is an essential corollary to the 
honourable process of reconciliation that s. 35 demands. It preserves the Aboriginal interest pending claims 
resolution and fosters a relationship between the parties that makes possible negotiations, the preferred process for 
achieving ultimate reconciliation.” 
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legislative branch of government, and not the judicial branch. The reconciliation mandate, of 
course, is always set in the background of Aboriginal-related constitutional jurisprudence but is 
not, in accordance with the account presented in this project, specifically enforced judicially. In 
contrast, the honour of the Crown principle is enforced judicially (i.e. through the actionable 
duties that are seen as flowing from it) and it functions not grandly to effect the reconciliation 
mandate but rather somewhat more modestly to specifically regulate Crown conduct (again, 
judicially) in those instances where the reconciliation mandate is being carried out (i.e. by other 
branches of government), and thus it plays a supporting role (i.e. to both facilitate and protect the 
reconciliation project).  
Manitoba Metis Federation's Duty to Purposively and Diligently Fulfill Applicable 
Constitutional Obligations 
Manitoba Metis Federation was the first case post Haida Nation where the Supreme Court 
meaningfully addressed the fundamental, conceptual nexus between Crown honour 
accountability and Crown fiduciary accountability in Aboriginal contexts. It was also the first 
instance post Haida Nation where the Supreme Court used the honour of the Crown principle to 
recognize a specific type of enforceable Crown honour; that is, a specific concrete obligation 
owed by the Crown to Aboriginal peoples. This concrete obligation – a duty to honourably (i.e. 
purposively and diligently) discharge constitutional obligations – is the second main Crown-
honour varietal that has been effectively incubated as such by the Supreme Court (Haida 
Nation’s duty to consult and accommodate being the first). 
This case dealt with allegations of Crown misconduct in relation to the carrying out of statutory 
obligations undertaken by the Crown in the Manitoba Act (which is a constitutional document; it 
is identified as part of the “Constitution of Canada” in section 52 of  the Constitution Act, 1982 
and appended as a separate schedule thereto). In the complex circumstances in which the 
Manitoba region was ultimately settled as part of Canada, Metis peoples of the region 
(specifically a group of French-speaking Roman Catholic Metis; the dominant demographic 
group in the region) had agreed to become part of Canada after a series of discussions with the 
Crown. As part of those discussions, the Crown undertook a number of specific commitments, 
which commitments were ultimately formalized as part of the Manitoba Act. Among those 
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commitments was an agreement by the federal government to grant 1.4 million acres of land to 
applicable Metis children, thus giving them “a head start” in the context of what promised to be a 
dramatic influx of non-Aboriginal settlers looking to acquire land. The central issue in the case 
was whether the Crown was liable for misconduct based on the manner in which it discharged 
this commitment (among other problems, the administration of the land grants to Metis children 
was slow and ineffectual).229 And the main two potential bases of Crown liability considered by 
the Supreme Court were (1) a breach of Crown honour accountability, and (2) a breach of Crown 
fiduciary accountability. 
Ultimately, the Court issued a declaration that the Crown had failed to act diligently in the 
context of administering the land grants that were to go to Metis children, thus effectively 
constituting Crown dishonour. The case had been largely framed and argued in the lower courts 
as an alleged breach of Crown fiduciary accountability. However, the Supreme Court determined 
that fiduciary obligations did not arise in the circumstances of this case. They held that that the 
claimed declaratory relief could be granted on the basis of a demonstrable breach of an 
enforceable concrete obligation flowing from the honour of the Crown principle. The concrete 
obligation recognized in the majority decision as having been breached here by the Crown was 
articulated as a duty to purposively and diligently discharge constitutional obligations that are 
owed specifically to Aboriginal peoples. 
I comment more in Chapter Three on the specifics regarding the manner in which the Supreme 
Court disposed of the claim in Crown fiduciary accountability. For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to note that (1) the claim to the effect that the Crown had breached the Haida Nation-
framed “off-shoot” fiduciary obligation was denied on the basis that there was no evidence that 
the Metis had a constitutionally-protected, proprietary land interest over which the Crown had 
assumed discretion, and that it therefore did not meet the applicable test set out in the Wewaykum 
and Haida Nation decisions230, and (2) where the Court, also, applied conventional fiduciary 
                                                            
229 The Metis had also claimed Crown liability based on an alleged failure to honourably discharge another of their 
obligations in the Manitoba Act, namely the commitment by the federal government to formally recognize existing 
Metis landholdings in the region (some held by Metis, others by non-Metis). The Supreme Court rejected this claim 
on the basis that that Crown commitment was “not a promise made specifically to an Aboriginal group, but rather a 
benefit made generally available to all settlers, Metis and non-Metis alike. The honour of the Crown is not engaged 
whenever an Aboriginal person accesses a benefit.”: Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5 at para 95. 
230 Ibid at paras 51-59. 
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doctrine to the circumstances of the case, they explained that conventional fiduciary 
accountability does not arise here because there was no evidence that the Crown had undertaken 
to act exclusively in the interest of the Metis, which is a precondition for the grounding of 
fiduciary accountability in the conventional context.231 Again, these dynamics are dealt with in 
greater detail in the next chapter. 
The claim in Crown honour, for its part, was successful despite the fact that no Aboriginal or 
treaty rights were explicitly at issue (though the majority decision did analogize the right at issue 
to a treaty right232). Recall that in Haida Nation, the honour of the Crown principle was defined 
in part as a corollary to the constitutionalization of Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982.233 However, there were here, in a Dworkinian sense, constitutional 
rights at issue; though not articulated as such, what was effectively enforced in this decision was 
the Metis right to honourable Crown conduct in the discharge of the statutory (indeed 
constitutional) obligation.  
In the majority decision, the facts of the case were found to engage the honour of the Crown 
principle because although no section 35 rights were at issue, the explicit obligation owed in this 
case (i.e. to administer land grants to Metis children) was constitutional and owed exclusively to 
a Metis collective, and therefore, materially, was linked to the broader Crown/Aboriginal, 
constitutional reconciliation mandate.234 Specifically, the majority stated that the Constitution 
Act, 1982, generally, “is at the root of the honour of the Crown, and an explicit obligation to an 
Aboriginal group placed therein engages the honour of the Crown at its core.”235 
Where commenting on the specific off-shoot obligation recognized in this case as flowing from 
the honour of the Crown principle (i.e. the duty to purposively and diligently fulfill constitutional 
obligations), the majority stated that this duty “varies with the situation in which it is engaged” 
and that “what constitutes honourable conduct” in any given situation, will also vary depending 
on context.236 It was stated that the key question, in circumstances where this duty is engaged, is 
                                                            
231 Ibid at paras 60-63. 
232 Ibid at para 92. 
233 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 20. 
234 Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5 at paras 68-72. 
235 Ibid at para 70. 
236 Ibid at para 74. 
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whether or not the Crown acted “with diligence to pursue the fulfillment of the purposes of the 
obligation” and “in a way that would achieve its objectives.”237 
Returning, then, for a moment to Dworkin’s rights thesis, this discreet type of enforceable Crown 
honour (i.e. a duty to purposively and diligently discharge constitutional obligations) was 
recognized and articulated by the Supreme Court in Manitoba Metis Federation in the form of a 
Dworkinian concrete obligation which, recall, is an explicit mandate in rule form. Such 
obligations specify essential facts which, if established, mandate liability. Here, the specific rule 
established is this: if the Crown owes a constitutional obligation exclusively to an Aboriginal 
community, it must bring a demonstrably purposive and diligent approach to the undertaking. 
Furthermore, while this Crown honour-based duty takes Dworkinian rule form, there are 
outstanding questions regarding its scope. For instance, the Court will need to clarify what types 
of constitutional obligations trigger the duty. As just one example, it is conceivable that Crown 
obligations undertaken in historical treaties (and perhaps also in modern treaties238) may suffice. 
Moreover, as is the case with any newly-minted obligation in common law (a newly-
acknowledged tort, for instance), we can assume the content of this duty will be fleshed out 
through future decisions, and that the outstanding questions will be answered. 
It should be noted that Justice Rothstein wrote a dissent in Manitoba Metis Federation  that was 
particularly critical of the majority decision. He described the majority’s incubation of the novel 
Crown honour-based duty here as constituting a dramatic change in the law not justifiable in 
these circumstances on the basis that the case had not been framed nor argued in the context of 
that specific duty, and thus that the fundamentals of the duty had not been effectively vetted 
though the conventional litigation process.239 Rothstein J. was also critical of the merits of the 
duty itself.  He was particularly concerned with the lack of a “clear framework” for determining 
the specific types of constitutional obligations that would trigger the duty. And he cautioned that 
                                                            
237 Ibid at paras 83 and 97. 
238 Though the Supreme Court has made comments of late to the effect that they intend to treat modern treaties 
differently than historical treaties; that there will be less need in the context of modern treaties to resort to Crown 
honour accountability, and that the courts ought to “strive to respect [the] handiwork” of modern treaty parties who 
are more likely to have been “adequately resourced and professionally represented”: see Little Salmon/Carmacks, 
supra note 14 at para 54. 
239 Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5 at para 204. 
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recognition of this duty brought with it the “potential to expand Crown liability in unpredictable 
ways.”240 
For present purposes, the manner in which Rothstein J. conceptualized this new duty in contrast 
to Crown fiduciary accountability was particularly interesting. He was of the opinion that denial 
of Crown fiduciary accountability in these specific circumstances ought to have ended the 
matter. He warned that recognizing the type of Crown honour-based duty that the majority 
decision articulated “risks making claims under the honour of the Crown into ‘fiduciary duty-
light.’”241 He referred to it as a “watered down cause of action [that] would permit a claimant 
who is unable to prove a specific Aboriginal interest to ground a fiduciary duty, to still be able to 
seek relief so long as the promise was made to an Aboriginal group.”242 And, finally, he stated 
that the new duty has “a broader scope of application and a lower threshold for breach” than 
would an applicable Crown fiduciary obligation, and he noted that the new duty constitutes a 
“significant expansion of Crown liability.”243 
Rothstein J.’s reasoning here suggests he either was mis-conceptualizing the fundamentals of the 
new “essential legal framework” for Crown/Aboriginal Law set out in Haida Nation, or resisting 
them. That is, the framework set out in Haida Nation is clear that Crown honour-based duties are 
triggered in applicable circumstances where facts do not give rise to Crown fiduciary 
accountability. For instance, in Haida Nation, Crown fiduciary accountability was denied on the 
basis that the Aboriginal interest was “insufficiently specific” (i.e. since the Aboriginal right in 
question was asserted but not yet established or codified). Yet, a Crown honour-based obligation 
(the duty to consult) was recognized and enforced.  In essence, a range of obligations that take a 
type of ‘fiduciary duty light’ form was precisely what was contemplated in Haida Nation.  
Furthermore, it is unclear what Rothstein J. meant when he stated that this duty brings with it a 
“lower threshold for breach” than do Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary duties. That is, the content of a 
Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary duty, post Haida Nation and once triggered, is a mandate to act 
“with reference to the best interest” of an applicable Aboriginal group. Exactly how that mandate 
                                                            
240 Ibid at para 161. 
241 Ibid at para 208. 
242 Ibid at para 208. 
243 Ibid at para 208. 
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is intended to differ from the fundamental Crown honour mandate (i.e. to act honourably in 
dealings with an Aboriginal group) is unresolved, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.  
My contention is that Rothstein J.’s evident confusion or resistance here in relation to the 
fundamentals of the emergent honour of the Crown framework is a direct manifestation of the 
fact that the Supreme Court has not (yet) explicitly acknowledged that its non-conventional 
approach to fiduciary accountability in Crown/Aboriginal contexts was, in effect, fundamentally 
adjusted in Haida Nation, if not entirely jettisoned. That is, and as I will now begin to 
demonstrate as I move to the next chapter, Crown honour accountability – put plainly – now 
does what Crown fiduciary accountability used to do, and there is no apparent residual role for a 
non-conventional type of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary obligation (i.e. of the kind articulated in 
Haida Nation), despite the insistence to the contrary in both Haida Nation and Manitoba Metis 
Federation.  
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III. CROWN FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTABILITY IN CANADIAN CROWN/ABORIGINAL 
LAW 
 
“[T]he fiduciary jurisdiction has been hijacked to provide the conceptual foundation for the 
positive regulation of aboriginal/Crown relations…The main concern with that usage of 
fiduciary accountability…is that it will contaminate the general [fiduciary law] 
jurisprudence…The Supreme Court appears to have a distinct agenda in this context. It 
intends to control more than opportunism [the mischief predominantly controlled by 
fiduciary law], it intends to control the discretion of the Crown generally.”  
 
- Professor Robert Flannigan244   
 
From my conceptualization of the doctrinal fundamentals of the honour of the Crown principle, I 
turn now to an examination of fiduciary doctrine, the role it has played in Crown/Aboriginal 
contexts to date, and the role it may be expected to play moving forward. As noted above, 
McLachlin C.J. described applicable fiduciary obligations in Haida Nation as “off-shoot” 
obligations that will arise in limited instances (i.e. off-shoots of the honour of the Crown 
principle); namely, where the Crown has assumed substantial discretionary control over 
“sufficiently specific” Aboriginal interests. This conception of fiduciary obligations represents a 
marked departure from earlier Crown/Aboriginal jurisprudence that, as will be shown, was 
organized around a generalized and over-arching type of fiduciary obligation. This generalized 
fiduciary obligation was articulated in Sparrow as a fiduciary-based “guiding principle” that 
required generally of the Crown honest, fair, and honourable dealing in matters involving 
Aboriginal or treaty rights.245    
At least prior to Haida Nation, this principle occupied a core doctrinal position in Canadian 
Crown/Aboriginal Law; it was from this principle that other specific (fiduciary) duties were seen 
to flow.246 The doctrinal re-ordering that took place in Haida Nation, detailed in the preceding 
chapter, effectively saw the Supreme Court jettison the notion of a generalized fiduciary 
                                                            
244 Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 65-67. 
245 Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1109. See, also, Mitchell, supra note 29 at para 9. 
246 See, e.g., infra note 388 and surrounding text. 
70 
 
principle and replace it with the honour of the Crown principle. Consequently, a fiduciary 
precept (or ethic) is no longer the doctrinal fount of obligations in Crown/Aboriginal Law, but 
rather is one such (quite undeveloped) concrete obligation. 
Given this fundamental re-ordering, and mindful of the fact that a substantial body of 
jurisprudence developed around the now-discarded fiduciary-based construct, 247  this chapter 
examines the residual, much-narrowed jurisdiction of fiduciary doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal 
contexts in Canada.  
To conceptualize fiduciary doctrine generally and the specific manner in which it has been 
deployed in Crown/Aboriginal contexts, initial questions one may pose are: 
 What does it mean in Canada to say that an obligation is fiduciary in nature? 
 What does it mean in Canada to say that a relationship is fiduciary in nature? 
One would expect answers to these fundamental questions to be readily available in the 
applicable jurisprudence. Unfortunately, in both (a) Guerin, Sparrow, and Delgamuukw (i.e. the 
three cases that principally incubated the Supreme Court’s Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine), 
and (b) much of the academic commentary on the nature of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary 
doctrine, 248  these questions are dealt with in an oddly perfunctory manner. This dearth of 
doctrinal analysis on fundamental principles is striking. As I will show, the treatment of fiduciary 
doctrine in Guerin, Sparrow, and Delgamuukw is novel and, quite literally, unprecedented; 
judicial precedent was not cited in support of the adoption of fiduciary doctrine in any of these 
cases.249   
Consequently, in this chapter I look to first principles – to conventional fiduciary law 
jurisprudence – in order to better conceptualize the nature of fiduciary accountability and the role 
it may (or may not) be equipped to play in Crown/Aboriginal contexts moving forward. In the 
first part of this chapter, I examine conventional fiduciary law. It will be observed that the 
                                                            
247 See, generally, McCabe, The Honour of the Crown and its Fiduciary Duties to Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 
49. 
248 See sources cited in supra note 49. 
249 In Guerin, Dickson J. did cite two lower court decisions in support one discreet principle related to fiduciary 
doctrine, but none in support of its main doctrinal fundamentals as he interpreted them therein. See, Guerin, supra 
note 27 at 384-385. 
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Supreme Court of Canada’s general fiduciary jurisprudence has itself, at least since Guerin (not 
coincidentally), been marked by quite extraordinary doctrinal opacity. As noted in a leading 
decision, fiduciary doctrine was once described as “one of the most ill-defined, if not altogether 
misleading” areas of Canadian law.250 While this certainly complicates the task of cogently 
conceptualizing a residual jurisdiction of fiduciary accountability in Canadian Crown/Aboriginal 
Law post-Haida Nation, a substantial measure of doctrinal clarity has emerged through a recent 
line of Supreme Court decisions 251  and this clarity provides some initial clues, and initial 
guidance, regarding future doctrinal development in Crown/Aboriginal contexts.  
In the second part of this chapter, I take a closer look at the Supreme Court of Canada’s non-
conventional Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine. I track the key pronouncements beginning 
with Guerin and Sparrow, and then contrast that thread of decisions with the more recent, 
transforming dicta in Wewaykum and Haida Nation. It is noted that the Supreme Court appears 
to be seeking in these later decisions to begin aligning the fundamentals of its non-conventional 
Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine (which it had initially described as “sui generis” in 
nature252) with the core fundamentals of conventional fiduciary doctrine (itself a bit of a work in 
progress, as will be demonstrated); though full alignment of the conventional and 
(Crown/Aboriginal) non-conventional is still a ways off. These applicable fundamentals are 
addressed in some detail. 
I also return here to Dworkin’s rights thesis to conceptualize the Supreme Court’s 
Crown/Aboriginal non-conventional fiduciary doctrine – both pre and post Haida Nation – for 
what it seems to clearly be: a mistake. Despite the praise that has been heaped upon the Guerin 
decision,253 I contend that from a doctrinal perspective, the approach to fiduciary accountability 
                                                            
250 This comment was made by Justice La Forest J. in Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. 
(1989), 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 [Lac Minerals cited to S.C.R.] at 644, where, citing Professor Paul 
Finn, he stated that there are “few legal concepts more frequently invoked but less conceptually certain than that of 
the fiduciary relationship…the principle on which the obligation is based is unclear… [it is] one of the most ill-
defined, if not altogether misleading terms in our law.” 
251 KLB, supra note 59; Galambos v. Perez, supra note 59; Elder Advocates, supra note 31.  
252 Guerin, supra note 27 at 387. 
253 See, e.g., James I. Reynolds, A Breach of Duty: Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: 
Purich, 2005) at preface p. x. It is noted there that Guerin has “been ranked as the tenth most important decision of 
the Supreme Court of Canada in the twentieth century and among the top thirty significant legal events.” Note also 
Justice Binnie’s articulation of Guerin’s significance in Wewaykum, supra note 33 at para 74: “The enduring 
contribution of Guerin was to recognize that the concept of political trust did not exhaust the potential legal 
character of the multitude of relationships between the Crown and aboriginal people.” 
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employed in that decision as well as the distinct approach used in Sparrow each took the form of 
a Dworkinian mistake, a mistake which then (a) pervaded (or, in Flannigan’s words from the 
epigraph to this chapter, “contaminated”) other areas of general fiduciary law, and (b) created 
substantial doctrinal confusion and dysfunction in Crown liability doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal 
Law in Canada.  It is suggested that one of the key dynamics in the seminal Haida Nation 
decision is a mending of a materially-flawed doctrine; substantial doctrinal repair was effected in 
that decision but much work remains.   
In the final part of this chapter, I articulate a conceptual synthesis of the narrow sphere of 
doctrinal space evidently remaining for the regulation of fiduciary accountability in 
Crown/Aboriginal contexts moving forward. 
a. Conventional Fiduciary Doctrine 
 
I now step away from the Crown/Aboriginal context, temporarily, to examine the conventional 
law of fiduciary accountability. Conventional fiduciary doctrine has been described as, for 
instance, “messy”254 and “unusually vexing.”255 For its part, the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
fiduciary doctrine has been described (at least since Guerin256 ) as a “profoundly confused 
jurisprudence”257 and as following a theoretical approach consistent with “analytical nihilism,” 
devoid of practical utility. 258 An extensive review of the Supreme Court of Canada 
                                                            
254 D. Gordon Smith, “The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty,” 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1399 at 1400. 
255 Paul B. Miller, “A Theory of Fiduciary Liability,” 56(2) (2011) McGill L.J. 235 at (Q.L.) para 1. 
256 As noted in Robert Flannigan, “Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada,” supra note 55 at 447: “Guerin 
is widely recognized as the decision that signaled the Canadian departure from conventional accountability, and the 
subsequent struggle to articulate boundaries.” 
257  Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 57 at 20. 
258 Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010) at 28 (“analytical nihilism”) and 26-28:  
…the description ‘fiduciary’ must be limited to duties that are peculiar to fiduciaries because unless the 
expression is so limited it is lacking in practical utility …[it is] extremely difficult to identify what generic 
function might be served by fiduciary duties as a class, which thereby deprives the fiduciary concept of 
analytical, and therefore predictive, utility … such an approach denudes the fiduciary concept of any 
analytically valuable meaning. (footnotes omitted) 
See, also, D.A. De Mott, “Fiduciary Obligation Under Intellectual Siege: Contemporary Challenges to the Duty to 
be Loyal,” (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall J.J. 471 at 497, cited in Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 57 at 38: [i]f 
fiduciary norms are overextended, that vitiates their force and their undergirding of commitments to act loyally, 
leaving a residue of empty, albeit emphatic, rhetoric.” 
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jurisprudence259 and of leading academic commentary260 reveals that both (a) the fundamental 
components of conventional fiduciary doctrine in Canada became substantially obscured post-
Guerin, (b) remained unresolved for decades (and still are, to some extent), and (c) was 
substantially reconceptualised (and repaired) in a quite recent line of Supreme Court decisions.261   
There are a host of competing theories among commentators (and Supreme Court justices) on 
what fiduciary law is, and ought to be, all about. Overviewing the broad selection of theories and 
pronouncements, fiduciary law in Canada may be understood, at a high level of abstraction, as a 
competition between two distinct schools of thought.   
On the one hand, there are those who see the fiduciary concept as involving a singular 
prohibition against self-interested conduct – or the appearance of such – in applicable trust-based 
relationships262 (note that fiducia means “an entrusting” in Latin263). On the other hand are those 
                                                            
259 Midcon, supra note 55; Peso Silver Mines, supra note 55; Hawrelak, supra note 55; Can. Aero v. O’Malley 
[1974] S.C.R. 592, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371 [Can. Aero cited to S.C.R.]; Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 42 D.L.R. 
(4th) 81 [Frame cited to S.C.R.]; Lac Minerals, supra note 250; Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 
3 S.C.R. 534, 85 D.L.R. (4th) 129 [Canson cited to S.C.R.]; Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 224, [1992] 6 
W.W.R. 673 [Norberg cited to S.C.R.]; McInerney v. MacDonald, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138, 93 D.L.R. (4th) 415 
[McInerney cited to S.C.R.]; M.(K.) v. M.(H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 [1992] S.C.J. No. 85 (Q.L.) [M.(K.) v. M.(H.) cited 
to S.C.R.]; Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, [1994] S.C.J. No. 84 (Q.L.) [Hodgkinson cited to Q.L.]; 
Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 146 D.L.R. (4th) 214; Cadbury, supra note 43; KLB, supra note 59; 
Strother v. 3464920 Canada Inc., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 177, 2007 SCC 24 [Strother cited to S.C.R.]; Galambos, supra 
note 59; Elder Advocates, supra note 31. 
260 In this project, and mindful of the morass of commentary that exists, effectively a competition of sorts, as to the 
nature of fiduciary accountability and the lack of consensus on various applicable doctrinal fundamentals, I have, for 
the purposes of this project, focussed primarily on certain instances of theoretical work undertaken by leading 
theorists in recent years, most particularly: Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 57; Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, 
supra note 258; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), and the work of Flannigan 
which is set out in a series of articles including but not limited to: Robert Flannigan, “The Fiduciary Obligation” 
Oxford J. Legal Studies (1989) 9 (3): 285-322; Robert Flannigan “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” 
supra note 37; Robert Flannigan, “Access or Expectation: The Test for Fiduciary Accountability” 89(1) Can. B. 
Rev. 1 (2010); and Robert Flannigan, “The Core Nature of Fiduciary Accountability” [2009] N.Z. L. Rev. 375. Also, 
key additional commentary on the nature of conventional fiduciary doctrine that has at various times been resorted 
to by the Supreme Court of Canada (some of which I make limited reference to in this project), include: Ernest J. 
Weinrib, “The Fiduciary Obligation” (1975) 25 U.T.L.J. 1.; Paul Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney: Law Book 
Company, 1977); J.C. Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries (Toronto: Carswell, 1981). See, also, Peter Birks, “The 
Content of the Fiduciary Obligation” (2000) 34:1 Isr. L.R. 3; Deborah A. DeMott, “Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis 
of Fiduciary Obligation,” 1988 Duke L.J. 879; Smith, “The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty,” supra note 
254; and Miller, “A Theory of Fiduciary Liability,” supra note 255. 
261 KLB, supra note 59; Galambos, supra note 59; Elder Advocates, supra note 31. 
262  Flannigan is a leading proponent of this approach. See, e.g., Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary 
Accountability,” supra note 37. See, also, Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258. Generally, and as indicated 
below, this conceptualization of the focus of fiduciary law is ubiquitous (whether envisioned as central to fiduciary 
doctrine or as constituting the full scope of the content of fiduciary accountability) in the applicable commentary and 
jurisprudence. In early Supreme Court of Canada decisions to address the nature of fiduciary accountability, it is 
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who conceptualize the fiduciary concept as more centrally structured around a (general) principle 
operating to source a range of tailored (specific) fiduciary obligations in the distinctive contexts 
of applicable trust-based relationships.264 Proponents of this latter approach would generally 
require of fiduciaries not the mere avoidance of self-interested conduct but exemplary moral 
conduct generally in the managing of interests under their trust and care.265   
I contend that the distinction between these two approaches is not so much one of degree, as it is 
sometimes described,266 but more one of fundamental jurisprudential form.267 The first school of 
thought is organized around a fiduciary rule: those in trust-based relationships shall not act or 
appear to act in self-interest regarding the incidents of a trust reposed. The second school of 
thought is organized around a fiduciary principle: those in trust-based relationships are to act 
honestly and with high honour and integrity in relation to the trust interests reposed.   
Recall from the summary of Dworkin’s rights thesis, above, that rules operate in all-or-nothing 
fashion (i.e. if the facts a rule stipulates are present, liability necessarily follows) whereas 
principles operate in a distinctly different jurisprudential manner. They incline a decision one 
way or another but do not by their form dictate specific results; rather, principles (at times in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
described explicitly as a “rule.” See, e.g., Midcon, supra note 55 at 326 (“Equity, in applying the rule as one of 
fundamental public policy does so ruthlessly to prevent its corrosion by particular exceptions; by an absolute 
interdiction it puts temptation beyond reach of the fiduciary by appropriating its fruits.”).  
263 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., Bryan A. Garner ed., (St. Paul, MN: Thomson, 2004) at 658. 
264 Rotman is a leading academic proponent of this approach: see, e.g., Fiduciary Law, supra note 57 generally, and 
at 295 (“The fiduciary concept is premised upon principles rather than rules so that it may retain the flexibility to 
respond to the myriad situations in which it may be applied, but can still provide sufficient guidelines for its 
informed application to specific scenarios.” Note also that while Frankel generally conceives of the content of 
fiduciary accountability as centrally concerned with self-interested conduct, she sees merit in a blending, to some 
extent, of the principle-based and rule-based approaches, reasoning that although “[f]uzzy rules, expressed as 
standards and principles, may raise issues concerning ‘the rule of law,’… the very risk that fuzzy rules pose for 
fiduciaries could act as a deterrent to violating the law”: see Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 260 at 105. La 
Forest J. was the leading judicial proponent of this approach in Canada, as noted below.  
265 See, e.g., Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 57 at 18: “Fiduciary duties … require that fiduciaries act with 
honesty, selflessness, integrity, fidelity and in the utmost good faith (uberrima fides) in the interests of their 
beneficiaries.” Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 110 describes this approach as one which appeals 
generally to “the higher moral order of equitable principles.”  
266 See, e.g., Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 36: “The divergent judicial 
views move in both directions, potentially contracting or expanding the traditional boundaries.”   
267 Frankel has used similar language.  See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 260 at 104: “Fiduciary duties, like 
other legal duties, can be designed and expressed by standards and principles, or by specific rules, or by both.”  
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combination with other principles) give rise to specific rights and obligations (and rules) in 
different contexts.268 
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, where I make reference to these two schools of 
thought, I distinguish them for convenience as, respectively, a rule-based conception of fiduciary 
accountability and a principle-based conception of fiduciary accountability.   
There is some debate as to whether fiduciary accountability, historically, was more of a rule-
based or a principle-based doctrinal concept.269 Flannigan points to a number of eighteenth 
century precedents to argue that “from the beginning of its recorded history,” it was essentially a 
legal construct consistent with the rule-based conception, a fully independent doctrine that 
operated solely to control the self-regarding impulse of actors in trust-based relationships and 
which operated in parallel to other legal duties (e.g. other trust law obligations in the classic trust 
context).270 Professor Matthew Conaglen, alternatively, disputes the certainty of Flannigan’s 
position and argues that much is lost in translation in some of the earliest applicable judgements 
and that “the historical evidence cannot be said to be completely compelling one way or the 
other.”271  
Rotman, for his part, describes fiduciary doctrine historically (and normatively in contemporary 
context) in a manner more consistent with the principle-based conception, suggesting it was 
always less concerned with the prohibition of a singular type of behaviour than with the 
protection of important societal relationships generally and with controlling the general manner 
in which those in positions of trust acted in relation to applicable entrusted interests. Rotman 
argues that fiduciary accountability in its historical and contemporary essence includes not only a 
strict prohibition against opportunism but a broader, prescriptive mandate requiring fiduciaries to 
                                                            
268 Supra note 91 and surrounding text. 
269 See, e.g., Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 11-31; Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 57 at 153-
237; Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 260 at 79-101; and J. Getzler, “Rumford Market and the Genesis of 
Fiduciary Obligations” in Andrew Burrows and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, eds., Mapping the Law: Essays in 
Memory of Peter Birks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
270 See Robert Flannigan, “Book Review: A Romantic Conception of Fiduciary Obligation” 84 Can. B. Rev. 391at 
396. 
271 Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 18 
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“act with honesty, selflessness, integrity, fidelity and in the utmost good faith (uberrima fides) in 
the interests of their beneficiaries.”272 
In contrast to (and indeed in explicit opposition to)273 Rotman’s thesis, however, and despite 
debate on the nature of historical precedent, Conaglen and Flannigan (and other leading 
commentators) 274  generally agree that as the jurisprudence evolved throughout the 
commonwealth, fiduciary law become (if it was not already) predominantly concerned with 
strictly (if not exclusively) prohibiting self-interested behaviour in trust and trust-like contexts. 
The jurisprudence is not uniform but this general conceptualization of its central theme is 
ubiquitous.   
At a high level, it can be said that the core, basic construct of fiduciary doctrine, on which there 
is relatively broad consensus among theorists, is essentially as follows. Where a beneficiary in a 
trust or trust-like relationship is able to establish that his or her alleged “fiduciary” acted or 
appeared to act, without consent, 275  in a self-regarding manner regarding trust interests 
reposed, 276  strict liability follows 277  and extraordinary remedial flexibility attends. 278   The 
                                                            
272 Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 58 at 18. 
273 See, e.g., Conaglen’s rejection of Rotman’s proposed approach in Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 
106-113. Flannigan, for his part, has also explicitly Rotman’s approach: see, e.g., Flannigan, “A Romantic 
Conception of Fiduciary Obligation,” supra note 270. 
274 See, as but two fairly randomly-plucked examples, Joshua Getzler, “Duty of Care” in Peter Birks and Arianna 
Pretto eds., Breach of Trust (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002).at 41, cited in Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 260 
at 4: “A fiduciary obligation is a legal requirement that a person in a fiduciary position should promote exclusively 
the beneficiary’s interests, and refrain from allowing any self-interest or rival interests to touch or affect his or her 
conduct…”; and Weinrib, “The Fiduciary Obligation,” supra note 48 at 1: “the propositions that a fiduciary must not 
allow his duty to conflict with his interest and must not make a profit from his position reverberate through the 
judgments, dislodging or reallocating improperly acquired gains.” 
275 Consent is a full defence to an allegation of breach. See, e.g., Midcon, supra note 55 at 327; Peso Silver Mines, 
supra note 55 at 680; Can. Aero, supra note 259 at 607; Hodgkinson, supra note 259 at para 88.  
276 The impermissible self-interested behavior must “result from the use, in any manner or degree by the fiduciary, 
of the property, interest or influence of the beneficiary”: Midcon, supra note 55 at 341 (per Rand J. in his dissenting 
opinion). 
277 The strict character of fiduciary accountability, see, e.g., Hodgkinson, supra note 259 at 87 (a “type of behaviour 
that calls for strict legal censure.”); Can. Aero, supra note 259 at 608 (“pervasiveness of a strict ethic”); and Midcon, 
supra note 55 at 341per Rand J. in his dissenting opinion (“Equity, in applying the rule as one of fundamental public 
policy does so ruthlessly to prevent its corrosion by particular exceptions; by an absolute interdiction it puts 
temptation beyond reach of the fiduciary by appropriating its fruits.”) 
278 See, e.g., Canson, supra note 258 at 588: 
the flexible remedies of equity, such as constructive trust, account, tracing and equitable compensation, 
must continue to be available and to be moulded to meet the requirements of fairness and justice in specific 
situations. Equitable remedies … should not be confined within the strictures of previous situations. Where 
new remedies are required, equity will recognize them”);  
Strother, supra note 259, generally. 
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beneficiary need not have suffered any harm and the alleged fiduciary need not have acted 
dishonestly or with ill intent.279 While an extensive review of the different types of remedies 
available for a fiduciary breach is beyond the scope of this project,280 the governing remedial 
precepts are both restitutionary and punitive, and are generally seen as more generous to 
claimants than those that attend any other area of law.281 A beneficiary need not prove damages 
(i.e. the applicable remedy can be gain-based as opposed to damages-based282) and windfalls to a 
beneficiary are permissible283 because furtherance of the “overriding deterrence objective”284 
takes priority. Wherever a fiduciary has derived profit in a position of conflict or has diverted 
profit to a third party in a position of conflict – again even where a beneficiary does not suffer 
loss – strict “disgorgement” in favour of the beneficiary is the order.285 
The long-accepted policy rationales for the strictness, or “bluntness”, of fiduciary regulation is 
that fiduciary breaches in trust-based relationships may be uniquely tempting for fiduciaries, 
difficult to prove and to regulate, and uniquely easy to conceal,286 and therefore draconian, strict 
                                                            
279 See, e.g., Midcon, supra note 55 where Rand J., at 337 in his dissenting decision, noted that profit by a fiduciary 
“is not permitted in any case, however honest the circumstances,” citing Lord Eldon in Ex Parte James (1803), 8 
Ves. 337 at 345, 32 E.R. 385 at 388; and at 338, citing Lord Russell from the decision of Supreme Court of Alberta, 
Appellate Division, in the same case, (1957), 21 W.W.R. 229, 8 D.L.R. (“liability arises from the mere fact of 
profit.”); Peso Silver Mines, supra note 55 at 680,  citing Regal (Hastings), Ltd. v. Gulliver et al, [1942] 1 All E. R. 
378 (“The profiteer, however honest and well-intentioned, cannot escape the risk of being called upon to account.”). 
280  On remedies for breaches of fiduciary obligations, see, generally, Mark Vincent Ellis, Fiduciary Duties in 
Canada, v.2 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2004) at 20-1. 
281 See, e.g., Norberg, supra note 259 at 295 per McLachlin J., as she then was, writing a minority decision (“a 
generous restorative remedial approach” which does not “countenance deductions for market fluctuation or failure 
of the beneficiary to mitigate or take appropriate care, as would the law of tort or contract.”) 
282 See, e.g., Can. Aero, supra note 259 at 612, 622-623: 
[it is] no answer to the breach of fiduciary duty that no loss was caused … or that any profit was of a kind 
(the  beneficiary] could not have obtained … nor is it a condition of recovery of damages that [the 
beneficiary] establish what its profit would have been or what it has lost … [i]t is entitled to compel the 
faithless fiduciaries to answer for their default according to their gain. 
See, also, Midcon, supra note 55 at 338 (per Rand J. in his dissenting opinion). 
283 See, e.g., Strother, supra note 259 at para 77 (“The prophylactic purpose thereby advances the policy of equity, 
even at the expense of a windfall to the wronged beneficiary.”) 
284 Cadbury, supra note 43 at para 30. 
285 See, e.g., Can. Aero, supra note 259 and Strother, supra note 259, generally. 
286 See, e.g., Midcon, supra note 55 at 337 where Rand J. in his dissenting opinion cites Lord Eldon from Ex Parte 
James (1803), 8 Ves. 337 at 345, 32 E.R. 385 at 388 (“no court is equal to the examination and ascertainment of the 
truth in much the greater number of cases.”); Canson, supra note 259 at 544 (per McLachlin J. (as she then was): 
…because the fiduciary has superior information concerning his or her acts, it will be difficult to detect and 
prove breach of these wide obligations; and because the fiduciary has control based on the notion of 
implicit trust, there is a substantial potential for gain through such wrongdoing.  This may justify more 
stringent remedies…; 
and Frame, supra note 259 at 137 per Wilson J. in her oft-cited dissenting judgment (“the grave inadequacy or 
absence of other legal or practical remedies to redress the wrongful exercise of the discretion or power”). 
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deterrence is compelled.287 It is also often suggested that the strict prohibition was in part born of 
a societal desire to deal harshly with faithless conduct generally in relationships that society 
places a particular value on nurturing and protecting.288   
While this brief summary of conventional fiduciary doctrine may seem clear enough, it will soon 
become apparent as I move to an examination of the Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence 
that (a) it is imbued with several analytical landmines that have led to doctrinal uncertainty (the 
prime example being the “notoriously intractable” problem of identifying a test for the types of 
societal interactions that attract fiduciary accountability), and (b) the Supreme Court, while not 
disputing a strict prohibition against opportunism as a central feature of fiduciary law (and, to be 
clear, only one Supreme Court of Canada decision outside the Crown/Aboriginal context has 
ever enforced any other type of fiduciary breach289), began in Can. Aero and Guerin to describe 
its doctrine in much broader terms, terms capable of wildly varying interpretations; the latter 
being a fact the jurisprudence has generally borne out.  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s contemporary fiduciary doctrine reads as a distinctly confused 
blend of the rule-based and principle-based approaches articulated above. Interestingly, at a point 
where the Supreme Court’s doctrine was particularly unsettled, the sitting Chief Justice of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal delivered a biting indictment of the failure of the Supreme 
Court to “make the law as clear as it should be.”290 In the following, lengthy passage from 
Critchley, McEachern C.J.B.C. refers pejoratively to the Supreme Court’s effective shift to a 
principle-based approach as an “experiment,” pleads with them to revert back to a rule-based 
approach, and notes the fact that the Supreme Court’s doctrine has been literally mocked 
elsewhere:  
Until recently, [fiduciary doctrine] was used for the purpose of requiring disloyal 
agents to disgorge secret or unlawful profits. Quite recently, fiduciary law has 
been extended to cover a myriad of circumstances … In a speech delivered in 
                                                            
287 The notion that fiduciary accountability is fundamentally designed to serve as a deterrent against applicable types 
of behaviour is ubiquitous in the jurisprudence.   
288 See, e.g., Hodgkinson, supra note 259 at para 48 (“The desire to protect and reinforce the integrity of social 
institutions and enterprises is prevalent throughout fiduciary law.”).  See, also, Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 
57 at 259-260. 
289 Flannigan made this point in “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 65. 
290 C.A. v. Critchley, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2587 (Q.L.), 166 D.L.R. (4th) 475 at para 79 [Critchley cited to D.L.R.]. 
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1988 to a Canadian-Australian legal-judicial exchange in Canberra, Mason C.J.A. 
commented humorously, but with considerable accuracy, that: ‘All Canada is 
divided into three parts: those who owe fiduciary duties, those to whom fiduciary 
duties are owed, and judges who keep creating new fiduciary duties!’ 
Our Supreme Court of Canada has led the way in the common law world in 
extending fiduciary responsibilities … but it has not provided as much guidance 
as it usually does in emerging areas of law … lawyers and citizens alike are often 
unable to know whether a given situation is governed by the usual laws of 
contract, negligence or other torts, or by fiduciary obligations whose limits are 
difficult to discern … it is time, in my view, for the law to be made more certain 
and less subjective. Certainly I regard it as part of this Court’s responsibility to 
urge the Supreme Court of Canada to clarify the law … Guerin is obviously a 
case that should be confined to its particular facts and we should not be timid …I 
conclude that it would be a principled approach to confine recovery … to cases of 
the kind where … the defendant personally takes advantage of a relationship of 
trust or confidence for his or her direct or indirect personal advantage … In effect, 
this redirects fiduciary law back towards where it was before this experiment 
began …291 (emphasis added) 
Moreover, it was for similarly-framed reasons that the New South Wales Court of Appeal stated 
that “Canadian authorities on equity must be treated with considerable caution.”292 
Against this overall backdrop, I move now to a closer examination of the jurisprudence.  The 
following analysis of general fiduciary law in the Supreme Court of Canada is set at a relatively 
high level of abstraction and organized under three incidents of fiduciary doctrine: (1) the 
function of fiduciary law; (2) the general content of fiduciary accountability (specifically, the 
nature of fiduciary obligations and fiduciary breaches); and (3) the specific trust-based contexts 
in which fiduciary accountability arises.   
                                                            
291 Ibid at paras 74-75, 84-85.  
292 Harris v. Digital Pulse Pty Ltd [2003] N.W.S.C.A. 10 at 32, (2003) 56 N.S.W.L.R. 298, cited in Conaglen, 
Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 25. 
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Function of Convention Fiduciary Law 
The core function of fiduciary doctrine in Canada is difficult to isolate; the Supreme Court of 
Canada “has refused to tie its hands”293 in terms of (explicitly) committing to a discernible 
mandate. It has been stated that the judicial disarray generally in this area (both in Canada and to 
the extent it exists in jurisprudence elsewhere) is primarily a result of a lack of clarity on the 
applicable doctrinal function.294  As such, that is my starting point. 
There are various instances in the jurisprudence where the Supreme Court has sought to 
articulate a general function (or functions) of fiduciary law. But instead of consensus, there are 
various incompatible or overlapping pronouncements.  Evident in the case law are (at least) five 
main types of doctrinal function that have in various decisions been described as fundamentally 
driving fiduciary law: 
 To regulate against self-interested behaviour (or opportunism) by trustees or by those 
acting in trustee-like roles;295  
 To promote the due performance of applicable non-fiduciary duties by trustees or by 
those acting in trustee-like roles;296 
 To maintain the integrity of social and economic relationships that society places 
particular value on;297  
 To promote norms of exemplary behaviour in trust-based relationships;298 and 
                                                            
293 Lac Minerals, supra note 250 at 296. 
294 See, e.g., Flannigan “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 36. 
295 This is the narrowest articulation of function. Implicitly this is the central doctrinal function, though typically 
when the Supreme Court explicitly articulates a function for fiduciary accountability, it does so in broader terms.   
296 See, e.g., Hodgkinson, supra note 259 at 82 (“used as a means of putting pressure on solicitors [and others] in the 
performance of their special skills”) and at * (La Forest J. adopted Frankel’s conceptualization here stating that “the 
law aims at deterring fiduciaries from misappropriating the powers vested in them solely for the purpose of enabling 
them to perform their functions.”); Elders Advocates, supra note 31 at para 43 (McLachlin C.J. adopted Finn’s 
theory here in describing the function thus: “the fiduciary principle’s function is … to secure the paramountcy of 
one side’s interests … this is achieved through a regime designed to secure loyal service of those interests”); 
Strother, supra note 259 at para 83 (“the prophylactic purpose of the … remedy”). 
297 See, e.g., Hodgkinson, supra note 259 at paras 48 and 93 (“The desire to protect and reinforce the integrity of 
social institutions and enterprises is prevalent throughout fiduciary law … the law is able to monitor a given 
relationship society views as socially useful while avoiding the necessity of formal regulation that may tend to 
hamper its social utility”); Galambos, supra note 59 at para 70 (“The underlying purpose of fiduciary law may be 
seen as protecting and reinforcing ‘the integrity of social institutions and enterprises’, recognizing that ‘not all 
relationships are characterized by a dynamic of mutual autonomy, and that the marketplace cannot always set the 
rules’” – footnotes omitted). 
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 To generally monitor or supervise the manner in which a trustee (or person in a trustee-
like capacity) exercises his or her discretion regarding applicable interests entrusted to 
them.299 
As may be expected, proponents of a rule-based conception of fiduciary doctrine tend to argue 
that the courts should explicitly recognize a narrow function for fiduciary law. Flannigan, for 
instance, posits that the singular function of fiduciary law is and has always been the control of 
opportunism.300 He argues that all of the other various ways in which the Supreme Court has 
sought to articulate the doctrinal function (or purpose) are each open to misinterpretation, and 
that only by instituting a narrow function for the doctrine can we be sure that it remains focused 
on the singular mischief it seeks to control (i.e. opportunism).   
Rotman, on the other hand, sees fiduciary doctrine serving a much broader function. He sees the 
doctrine as having much in the way of untapped potential,301  and he interprets the overall 
jurisprudence (historical and contemporary) as ultimately standing for the proposition that the 
primary function of fiduciary doctrine is to protect the types of relationships that make society a 
better place.  Specifically, Rotman states that: 
The interest and concern that the fiduciary concept has generated may be traced to 
the important purpose that it is designed to fulfill. ‘Fiduciary’ is one of the means 
by which law transmits its ethical resolve to the spectrum of human interaction … 
its purpose is to preserve important social and economic interactions. In 
particular, it is impressed with the difficult task of maintaining the integrity of 
socially and economically valuable, or necessary, relationships of high trust and 
confidence that facilitate and flow from human interdependency … the fiduciary 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
298 See, e.g., Can. Aero, supra note 259 at 306 (“to compel obedience … to norms of exemplary behaviour…”). 
299 See, e.g., Guerin, supra note 27 at 385 (“Equity will then “supervise the relationship”); Hodgkinson, supra note 
259 para 27 (“monitors the abuse of a loyalty reposed”) and at * (“the enforcement of fiduciary duties in policing the 
advisory aspect of solicitor-client relationships”). 
300 See, e.g., Flannigan “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 35. 
301 In L.I. Rotman, “Fiduciary Doctrine: A Concept in Need of Understanding,” (1996) 34 Alta. L. Rev. 821 at 852, 
Rotman refers to the fiduciary concept as “a vibrant and exciting facet of law whose potential is only beginning to 
be tapped.” 
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concept exists to foster human advancement through the specialization of 
knowledge and tasks which leads to enhanced fiscal and information wealth.302 
The simple take away from this brief section is that the range of conduct that fiduciary law 
purports to regulate may well differ depending on what is seen as the doctrine’s central function. 
And the Supreme Court could add much clarity to their doctrine by arriving at a consensus on 
function.   
Content of Conventional Fiduciary Accountability 
I will now consider the substantive nature of a fiduciary obligation (and a fiduciary breach).  
Fundamentally, and as noted above, fiduciary accountability is said to involve a strict obligation 
placed upon actors in applicable trust-based relationships to avoid both (a) self-interested 
behaviour, and (b) the appearance of self-interested behaviour. This is the most common 
conception of fiduciary accountability.   
In one of the early Supreme Court of Canada decisions addressing fiduciary doctrine, Rand J, in 
a dissenting judgment, stated that the general nature of fiduciary accountability “has been laid 
down consistently for several centuries”303 and may be generally understood as follows: 
The loyalty of a fiduciary … means that he must divest himself of all thought of 
personal interest or advantage that impinges adversely on the interest of the 
beneficiary or that result from the use, in any manner or degree by the fiduciary, 
of the property, interest or influence of the beneficiary … The fiduciary relation is 
that of trust in one who is to act in relation to the beneficial interest of another.  It 
creates a standard of loyalty that calls for … the exclusion of all personal 
advantage and the total avoidance of any personal involvement in the interests 
being served or protected…304 
                                                            
302 Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 57 at 2 and 259. 
303 Midcon, supra note 55 at 336 (per Rand J. in his dissenting opinion). 
304 Ibid at 335 and 342 (per Rand J. in his dissenting opinion). See, also, KLB, supra note 59 at para 48 (“The 
traditional focus of breach of fiduciary duty is breach of trust, with the attendant emphasis on disloyalty and 
promotion of one’s own or others’ interests at the expense of the beneficiary’s interests.”); Hodgkinson, supra note 
259 at 96-97 where McLachlin J. (as she then was) and Sopinka J. state in their dissenting judgment as follows:  
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The content of fiduciary accountability is often described as a prohibition against both profit and 
conflict (conflict of interest or conflict of duty) in the carrying out of one’s trust-based 
undertakings.305 Indeed, profit and conflict have often been posited as the only two legitimate 
forms of fiduciary breach. 306  Furthermore, fiduciary obligations are often described as 
proscriptive (or negative) in form as opposed to prescriptive (or positive).307  That is, a fiduciary 
obligation “tells the fiduciary what he must not do. It does not tell him what he ought to do.”308  
(emphasis added) 
The content of fiduciary accountability, understood as such, fits nicely into a rule-based doctrinal 
construct (i.e. if a fiduciary actor self-deals, or appears to self-deal, in the circumstances of their 
trust-based undertakings, she or he commits a fiduciary breach and liability necessarily follows – 
in accordance with the bluntness of the classic, strict rule). However, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has often described the content of fiduciary accountability in much broader terms; terms 
consistent with it being conceptualized more as a principle-based construct. 
The first signs of the Supreme Court embracing a principle-based approach appear in the 1974 
decision of Can. Aero, where Laskin J. states that fiduciary accountability “in its generality 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Fiduciary duties find their origin in the classic trust where one person, the fiduciary, holds property on 
behalf of another, the beneficiary. In order to protect the interests of the beneficiary, the express trustee is 
held to a stringent standard; the trustee is under a duty to act in a completely selfless manner for the sole 
benefit of the trust and its beneficiaries to whom he woes the utmost duty of loyalty.” (FNs omitted);  
and Peso Silver Mines, supra note 55 at 680, citing Regal (Hastings), Ltd. v. Gulliver et al, [1942] 1 All E. R. 378: 
they acted with bona fides, intending to act in the interest of [the beneficiary] … Nevertheless they may be 
liable to account for the profits which they have made, if, while standing in a fiduciary relationship to [the 
beneficiary], they have by reason and in course of that fiduciary relationship made a profit. … The rule of 
equity which insists on those, who by use of a fiduciary position make a profit, being liable to account for 
that profit, in no way depends on fraud, or absence of bona fides; or upon such questions or considerations 
as whether the profit would or should otherwise have gone to the plaintiff, or whether the profiteer was 
under a duty to obtain the source of the profit for the plaintiff, or whether he took a risk or acted as he did 
for the benefit of the plaintiff, or whether the plaintiff has in fact been damaged or benefited by his action. 
The liability arises from the mere fact of a profit having, in the stated circumstances, been made. The 
profiteer, however honest and well-intentioned, cannot escape the risk of being called upon to account. 
305 See, e.g., Lac Minerals,  supra note 250 at 646-647 (“the fiduciary duty of loyalty … will most often include the 
avoidance of a conflict of duty and interest and a duty not to profit at the expense of the beneficiary.”).         
306 See, e.g., Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 32-58. 
307  Flannigan “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 47 (“Conventional fiduciary 
accountability is also narrow in the sense that it has only a negative operation. In the usual terminology, it is 
proscriptive rather than prescriptive”). Cf. Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 57 at 311 and 317 (“While the 
proscriptive characterization of fiduciaries’ duties emphasizes some of the important prohibitions imposed upon 
fiduciaries’ behaviour, it arbitrarily circumscribes the scope of fiduciary obligations ... The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s discussion of the nature of the Crown’s fiduciary duties in Guerin provides a clear indication of the court’s 
adoption of a prescriptive approach to fiduciary duties.” 
308 Attorney-General v. Blake, [1998] Ch. 439 (C.A.) at 455, cited in Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty at 202.   
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betokens loyalty, good faith, and the avoidance of a conflict of duty and self interest” and that it 
seeks to “compel obedience … to norms of exemplary behaviour.”309 Note that this dictum 
departs from the classic rule-based construct described above, suggesting that bad faith generally 
or conduct constituting less than “exemplary behaviour” may constitute a fiduciary breach. The 
implication is that fiduciary actors have positive or prescriptive fiduciary obligations to act in 
good faith, loyally, and in exemplary fashion; that fiduciary accountability is not limited to the 
proscriptive prohibition against self-dealing (i.e. profit and conflict). 
Following Can. Aero, the next major shift towards a principle-based approach came in Guerin 
and the Crown/Aboriginal line of cases which, as discussed in detail in the next section, 
ultimately recognized the Crown as under a fiduciary obligation “to treat Aboriginal people 
fairly and honourably.”310 Again, a positive fiduciary obligation to act fairly and honourably is a 
fair distance removed from a tractable rule-based standard, and quite distinct from the classic 
fiduciary prohibition against self-dealing.311 
Although Dickson J. may have been concerned to limit his novel fiduciary analysis in Guerin to 
Crown/Aboriginal contexts, having described the fiduciary obligation at issue as sui generis in 
nature, 312  Guerin was distinctly influential in shaping future doctrinal development of 
conventional fiduciary law in Canada.313   
The Supreme Court Justice perhaps most responsible for veering the court towards a principle-
based approach to fiduciary accountability was Justice La Forest.314 In Lac Minerals, he stated of 
fiduciary accountability that “compendiously it can be described as the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
                                                            
309 Can. Aero, supra note 259 at 306. 
310 Mitchell, supra note 29 at para 9. 
311 Cf. Meinhard v. Salmon, supra note 149 at 465 where Cardozo J. describes fiduciary accountability as follows: 
“A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive is then the standard of behavior.” 
312 Guerin, supra note 27 at 387 (“I repeat, the fiduciary obligation which is owed to the Indians by the Crown is sui 
generis. Given the unique character both of the Indians' interest in land and of their historical relationship with the 
Crown, the fact that this is so should occasion no surprise.”) 
313 As noted in Flannigan, “Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada,” supra note 55 at 447: “Guerin is 
widely recognized as the decision that signaled the Canadian departure from conventional accountability, and the 
subsequent struggle to articulate boundaries.” See, also, Hodgkinson, supra note 259 at 29, La Forest J. described 
the Guerin-begun line of jurisprudence as having “led to the development of a ‘fiduciary principle’ which can be 
defined and applied with some measure of precision.” See, also, M.(K.) v. M.(H.), supra note 259 at para 33 where 
La Forest J. states that the jurisprudence has “perhaps reached a point where a ‘fiduciary principle’ can be applied 
through a well-defined method. The process was started in Guerin.”  
314 See, e.g., ibid. 
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and will most often include the avoidance of a conflict of duty and interests and a duty not to 
profit at the expense of the beneficiary.”315 Like Laskin J. in Can. Aero, La Forest J. in this 
dictum describes the prohibition against conflict and profit as the most common but not exclusive 
type of fiduciary mandate. 
Furthermore, and still speaking in regard to Justice La Forest, as noted above, while many 
Supreme Court of Canada decisions subsequent to Guerin use applicable rhetoric in describing 
the content of fiduciary accountability as potentially regulating more than self-interested 
behaviour, only one case outside the Crown/Aboriginal context actually founds and enforces a 
fiduciary breach that does not take the form of a conflict or profit, as noted above, and that 
decision was written by Justice La Forest. In McInerney, the Supreme Court held that a doctor 
owed a patient a fiduciary obligation to inform his patient regarding medical records that the doctor 
had obtained from other medical professionals. Relying heavily on Guerin, La Forest conceptualizes 
fiduciary doctrine in McInerney as operating to supervise behaviour broadly in the relationship at 
issue, states that fiduciary obligations are “shaped by the demands of the situation,”316 and proceeds 
generally on the basis that a fiduciary actor has an obligation to act in the best interests of their 
beneficiary.317   
This notion that fiduciary accountability involves an obligation to act in the “best interests” of one’s 
beneficiary, a notion germinated in Guerin, is one also picked up in other Supreme Court 
decisions.318 Again, and unless this “best interests” mandate is interpreted as a singular duty to act in 
an other-regarding manner, such a conception of fiduciary accountability is a principle-based 
construct and not a rule-based construct (i.e. it is not a standard that traces the specific facts that 
necessitate liability).  
Shifting focus, it was noted at the outset of this chapter that despite the opacity of the Supreme 
Court’s conventional fiduciary law jurisprudence, there are some seeds of doctrinal clarity emerging 
in a trend that can be traced through a recent line of decisions.  In these recent decisions, the 
                                                            
315 Lac Minerals, supra note 250 at 646-647. 
316 McInerney, supra note 259 at 149. 
317 Ibid at * (“As part of the relationship of trust and confidence, the physician must act in the best interests of the 
patient … reciprocity of information between the patient and physician is prima facie in the patient's best 
interests.”).  
318 See, e.g., Norberg, supra note 259 and Hodgkinson, supra note 259, generally. 
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Supreme Court appears now to be distancing itself from their principle-based conception of the 
content of fiduciary accountability and attempting to develop a more restrictive account of 
relationship regulation,  one more consistent with a rule-based construct. 
In KLB, it had been argued that lack of care by government officials in their act of placing the 
plaintiff children in foster homes (which led to the plaintiff being sexually assaulted in those 
homes) was a fiduciary breach in that it constituted a failure to act in the best interests of the 
children involved.  McLachlin C.J. ultimately disagreed, explaining that there was “no evidence 
that the government put its own interests ahead of those of the children or committed acts that 
harmed the children in a way that amounted to betrayal of trust or disloyalty… [the] fault was 
not disloyalty [and so not a fiduciary breach] but failure to take sufficient care.”319   
Moreover, she stated that the specific fiduciary obligation that existed in the facts of this case 
was an obligation to “act loyally, and not to put one’s own or others’ interests ahead of the 
child’s in a manner that abused the child’s trust.”320 In her decision, the Chief Justice goes to 
some length to reject the notion that a duty to act in the best interests of a beneficiary is properly 
viewed as fiduciary in nature. Her rejection here is made on two bases. First, she states that a 
fiduciary-based best-interests ethic lacks practical utility in the sense that it fails to provide a 
“workable standard by which to regulate conduct … [that it] simply does not provide a legal or 
justiciable standard.”321 Second, she states that it results in an inappropriate result-based analysis, 
explaining in the circumstances of the case that: 
Parents should try to act in the best interests of their children.  This goal underlies 
a variety of doctrines in family law and liability law.  However, thus far, failure to 
meet this goal has not itself been elevated to an independent ground of liability at 
common law or equity.  There are good reasons for this.  … an obligation to do 
what is in the best interests of one’s child would seem to be a form of result-based 
liability, rather than liability based on faulty actions and omissions: such an 
obligation would be breached whenever the result was that the best interests of the 
child were not promoted, regardless of what steps had or had not been taken by 
                                                            
319 KLB, supra note 59 at para 50. 
320 Ibid at para 34. 
321 Ibid at para 46. 
87 
 
the parent. Breach of fiduciary duty, however, requires fault.  It is not result-based 
liability, and the duty is not breached simply because the best interests of a child 
have not in fact been promoted.322  (emphasis added) 
This dictum from KLB. reflects a recent trend, an attempt by the Supreme Court to make clear, in 
the words of Justice Binnie in Wewaykum (a decision released shortly before KLB), that “not all 
obligations existing between the parties to a fiduciary relationship are themselves fiduciary in 
nature.”323 A similar comment is made by Justice Cromwell in Galambos: “[a] claim for breach 
of fiduciary duty may only be founded on breaches of the specific obligations imposed because 
the relationship is one characterized as fiduciary.”324 
This recent trend closely mirrors dictum from a leading English decision on the nature of 
fiduciary accountability, Bristol & West Building Society v. Mothew, where Millet L.J. states 
that: 
The expression ‘fiduciary duty’ is properly confined to those duties which are 
peculiar to fiduciaries and the breach of which attracts legal consequences 
differing from those consequent upon the breach of other duties.  Unless the 
expression is so limited it is lacking in practical utility.  In this sense it is obvious 
that not every breach of duty by a fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary duty.325 
The question then becomes: what are the specific types of breach of duty that are uniquely 
fiduciary in nature?  In the two most recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions, both McLachlin 
C.J. (in Elder Advocates) and Cromwell J. (in Galambos) continue to resist exclusively 
restricting fiduciary accountability to the classic prohibition against self-interested behavior (or 
the appearance of such), instead placing central emphasis on “abuse of power” (McLachlin C.J. 
uses the similar if not synonymous notion “abuse of trust”) as the type of wrong that is fiduciary 
in nature. Further, abuse of power (or abuse of trust) is now isolated, at least temporarily, as the 
exclusive type of mischief regulated by conventional fiduciary doctrine in Canada. Put another 
way, the Supreme Court’s current conceptualization of fiduciary accountability is as follows: an 
                                                            
322 Ibid at 44-45. 
323 Wewaykum, supra note 33 at para 83. 
324 Galambos, supra note 59 at para 37. 
325 [1998] Ch. 1 (C.A.) at 16. 
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abuse of power (or trust) is the only recognized and actionable breach of the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty. 
In KLB, Chief Justice McLachlin stated the “emphasis” in terms of the content of a fiduciary 
“abuse of trust” is “disloyalty and promotion of one’s own or others’ interest at the expense of 
the beneficiary’s interests.”326  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court has gone some distance to restrict their doctrine to a more rule-
based conception of fiduciary accountability (arguably, a return to the classic fiduciary doctrinal 
construct); that is, one which stipulates that if a fiduciary actor commits an abuse of power or 
trust in the context of their trust-based undertakings, liability necessarily follows. This is 
certainly a more restricted standard than a principle-based directive essentially mandating that 
fiduciaries act in accordance with a high standard of moral conduct generally. However, the 
terms “abuse of power” and “abuse of trust” are still open to varying interpretations (i.e. despite 
McLachlin C.J.’s comment in Elder Advocates that the “emphasis” is to be on the prohibition of 
self-dealing327), and still, to some extent, beg the question: what specific types of power or trust 
abuses are uniquely fiduciary in nature?   
In one of the most recent treatises attempting to theorize commonwealth fiduciary doctrine, 
Conaglen picks up on this question of what types of duties are peculiarly fiduciary in nature, 
delineates the main types of duties that have at times been held to be fiduciary in nature, 
discusses each at length, and posits in conclusion that only duties to avoid conflict and profit are 
properly characterized as fiduciary.328   
Ultimately, it remains to be seen if the Supreme Court of Canada will follow suit, or if their 
concepts of “abuse of power” or “abuse of trust” will apply more broadly. 
Finally, note also that during the years, post Guerin, where the Supreme Court jurisprudence was 
effectively a confused blend of the principle-based and rule-based conceptions of fiduciary 
doctrine, as I contend, there are a number of perplexing pronouncements regarding the 
                                                            
326 KLB, supra note 59 at para 33. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 32-58. 
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conceptual nexus between fiduciary and non-fiduciary obligations. That is, it is relatively well 
settled elsewhere throughout the commonwealth (and, arguably, now again in Canada) that 
conventional fiduciary accountability operates as an independent form of legal regulation (i.e. 
regulating a precise and singular mischief: self-interested conduct in trust or trust-like 
contexts). 329  However, scattered throughout the jurisprudence and applicable academic 
commentary are statements that effectively conceptualize fiduciary accountability as something 
that does not operate entirely independently from other legal obligations (i.e. obligations not 
otherwise fiduciary in nature, such as contractual or tort obligations), but rather “superimposes” 
onto (or, as others have put it, becomes “molded to”330 or “parasitic to”331 or “subsidiary to”332) 
those other obligations in contexts where a particular relationship is defined as fiduciary in 
nature.  
Some even conceptualize non-fiduciary obligations as, essentially, metamorphosing, or as taking 
on a fiduciary quality in applicable scenarios, meaning that a breach of a non-fiduciary 
obligation actually becomes a “fiduciary breach” when it takes place in the context of a 
“fiduciary relationship.”333 Put another way, such a conceptualization posits that “if someone is a 
fiduciary, all of the duties that the person owes can be analyzed as fiduciary duties.”334  
However, as Professor Paul Finn explained: 
                                                            
329  See, generally, Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258. Flannigan, for his part, describes fiduciary 
accountability as having independent, “parallel” application in terms of the manner in which it co-regulates certain 
types of societal interaction: see, e.g., Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 
64. 
330 See, e.g., Strother, supra note 259 at para 141 (a fiduciary obligation “enhances the contract by imposing a duty 
of loyalty with respect to the obligations undertaken, but it does not change the contract’s terms. Rather it is molded 
to those terms.”) 
331  See, e.g., Getzler, “Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligations,” supra note 269 at 578 
(interpreting Birks’ conceptualization of fiduciary duties as being ‘parasitic’ on other applicable obligations, in that 
they purport to ensure optimal performance of such other obligations). 
332 See, e.g., Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 75. 
333 See, e.g., Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 
[1995] 4 S.C.R. 344 at para 37, [1995] S.C.J. No. 99 (Q.L.) [Blueberry cited to S.C.R.] (“whether on the particular 
facts of this case a fiduciary relationship was superimposed on the regime for alienation of Indian lands 
contemplated by the Indian Act” emphasis added); Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 57, generally. See, also, 
Conoglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 11-12 where Conaglen discusses this viewpoint (which Conaglen 
himself  does not agree with). 
334 Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 11. Here, Conaglen is summarizing but not agreeing with this 
conception. 
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 [i]t is not because a person is a ‘fiduciary’ or a ‘confidant’ that a rule applies to 
him. It is because a particular rule applies to him that he is a fiduciary or 
confidant for its purposes.335 
Moreover, this notion that a non-fiduciary duty can morph into a fiduciary duty in certain 
instances may be viewed as a logical manifestation of the Supreme Court having adopted the 
non-conventional principle-based approach to fiduciary doctrine (i.e. since the principle that one 
is to act fairly, honestly, and honourably in applicable contexts is broad enough to be read 
synonymously with all different types of breach of duty). This is precisely the type of 
“contamination” that Flannigan refers to in the epigraph to this chapter.  
Ultimately, these esoteric frolics have contributed much to the confusion here to be sure, and it 
would be helpful, again, for the Supreme Court to clarify whether (or not) it views conventional 
fiduciary accountability as independent from other types of accountability (i.e. regardless of the 
specific contexts in which it is deemed to arise, and regardless of the colourful ways in which it 
can be described, once it does arise, in relation to various other obligations that may exist in the 
context of a particularized relationship).  
Contexts in Which Conventional Fiduciary Accountability Arises 
I have now noted material uncertainty in two key incidents of the Supreme Court’s doctrine on 
fiduciary law: (a) the core doctrinal function (does fiduciary law function solely to control the 
self-regarding impulse of actors in trust-based relationships, or is it more fundamentally 
concerned with policing a high standard of moral conduct generally?), and (b) the content of the 
doctrinal mandate (is fiduciary accountability broader than a prohibition against conflict and 
profit?).  I will now consider the various types of contexts in which fiduciary obligations are said 
to arise. 
The prototype factual context in which fiduciary accountability arises is the express trust.  
Because a trustee is given direct (and typically unmonitored) access to the assets or opportunities 
of a trust beneficiary on a mandate of managing those assets/opportunities in the best interests of 
                                                            
335 P.D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1977) at 3, cited in Conaglen, Fiduciary 
Loyalty, supra note 258 at 9. 
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that beneficiary, there is seen to be a unique opportunity for that trustee to act selfishly regarding 
those assets/opportunities (in circumstances also seen as uniquely difficult to regulate, as already 
noted). For that reason, and to reiterate, an equitable and uniquely strict rule – the fiduciary 
obligation – developed to prohibit even the appearance of self-dealing in such contexts. 
The fiduciary obligation has now been exported to a wide variety of categories of human 
interaction/relationship.  The following are some examples of relationship categories that have 
been found by various courts to be sufficiently trust-like so as to give rise, as a matter of course, 
to applicable fiduciary obligations: 
 Executor-beneficiary 
 Solicitor-client 
 Agent-principal 
 Director-corporation (and director-shareholder) 
 Guardian-ward 
 Doctor-patient 
 Parent-child 
 Elected official-electorate336 
Beginning in their decision in Lac Minerals, the Supreme Court began to follow the doctrinal 
practice of simply deeming that fiduciary accountability exists “per se” in the context of these 
types of traditionally-recognized categories of relationship, focussing the analysis in such 
contexts then on the types of conduct within such relationships that constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary accountability owed.   
Courts are often faced with (a) an allegation of a breach of a fiduciary obligation in 
circumstances that do not fall within one of the above-noted traditional categories of “fiduciary 
relationship,” or (b) an allegation that an alleged fiduciary’s impugned conduct, while within the 
                                                            
336 When the traditional categories are delineated, as they often are, in Supreme Court decisions, this relationship 
category (elected official-electorate) is inexplicably left off the list. However, although it rarely rises, this has been a 
long-recognized category of “fiduciary relationship”: see, e.g., “Governmental Authorities,” Chapter 19 in Ellis, 
Fiduciary Duties in Canada, supra note 280 at 19-1; Robert Flannigan, “Fiduciary Control of Political Corruption” 
(2002) 26 Advocates’ Q. 252 at 252 (“On any conceptual understanding, the relationship between citizens and their 
elected representatives is fiduciary”); Hawrelak, supra note 55. 
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context of a relationship of a kind traditional recognized as fiduciary in nature, is not a breach of 
duty that is itself fiduciary in nature. It is in these types of situations where attempts have been 
made to formulate a rationale to justify (or not) extending the scope of fiduciary accountability to 
a novel set of facts.  
In order to determine whether or not fiduciary obligations ought to be extended to a new type of 
relationship category or factual situation,337 courts in various jurisdictions (as well as academic 
commentators) have struggled mightily to conceptualize what it is about the traditional 
categories of relationship that gives them their fiduciary quality (assuming that there must be a 
universal principle or rationale that unifies the various categories).338   
For its part, the Supreme Court of Canada has been wildly inconsistent in its attempts to 
articulate the conceptual basis (or bases) upon which the classic trust-based fiduciary obligation 
has been (and ought to be) extended to other types of human interaction.  As noted, for instance, 
in the indictment of their jurisprudence by McEachern C.J.B.C. in Critchley, their approach is 
seen by some as having been uniquely expansive.  
Turning then to the applicable specifics of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, it may be 
observed that beginning with its decision in Guerin, the Supreme Court developed a litany of 
(effectively competing) tests and rationales for what ought to constitute the essential justification 
for the imposition of fiduciary accountability. Detailed analyses of some of the various tests and 
principles have been set out elsewhere.339 In summary, what the Court initially attempted to 
                                                            
337 This is an analysis often referred to by the Supreme Court as a “fact-based” assessment of whether or not 
fiduciary accountability arises; as conceptually distinguished from the “status based” context where fiduciary 
accountability is simply deemed because the relationship category at issue is traditionally-recognized as having a 
fiduciary quality. Other terminological distinctions the Supreme Court has at times used is that between “ad hoc” 
and “per se” fiduciary accountability (again, the former arises when a “fact based” assessment leads to liability, and 
the latter arises when a relationship at issue is one traditionally recognized as fiduciary). See, e.g., Hodgkinson, 
supra note 259, generally. 
338 See, e.g., Lac Minerals, supra note 250 at 644 where La Forest J. states that “[i]n specific circumstances and in 
specific relationships, courts have no difficulty in imposing fiduciary obligations, but at a more fundamental level, 
the principle on which that obligation is based is unclear.  …  It has been said that the fiduciary relationship is ‘a 
concept in search of a principle’ …  Some have suggested that the principles governing fiduciary obligations may 
indeed be undefinable … while others have doubted whether there can be any ‘universal, all-purpose definition of 
the fiduciary relationship’ …  The challenge posed by these criticisms has been taken up by courts and academics 
convinced of the view that underlying the divergent categories of fiduciary relationships and obligations lies some 
unifying theme.”  
339 See, e.g., Flannigan “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 67-76; Leonard I. Rotman, 
“The Vulnerable Position of Fiduciary Doctrine in the Supreme Court of Canada,” (1996) 24 Man. L.J. 60-91 
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isolate was an abstract indicator (or set of indicators) that would operate to determine, on a case-
by-case basis, whether fiduciary obligations are indeed owed in any given context.   
In Guerin, where fiduciary accountability was first imported to the Crown/Aboriginal context, 
Justice Dickson offered this as the conceptual test for when fiduciary accountability arises: 
… where by statute, agreement, or perhaps by unilateral undertaking, one party 
has an obligation to act for the benefit of another, and that obligation carries with 
it a discretionary power, the party thus empowered becomes a fiduciary.340 
This oft-cited dictum from Guerin was later picked up by Justice Wilson in Frame who went on 
to set out a “rough and ready guide to whether or not the imposition of a fiduciary obligation on 
a new relationship would be appropriate and consistent” in context.341 Attempting to synthesize 
previous case law, she offered a flexible conceptual framework, essentially stating that fiduciary 
accountability would be appropriate in circumstances where some or all of the following three 
characteristics are present:  
(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power. 
(2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect 
the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests. 
(3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary 
holding the discretion or power.342 
Wilson J.’s “rough and ready guide” from Frame is widely cited in subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions. Various Supreme Court Justices sought to put their own spin on how Wilson J.’s guide 
should be applied. Justice La Forest, for instance, was a proponent of the view that the 
determinative question should be whether a claimant’s expectation that a defendant ought to 
have acted in his or her best interests in the circumstances at issue was reasonable or legitimate 
                                                            
340 Guerin, supra note 27 at 384 
341 As it was later described by Justice La Forest in Lac Minerals, supra note 250 at 647. 
342 Frame, supra note 259 at 136. 
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(i.e. a reasonable/legitimate expectations test).343  In contrast, Chief Justice McLachlin (in earlier 
decisions) saw as more centrally determinative the question of whether power or discretion was 
ceded by a claimant (explicitly or implicitly) to such an extent that the defendant was in a 
position to adversely impact the interests of the claimant (i.e. a power-ceding test).344   
More recently, however, the Supreme Court has fundamentally changed course. In Galambos 
and Elders Advocates, the Supreme Court has effectively rejected the Frame approach of using 
flexible, abstract criteria/indicia (as well as the reasonable-expectations and power-ceding tests 
of La Forest J. and McLachlin C.J., noted above) and has embraced more of an essentialist 
approach (i.e. one which holds that for fiduciary accountability to arise, certain essential facts 
must be present).   
The current three-part Supreme Court of Canada test for when fiduciary accountability arises, as 
articulated by Chief Justice McLachlin in Elders Advocates, is as follows: 
1) First, the evidence must show that the alleged fiduciary gave an undertaking of 
responsibility to act in the best interests of a beneficiary; 
2) Second, the duty must be owed to a defined person or class of persons who must 
be vulnerable to the fiduciary in the sense that the fiduciary has a discretionary 
power over them; and 
3) Finally … the claimant must show that the alleged fiduciary’s power may affect 
the legal or substantial practical interests of the beneficiary … 345  (footnotes 
omitted) 
The first two components of the new test offer discernible boundaries of accountability, and are 
common features of the Supreme Court’s post-Guerin jurisprudence. For fiduciary accountability 
to arise, there must have been an undertaking by an alleged fiduciary to act in the best interests 
of a beneficiary (which undertaking may be explicit as in a statutory or contractual commitment, 
or implicit as, for instance, self-evidently present in doctor-patient or parent-child 
                                                            
343 See, e.g., Lac Minerals, supra note 250 at 648; and Hodgkinson, supra note 259 at para 38. 
344 See, e.g., Hodgkinson, supra note 259 at paras 117-137 (per McLachlin J., as she then was, and Sopinka J.). 
345 Elder Advocates, supra note 31 at para 36. 
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relationships346) and the beneficiary must have been vulnerable in the sense that the alleged 
fiduciary had power or discretion over them or their interests. The third component, however, 
introduces as an essential pre-condition to fiduciary accountability a notion that will require 
further judicial elaboration. There is little guidance in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
what types of interests, for instance, may be sufficiently vital or substantial to satisfy the third 
component of the test.347   
Before moving on, a current debate between two leading commentators is notable here.  
Flannigan has long promoted the importance of following a strictly essentialist approach to the 
identification of conceptual boundaries of fiduciary accountability (note, also, that Frankel, for 
her part, has also recently articulated a proposed essentialist test348). For Flannigan, fiduciary 
accountability arises only (and always) when one person is entrusted with limited access to the 
                                                            
346 See, e.g., Galambos, supra note 59 at para 75. 
347 On how the Supreme Court of Canada has addressed this interest-criticality item in the Crown/Aboriginal 
context, see infra notes 435 and 436 and the text surrounding each. Generally, see, e.g., Smith, “The Critical 
Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty,” supra note 254 at 1444: 
What things qualify as “critical resources,” thus justifying the imposition of fiduciary duty? … Whether the 
existence of a particular thing justifies the imposition of fiduciary duties, therefore, depends on whether 
that thing provides the fiduciary with the occasion to act opportunistically. And whether that thing provides 
the fiduciary with the occasion to act opportunistically will depend in large part on whether society has 
made a normative decision that the thing belongs to the beneficiary. So what is a “critical resource”? Like 
property, critical resources may be tangible or intangible. The “owner” of critical resources need not have 
legally enforceable rights in the same way that an owner of property has such rights, but she must have 
residual control rights that, at a minimum, provide practical control over the resources.  
See, also, Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 260 at 13-25. For an argument that the criticality of the interests at 
issue is irrelevant to whether or not fiduciary accountability out to arise, see, e.g., Robert Flannigan, “Fiduciary 
Mechanics”(2008) 14 C.L.E.L.J. 25 at 25-26, 46: 
Others regard the imposition of fiduciary liability on mechanics as a feral extension of the jurisdiction. 
They assume it to be self-evident that mechanics are not regulated by fiduciary accountability. They are 
mistaken. … Opportunism does not change its nature because an arrangement ostensibly is less socially 
important or less vital than others.  
Cf. Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 254.  
348 Frankel, supra note 260 at 6:  
The suggested features that all fiduciaries share are the following: 
First, fiduciaries offer mainly services (in contrast to products). The services that fiduciaries offer are 
usually socially desirable, and often require expertise, such as healing, legal services, teaching, asset 
management, corporate management, and religious services. 
Second, in order to perform these services effectively, fiduciaries must be entrusted with property or power. 
Third, entrustment poses to entrustors the risks that the fiduciaries will note be trustworthy. They may 
misappropriate the entrusted property or misuse the entrusted power or they will not perform the promised 
services adequately. 
Fourth, there is the likelihood that (1) the entrustor will fail to protect itself from the risks involved in 
fiduciary relationships; (2) the markets may fail to protect entrustors from these risks; and that (3) the costs 
for the fiduciaries of establishing their trustworthiness may be higher than their benefits from the 
relationships.  (footnotes omitted) 
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assets or opportunities of another and for a defined purpose.349 Conaglen, on the other hand, 
recently criticized Flannigan’s essentialist model, and cast doubt on whether a truly essentialist 
or universal test for fiduciary accountability is possible given the wide variety of social and 
factual contexts in which it is said to arise. 350  Conaglen cites two notable Canadian 
commentators on fiduciary law in lamenting as “notoriously intractable” the task of isolating 
such a test351 and noting the fact the task has been likened to the search by the Knights of 
Antiquity for the Holy Grail352 (note that Rotman, for his part, cites these types of dynamics to 
argue that the search for such an essentialist test should be abandoned353).  
Further, Conaglen opines that a reasonable/legitimate expectations test of a kind earlier promoted 
by Justice La Forest (and one which allows recourse to the various types of abstract criteria noted 
above to have been used in the past by the Supreme Court) is the most intellectually satisfying of 
all available. He conceded the imperfect nature of this type of non-essentialist approach but 
extrapolated that “courts have persevered with the concept, and the skies have not fallen.”354 To 
the contrary, Flannigan has argued, metaphorically, that the skies in this area literally have 
fallen, explaining that “a conceptual fog” has descended over the Supreme Court’s fiduciary 
doctrine as a result of the non-essentialist approach they followed post-Guerin and prior to 
Galambos and Elders Advocates. 
Ultimately, while the Supreme Court has embraced a move to a more restricted, essentialist 
approach to the question of when fiduciary accountability arises, it remains to be seen how their 
new test will be applied by lower courts and, in particular, how the third component of the test – 
the interest in question being sufficiently vital or substantial – will be interpreted. 
                                                            
349 See, e.g., Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 36-54. 
350 Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 252 and 268. 
351 Weinrib, “The Fiduciary Obligation,” supra note 48 at 5, cited in Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 
9. 
352 D.W.M. Waters, “Banks, Fiduciary Obligations and unconscionable Transactions” (1986) 65 Can. B. Rev. 37 at 
56, cited in Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 9. 
353 Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 57 at 13, citing Justice E.W. Thomas, “An Affirmation of the Fiduciary 
Principle,” (1996) N.Z.L.J. 405 at 405:  
Perhaps we should heed instead, the words of E.W. Thomas J. who says that the problem with fiduciary 
law ‘lies not in the concept of the fiduciary relationship itself, but in the quest of judges, lawyers and 
academics for a precision which the law is incapable of delivering.’ The fact that the quest for a fiduciary 
taxonomy continues more than 300 years after the initial appearance of the fiduciary concept in English law 
should send a message to those who seek this alleged Holy Grail.  
354 Conaglen, Fiduciary Law, supra note 258 at 261. 
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b. Non-Conventional – or Sui Generis – Crown/Aboriginal Fiduciary Doctrine  
 
In the previous section, and at a high level, I articulated two distinct and competing 
conceptualizations of fiduciary doctrine – the principle-based (i.e. the notion that the fiduciary 
concept is more a principle that gives rise to specific duties as opposed to merely a specific duty 
in and of itself355) and the rule-based (i.e. that fiduciary doctrine is essentially limited to a 
singular rule against self-interested conduct in applicable contexts) – and noted that the Supreme 
Court of Canada appears to be returning towards a rule-based construct, after having 
experimented post-Guerin, with a principle-based approach.356  
Accepting the premise that these recent developments mark a return to fiduciary doctrine’s 
conventional doctrinal construct, one may begin to apprehend the difficulty of using 
conventional fiduciary doctrine to regulate Crown conduct generally in Aboriginal contexts. That 
is, when Aboriginal and treaty rights come before a court, it is most often in the context of a 
societal friction between an Aboriginal or treaty rights-holder and the rights or interests of some 
other member or segment of society, or society writ large of which the (often marginalized) 
Aboriginal rights holder is a part. In such contexts, the Crown is in a position of having to 
balance the various (often conflicting) interests involved with an eye towards some type of 
reconciliation; that is the essential function of their role. Consequently, they will not generally be 
seen as having undertaken to act exclusively in the best interests of anybody.357 And so, pursuant 
to the Supreme Court’s current test for when fiduciary accountability arises (i.e. their 
conventional doctrine), the Crown in such scenarios would typically not owe fiduciary 
obligations to any one party (Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal) with respect to the reconciliation of 
the applicable interests in dispute.358 
                                                            
355 Recall that McEachern C.J.B.C. referred to this type of an approach as an ill-advised “experiment” in Critchley, 
supra note 290 at 79-85.   
356 Recall generally from the discussion above that Justice La Forest saw Guerin as effectively incubating a 
principle-based approach and he, nearly single-handedly, reconceived conventional fiduciary law on that basis.  
357 See, e.g., Elder Advocates, supra note 31 at para 44: “Compelling a fiduciary to put the interests of the 
beneficiary before their own is … essential to the [fiduciary] relationship. Imposing such a burden on the Crown is 
inherently at odds with its duty to act in the best interests of society as a whole…” 
358 See, generally, Elder Advocates, supra note 31.  Note, however, that Crown actors often owe a fiduciary duty to 
the electorate as a whole: see supra note 335 and surrounding text.  
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There are other instances of Crown/Aboriginal interaction, however (i.e. outside the contexts that 
generally invoke a Crown mandate of reconciling Aboriginal or treaty rights with the interests of 
a third party or the overall citizenry), where fiduciary accountability clearly does arise in 
accordance with the prevailing, conventional doctrine. 359  The factual circumstances in the 
Guerin litigation are one such instance. In the circumstances of Guerin, the Crown had 
undertaken, pursuant to their applicable statutory mandate, to act exclusively in the best interests 
of the Musqueam when exercising their discretionary powers in the exercise of their mandate 
(i.e. of negotiating a fair deal with a third party for the land interest the Musqueam ultimately 
surrendered to the Crown for lease to a third party). In Guerin, that undertaking was part of the 
triggering criteria relied upon by Dickson J. to found fiduciary accountability.360 Conventional 
fiduciary duties, based on any known doctrinal conception, arose in that context. That is, the 
Crown and its agents were prohibited on the facts in Guerin, in accordance with conventional 
fiduciary doctrine, from acting opportunistically in relation to their assumed discretion over the 
applicable Musqueam interests.361   
Another instance where conventional fiduciary accountability arises in the context of 
Crown/Aboriginal interaction are situations like the one in Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation 
v. Canada362 where the Crown undertakes a statutory duty to manage resource royalty payments 
(i.e. royalties paid on resources extracted from Aboriginal lands) exclusively in the interests of 
an Aboriginal group. In those situations, there are clearly conventional fiduciary obligations that 
prohibit the Crown from, effectively, stealing the Aboriginal group’s money. 
However, and as noted, the Supreme Court’s Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine was not 
developed in accordance with the conventional rule-based prohibition against self-dealing.  
Rather, it was brought in initially to both promote a high standard of moral conduct on the part of 
the Crown generally and to regulate Crown dishonour in the context of the Crown’s dealings 
with Aboriginal peoples in circumstances where there was the potential for Crown conduct to 
                                                            
359 In accordance with the newly reconceptualised test for fiduciary accountability set out in Elder Advocates, supra 
note 31 at 36. 
360 Guerin, supra note 27 at 385. 
361 As to what a classic fiduciary breach may specifically look like in such contexts, see discussion below under 
section III(b)(ii). 
362 2009 SCC 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 [Ermineskin cited to S.C.R.]. 
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infringe or negatively impact Aboriginal or treaty rights (including Indian land interests), and it 
developed in accordance with a distinctly principle-based approach.  
To properly conceptualize the genesis of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine in Canada, we 
must look a bit closer at the circumstances surrounding the Guerin litigation. Guerin was the first 
Supreme Court of Canada decision to explicitly import fiduciary concepts into the core of 
Canadian Crown/Aboriginal Law. In that case, the Supreme Court was addressing a situation 
where the Musqueam Band had leased a portion of their reserve lands to a third party for use as a 
golf course (the impugned conduct had all taken place back in the late 1950s). As already noted, 
pursuant to the Indian Act framework, the Musqueam had been required to first surrender the 
lands to the federal government who then negotiated the lease with the third party (i.e. on the 
Musqueam’s behalf), on what was effectively a statutory undertaking to act exclusively in the 
Musqueam’s best interests.363  
Aboriginal peoples in Canada, of course, are typically precluded from disposing of their own 
lands to any entity other than the Crown, and the Crown for its part, is then mandated, upon land 
interests being surrendered to it, to act on the behalf of the applicable Aboriginal group in 
relation to those lands. This inalienability dynamic regarding Aboriginal peoples and their lands 
has always been a feature of Canadian constitutionalism (and remains to this day) and dates back 
at least to the Royal Proclamation (1763) where the Crown formally assumed this type of 
responsibility. 364  The essential purpose of this arrangement, it has often been said, is the 
protection of Aboriginal peoples against “exploitative bargains” in relation to the disposition of 
their lands.365 
What generally transpired in the circumstances of the Guerin case is that the federal Crown, in 
their dealings with the third party lessor, made some late adjustments to the terms of the lease 
that were never discussed with the Musqueam, adjustments that were necessary to effect the deal 
but which made the transaction significantly less advantageous (i.e. for the Musqueam).  Further, 
the Crown had failed to take into account during their negotiations certain concerns that the Band 
had previously raised with them. And once the lease was finalized, and despite repeated requests 
                                                            
363 Guerin, supra note 27 at 383-384. 
364 See, generally, Royal Proclamation (1763), [reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No.1]. 
365 See, e.g., Wewaykum, supra note 33 at para 100.  
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from the Band, the Musqueam were not shown a copy of the lease until approximately twelve 
years after it was signed.   
It was not suggested on the facts of the case that the Crown acted out of self-regard or with any 
particular ill intent; rather, the effective issue was whether they acted in too unilateral (or 
dishonourable) a fashion, whether they ought to have gone back to the Musqueam to discuss the 
final negotiated adjustments to the lease before finalizing it, and whether they should have 
worked harder to address some of the comments and concerns the Musqueam had raised in prior 
discussions with Crown officials regarding the lease, particularly since they had initially 
“induced” the Musqueam to avail themselves of the opportunity.366  
This case was the first major Supreme Court decision to address, effectively, the nature of Crown 
liability doctrine following the repatriation of the constitution in 1982 which involved, among 
others, the following two formal changes: 
1) Aboriginal and treaty rights were explicitly confirmed as legal (indeed constitutional) in 
nature; and 
2) The Constitution Act, 1982 was declared the supreme law of Canada 367  meaning, 
effectively, that Crown laws and Crown conduct could now be judicially reviewed to 
ensure applicable consistency with the constitution. 
Prior to 1982, Crown responsibility in the context of Aboriginal lands was typically described as 
constituting a type of “political trust” (as opposed to a legal trust) and the Crown was effectively 
immune from judicial scrutiny regarding such conduct. A notable line of jurisprudence 
developed describing the nature of that form of Crown immunity.368 Predictably, therefore, there 
was substantial effort made in Guerin to conceptualize the resultant Crown/Musqueam 
relationship using “trust” language (indeed, the Musqueam had framed their claim in trust).  For 
instance, and although Dickson J. refused to characterize that relationship as an express (legal) 
trust, stating rather that the relationship was trust-like and so attracted fiduciary accountability, 
                                                            
366 Ibid at 389. 
367 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 18 at s. 52.  
368 See, e.g., Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 57 at 562-265. 
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Wilson J., in a minority decision, arrived at the conclusion that the relationship (i.e. between the 
Crown and the Musqueam, upon the surrender) was indeed an express trust.369  
Returning to the specific facts in Guerin, the Musqueam had argued that the Crown had failed to 
discharge its legal obligation in sufficient accordance with Musqueam best interests.  Dickson J. 
ultimately agreed with that argument, concluding that the Crown had a fiduciary duty (but not a 
trust duty) in this scenario to act with “utmost loyalty” in the best interests of the Musqueam.370   
Dickson J. did not, however, base his finding of fiduciary breach in the conventional way (i.e. on 
the Crown’s conduct in putting its own interests in conflict with the applicable interests of the 
Musqueam). Rather, he conceptualized fiduciary doctrine as permitting the Court, in 
circumstances where fiduciary accountability is recognized as having arisen (i.e. by the Crown 
having assuming a discretionary power to act exclusively on the Musqueam’s behalf), to then 
flexibly monitor the entirety of the Crown’s exercise of that discretion and to sanction applicable 
moral transgressions as breaches of the fiduciary duty to act loyally in the best interests of the 
Aboriginal group. Dickson J. described the applicable Crown conduct that had transpired in 
Guerin as unconscionable (i.e. seemingly conceiving unconscionability here in a plain or sui 
generis sense of that word, since the conduct at issue would not have constituted conventional 
unconscionability at law,371 nor was any such precedent cited to suggest it did). Dickson J. 
described his finding of unconscionability here as “the key to a conclusion that the Crown 
breached its fiduciary duty.”372  
Moreover, Justice Dickson did not cite judicial authority in support of this conceptualization of 
the fundamental nature of fiduciary doctrine.373 He did refer vaguely, and more than once, to the 
fiduciary obligation enforced in this case as sui generis,374 which suggests he may well have 
been concerned about restricting his dictum here to the specific facts of the case. However, recall 
that all fiduciary obligations vary depending on the context in which they arise and are, arguably 
                                                            
369 Guerin, supra note 27 at 355. 
370 Ibid at 390. 
371 As pointed out in Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 63. 
372 Guerin, supra note 27 at 388. 
373 He cited two lower court decisions to support the general principle that fiduciary accountability is tailored to 
context: Guerin, supra note 27 at 384-385. However, he cited no judicial authority in support of the manner in 
which he defined the core fundamentals of fiduciary doctrine. 
374 Guerin, supra note 27 at 387. 
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and in that sense, sui generis. Recall also that the fundamentals do not vary (i.e. in conventional 
fiduciary doctrine); rather only the application of those fundamentals varies from context to 
context. 
Here, in radically varying the applicable doctrinal fundamentals, Dickson J. arguably committed 
a “conceptual error,”375 perhaps as a result of the fact that there were, recall, some conflicting 
precedents in fiduciary law at that time in Canada (on this, we cannot be sure, however, since he 
cited no such precedents). This flawed doctrinal genesis forms the starting point of the broader 
argument I make later in this chapter that the Supreme Court’s Crown/Aboriginal doctrine in its 
entirety, and including its (adjusted) prevailing fundamentals in more recent decisions (i.e. as 
those prevailing decisions are still embedded with doctrinal residue of this first fundamentally 
flawed precedent), takes the form of a classic Dworkinian mistake. 
Moreover, it was (again) not made clear in his reasons whether Dickson J. intended that the sui 
generis Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary accountability he recognized in Guerin would be confined to 
the facts of that case (i.e. Aboriginal land-surrender scenarios) or whether it was to apply more 
broadly in Crown/Aboriginal contexts. We certainly know, from the discussion in the previous 
section, that his decision was applied broadly outside the Crown/Aboriginal context; effectively 
exported for a period of time to the core of the conventional doctrine.   
In Sparrow, Justice Dickson’s applicable dicta from Guerin was interpreted as a generalized 
fiduciary-based principle that Crown/Aboriginal relationships are fiduciary in nature and that the 
Crown is to act “in a fiduciary capacity” in all of its dealings involving Aboriginal and treaty 
rights, even those where the Crown has not undertaken a specific mandate of acting exclusively 
in the interests of an Aboriginal group.  
The Sparrow litigation involved a claim, again by the Musqueam, that in limiting the length of 
fishing nets that Band members could use (i.e. in the terms of the Band’s food fishing license 
issued), the federal Crown had unconstitutionally infringed the exercise of Musqueam Aboriginal 
rights (i.e. fishing rights). The Supreme Court did not make a determination in their decision on 
whether the Crown conduct at issue constituted any type of breach of duty (fiduciary or 
                                                            
375 Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 63. 
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otherwise) – they sent the matter back to trial for reconsideration of the liability issues – but they 
set out a detailed framework describing the manner in which Crown regulatory powers are 
restrained in instances where Aboriginal and treaty rights could potentially be impacted.   
The Sparrow Court confirmed that Aboriginal and treaty rights are not absolute, not immune 
from Crown regulation in contemporary society. However, they also confirmed that the 
constitutionalization of Aboriginal and treaty rights had the effect of placing material, legal 
constraints on applicable Crown (sovereign) regulatory powers.  They held that any infringement 
of an Aboriginal or treaty right by Crown regulation must be justified in accordance with a 
detailed legal framework set out in the decision. 
In describing their applicable justification test, they held that the legal restraint on Crown power 
constitutionalized in section 35 was, doctrinally, fiduciary in nature.  Towards this effect, they 
first stated that: 
the words “recognition and affirmation” [i.e. in section 35] incorporate the 
fiduciary relationship … and so import some restraint on the exercise of sovereign 
power … federal power must be reconciled with federal duty …376 
Furthermore, and as noted in the previous chapter, where they sought to articulate a general ethic 
or constitutional principle that would ground applicable Crown obligations in the context of their 
regulatory interactions with Aboriginal and treaty rights, they held that the Crown had an 
obligation to generally act “in a fiduciary capacity” in relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights 
holders.  The key doctrinal pronouncement here, again, is this one: 
Guerin [fiduciary accountability], together with R. v. Taylor and Williams [the 
honour of the Crown]… ground a general guiding principle for s.35(1).  That is, 
the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to 
aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government and aboriginals is 
                                                            
376 Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1109. 
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trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation 
of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship.377 
The main take away for the purposes of the present section is that Sparrow espoused a 
proposition, indeed a general constitutional principle, that any infringement of Aboriginal or 
treaty rights by the Crown in its regulatory function must be undertaken in accordance with a 
standard of conduct similar to that generally required of a fiduciary, mindful of the reality that 
there would typically be conflicting interests.  
This principle-based conception of fiduciary accountability (i.e. that a general fiduciary principle 
gives rise to specific fiduciary obligations in different contexts) was at the core of 
Crown/Aboriginal Law following Sparrow and for many years, and a substantial body of 
jurisprudence built up around it.378 I will look closer at the fundamentals of this jurisprudence 
shortly. 
As has been noted, however, in more recent decisions the Supreme Court has been effectively 
dismantling this fiduciary-based legal framework and replacing it with the honour of the Crown-
based framework. In Wewaykum, for instance, Justice Binnie’s decision reads as though he was 
on a mission to substantially rein in the scope of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary accountability, 
starting with this important doctrinal statement about its jurisdictional boundaries: 
… there are limits.  The appellants seemed at times to invoke the “fiduciary duty” 
as a source of plenary Crown liability covering all aspects of the Crown-Indian 
band relationship.  This overshoots the mark.  The fiduciary duty imposed on the 
Crown does not exist at large but in relation to specific Indian interests …379 
Further, he stated that “not all obligations existing between the parties to a fiduciary relationship 
are themselves fiduciary in nature”,380 and he went on to highlight the inherent conflict of 
                                                            
377 Ibid at 1108. 
378 See, generally, McCabe, The Honour of the Crown and its Fiduciary Duties to Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 49 
at 147-232. 
379 Wewaykum, supra note 33 at para 81. 
380 Ibid at para 83. 
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interest that the Crown often finds itself in when tasked with balancing interests between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal entities, explaining that: 
When exercising ordinary government powers in matters involving disputes 
between Indians and non-Indians, the Crown was (and is) obliged to have regard 
to the interest of all affected parties, not just the Indian interest.  The Crown can 
be no ordinary fiduciary; it wears many hats and represents many interests, some 
of which cannot help but be conflicting …381 
Binnie J. was clearly uncomfortable with the principle-based fiduciary construct that the 
Supreme Court had developed for this area to date, and was taking initial steps towards reshaping 
its doctrinal fundamentals. However, despite his refrains, Binnie J. still described the content of 
fiduciary accountability in the circumstances of that case, in an exceedingly principle-based 
manner, still conceptualizing applicable Crown obligations as flowing from a fiduciary 
principle.382 
In Haida Nation, however, Chief Justice McLachlin went substantially further than Binnie J. had 
in Wewaykum in terms of dismantling the applicable principle-based fiduciary construct. That is, 
she instituted a replacement principle (i.e. the honour of the Crown principle) in the place of the 
previous fiduciary-based principle, and sourced the applicable duty enforced in that case (i.e. the 
consultation duty) to that replacement principle and not to any overarching fiduciary principle.  
However, despite this doctrinal eclipsing of the previous fiduciary-based construct with the 
honour of the Crown “essential legal framework” installed in Haida Nation, McLachlin C.J. 
articulated a delimited, residual jurisdiction for fiduciary accountability in Crown/Aboriginal 
contexts, as follows:  
Where the Crown has assumed discretionary control over specific Aboriginal 
interests, the honour of the Crown gives rise to a fiduciary duty … The content of 
the fiduciary duty may vary to take into account the Crown’s other, broader 
obligations.  However, the duty’s fulfilment requires that the Crown act with 
                                                            
381 Ibid at paras. 82-83, 96. 
382 Ibid at para 86. 
106 
 
reference to the Aboriginal group’s best interest in exercising discretionary 
control over the specific Aboriginal interest at stake.   
As noted in the previous chapter, this conceptualization of the intersection between Crown 
honour accountability and Crown fiduciary accountability in Aboriginal contexts was, although 
not acknowledged in the decision, a fundamental doctrinal re-orientation.383 
Against this general backdrop of the key pronouncements in the development of the Supreme 
Court’s sui generis Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine, I move now to a more detailed 
examination of the doctrine’s fundamentals. I will use the same format I did in the previous 
section on conventional fiduciary doctrine by examining three discreet incidents of the Supreme 
Court’s (evolving, but still non-conventional) Crown/Aboriginal doctrine: its function; the 
content of the duties it is to include; and the specific Crown/Aboriginal contexts that give rise to 
it. 
Function of Crown/Aboriginal Fiduciary Accountability  
Prior to the doctrinal transformation effected in Haida Nation, the Supreme Court’s sui generis 
and principle-based fiduciary construct constituted the core of Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada. 
In general terms, its doctrinal function was to regulate Crown conduct in circumstances where 
there was some potential for adverse impacts to Aboriginal or treaty rights (or to Indian Act-
based reserve land interests that have been tactically surrendered), and to specifically prescribe 
that in any such instances, the Crown must act honestly, fairly, and honourably in relation to the 
applicable Aboriginal interests involved. Put another way, its function was to restrain Crown 
conduct (or, put another way, prohibit applicable Crown dishonour), where such regulation was 
deemed necessary to ensure honourable dealings with potentially-impacted constitutional rights 
holders. At various points, the Supreme Court referred to this function using the language of 
“supervision”; that this generalized fiduciary obligation (or ethic) operated to supervise 
applicable Crown conduct.384   
                                                            
383 See, e.g., supra notes 188 and 190 and the text surrounding each.  
384 See, e.g., Guerin, supra note 27 at 385 (“Equity will then “supervise the relationship”); Wewaykum, supra note 
34 at 78 (“The fiduciary duty, where it exists, is called into existence to facilitate supervision of the high degree of 
discretionary control gradually assumed by the Crown over the lives of aboriginal peoples…”). 
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In terms of the specific operative dynamics of the doctrine, the general fiduciary principle often 
functioned to give rise to specific off-shoot fiduciary obligations as required in applicable 
contexts to ensure these broader constitutional functions were promoted. 
The doctrinal reordering in Haida Nation, of course, had the effect of dramatically changing the 
function of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary accountability. That is, the broad functions, described 
above, involving the general regulation (and restraint) of Crown conduct in constitutional 
reconciliation scenarios were effectively usurped by the honour of the Crown-based “essential 
legal framework.” And it is now quite uncertain what function “off-shoot” Crown/Aboriginal 
fiduciary accountability will serve.  
As noted, and as we examine in more detail in the next two subsections, the prevailing 
framework (i.e. that set out in Haida Nation) dictates that (a) the content of a Crown/Aboriginal 
fiduciary obligation is to act “with reference to the best interests” of an Aboriginal community, 
(b) in a context where the Crown has assumed a sufficient amount of discretion over specific, 
cognizable interests belonging to that community. 
The Supreme Court has not been explicit as to why this type of sui generis Crown/Aboriginal 
fiduciary accountability has been retained as part of the core of Crown/Aboriginal Law; they 
have not articulated the general function of this residual type of fiduciary accountability.  
The implicit indication from Haida Nation and subsequent Supreme Court decisions is that a 
(still non-conventional) fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of an Aboriginal community 
will still apply in circumstances like the one that arose in Guerin, where the Crown undertakes a 
statutory obligation to an Aboriginal community to manage surrendered land interests on their 
behalf. 385  In such circumstances, the Crown is explicitly tasked with exercising a discretionary 
                                                            
385 See, e.g., Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5, generally; and Elder Advocates, supra note 31 at para 49: 
The government, as a general rule, must act in the interest of all citizens … It is entitled to make 
distinctions between different groups in the imposition of burdens or provision of benefits … In the 
Aboriginal context, an exclusive duty in relation to Aboriginal lands is established by the special Crown 
responsibilities owed to this sector of the population and none other. 
See, also, Ermineskin, supra note 361. In Ermineskin, all sides conceded that Crown fiduciary accountability arose 
in the circumstances of the case. There was substantial discussion, however, in relation to the source of that 
accountability.  The appellants claimed (unsuccessfully) that the source of the fiduciary accountability was Treaty 6 
and that, therefore, government legislation that constrained the ability of Crown agents to invest monies held by the 
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power and acting exclusively for the benefit of the First Nation. So, again, this begs the question: 
what function (additional to or as some adjunct to those served generally by the over-arching 
honour of the Crown-based governing framework, and in addition to the explicit statutory 
mandate that the Crown, effectively, act for the sole benefit of an applicable First Nation) is 
served by placing a non-conventional fiduciary obligation on the Crown in such circumstances, 
specifically mandating that they act with reference to the best interests of the applicable 
Aboriginal community? 
It is unclear whether, for instance, a specific fiduciary obligation, once triggered in such 
contexts, is intended to function generally to mandate some unarticulated high measure of moral 
conduct (i.e. higher, in some meaningful way, than that which would otherwise be required under 
Crown honour accountability), whether it is to singularly prohibit a certain type of Crown 
behaviour (e.g. acting other than exclusively for the benefit of the applicable Aboriginal group), 
or whether it is to simply (and unconventionally) be superimposed onto the Crown honour-based 
legal framework (meaning that liability dynamics would be entirely dictated by the Crown 
honour framework; and the superimposed fiduciary quality would only have remedial 
significance386). And further clarification from the Supreme Court is required. 
Content of Crown/Aboriginal Fiduciary Accountability 
Looking at this next incident of the Supreme Court’s Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine – the 
content of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary accountability – I conceptualize it, again, both prior to 
and subsequent to the Supreme Court’s transformative decision in Haida Nation. Prior to Haida 
Nation, Crown liability doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal Law was structured around a hierarchy of 
sorts of sui generis fiduciary principles and obligations. There was a generalized fiduciary 
principle and specific off-shoot fiduciary obligations. You may wish to sit down for this part. 
Rotman described this type of doctrinal construct as a “two-pronged fiduciary duty [owed by the 
Crown] to Aboriginal peoples” and he explains the applicable dynamics as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Crown on the behalf of the appellants was unconstitutional for infringing Treaty rights: Ermineskin, supra note 361 
at para 67.  
386 This is not how conventional fiduciary doctrine typically operates: see, e.g., supra note 328 and surrounding text. 
Therefore, if this is the Supreme Court’s intention, they should be explicit so as to prevent further confusion. 
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On a macroscopic level, the Crown ought to be understood to owe a general, 
overarching fiduciary duty to the Aboriginal peoples [which he describes 
elsewhere as requiring the Crown to generally act “honourably, with honesty, 
integrity, and the utmost good faith in the Aboriginals’ best interests”387] … In 
addition to the Crown’s general duty, the Crown may also owe specific fiduciary 
duties to particular Aboriginal groups stemming from its particular interactions 
with them … It is possible for the Crown to owe both a general and one or more 
specific fiduciary duties to an Aboriginal group as a result of its intercourse with 
them.388 
Moreover, a general fiduciary obligation, or principle, was articulated in Sparrow (i.e. a mandate 
to act honourably) but was seen as a mere extension of the Guerin dicta. There is an important 
distinction, however, between the Sparrow and Guerin conceptualizations of the fiduciary 
mandate.  
In Guerin, the Crown’s fundamental fiduciary obligation, as stated by Dickson J., was, in effect, 
to act exclusively for the benefit of the First Nation.389 And once he observed that obligation to 
have been triggered, he conceptualized fiduciary doctrine as allowing him to then generally (and 
flexibly) monitor the Crown’s conduct in the carrying out of that obligation, as indicated at the 
outset of this chapter. 390  In Sparrow, however, the fundamental mandate of the fiduciary 
obligation was described as something less than an obligation to act exclusively for the benefit of 
the First Nation; it was described as a legal mandate to act honourably and with integrity in 
applicable scenarios, mindful of inherent conflicts. In some instances, it was conceptualized by 
the Supreme Court as a mandate to merely “take into account” Aboriginal interests in applicable 
scenarios.391 In any event, the fiduciary mandate in Sparrow was ultimately (and unequivocally) 
                                                            
387 Rotman, Fiduciary Law, supra note 57 at 606. 
388 Ibid at 600-601. 
389 Guerin, supra note 27 at 377 (“In my view, the nature of Indian title and the framework of the statutory scheme 
established for disposing of Indian land places upon the Crown an equitable obligation, enforceable by the courts, to 
deal with the land for the benefit of the Indians. … It is rather a fiduciary duty.”).  
390  There was no evidence the Crown failed to discharge that singular obligation by, for instance, acting in 
furtherance of its own or a third party’s interest (i.e. acting in conventional fiduciary breach).  Rather, the impugned 
conduct was simply not up to a standard that the Court determined was required in context.   
391 See, e.g., Gladstone, supra note 145 at para 63. See, also, Lambert J.’s interesting conceptualization of the 
content of the Crown’s fiduciary obligation in Haida Nation BCCA No. 1, supra note 145 at para 62:  
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to involve a balancing and a reconciliation of the various (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) 
interests involved. 
In effect then, there were two parallel fiduciary constructs within Crown/Aboriginal Law prior to 
Haida Nation. In the Guerin construct, there was both (1) a (somewhat generalized) fiduciary 
obligation to act exclusively for the benefit of an Aboriginal community (as it was often 
interpreted 392 ) and, (2) specific fiduciary obligations that could then trigger and vary 
substantially in form depending on context and, evidently, have little or no connection to the 
over-arching obligation to act exclusively in the Aboriginal group’s interests (i.e. a duty to not 
act unconscionably, the specific duty effectively enforced in Guerin, is not fundamentally linked 
to a singular obligation to act exclusively in one party’s interests; doctrinally, the two obligations 
are entirely distinct).  
In the Sparrow construct, there was a general fiduciary obligation (or principle) to act with high 
honour and integrity, and then specific off-shoot fiduciary obligations. The latter, again, were to 
vary depending on context but, under this construct (unlike in the Guerin construct), the off-
shoot specific fiduciary obligations were clearly linked to the over-arching general obligation, 
and played a supporting, doctrinal role in relation thereto. 
So, again, the initial take away here is that there was a complex hierarchy of fiduciary 
obligations (inconsistently applied) in Crown/Aboriginal Law prior to Haida Nation involving 
both general and specific obligations. The general fiduciary obligation described in Sparrow 
which, again, mandated that in applicable scenarios the Crown is to act in accordance with a 
“high standard of honourable dealing” clearly took the doctrinal form of a Dworkinian abstract 
principle which, recall, operates to incline a judicial decision one way or another but does not by 
itself dictate specific results; rather, it may give rise to specific rights and obligations (and rules) 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
The fiduciary duty of the Crown, federal or provincial, is a duty to behave towards the Indian people with 
utmost good faith and to put the interests of the Indian people under the protection of the Crown so that, in 
cases of conflicting rights, the interests of the Indian people, to whom the fiduciary duty is owed, must not 
be subordinated by the Crown to competing interests of other persons to whom the Crown owes no 
fiduciary duty. 
392 See, e.g., Blueberry, supra note 332 at para 38; and Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 746 
at paras 52 and 53, 206 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Osoyoos cited to S.C.R.]. 
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in different contexts. Of course, as I noted above, the honour of the Crown principle is of the 
same doctrinal varietal.393 
However, the threshold fiduciary obligation in Guerin (i.e. the obligation to act exclusively for 
the benefit of a First Nation394), actually does not take the form of an abstract principle. Rather it 
takes the form of a Dworkinian concrete obligation (or rule); recall that such obligations, by 
themselves, are capable of adjudicative enforcement (unlike abstract principles) and explicitly 
specify the essential facts necessary to ground liability. So here, and according to this 
Dworkinian form only (i.e. and not to the broader manner in which Dickson J. used it in Guerin), 
the general Guerin obligation would operate doctrinally as follows: if the Crown was found to 
have not acted exclusively in the interests of an applicable First Nation, liability would 
necessarily follow on that basis. 
Furthermore, the specific fiduciary obligations that flow from either Sparrow or Guerin’s central 
fiduciary obligation are also, for their part, Dworkinian concrete obligations (or rules) capable of 
adjudicative enforcement.  
The jurisprudence following Sparrow in relation to these applicable doctrinal fundamentals was, 
to use a colloquial term, a conceptual mess. The distinction between the Guerin and Sparrow 
constructs, described above, was often missed, and understandably so; that is, despite the 
description in Guerin of the fundamental fiduciary duty as a mandate to act exclusively in the 
interests of the Aboriginal group, Dickson J. enforced that duty in Guerin as though it operated 
as a more generalized principle that could give rise to specific off-shoot Crown obligations (i.e. 
again, ostensibly, once fiduciary accountability triggered, Dickson J.’s view was that it could 
then operate to effectively prohibit a broad range of Crown immorality in context).  
                                                            
393 Note that in Wewaykum, supra note 33 at para 80, Justice Binnie noted the similarity between the honour of the 
Crown principle and the generalized fiduciary obligation, stating that “[s]omewhat associated with the ethical 
standards required of a fiduciary in the context of the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is the need to uphold the 
‘honour of the Crown’…”. 
394 Note that, of course, in Guerin, Dickson J.’s decision stood for the proposition that once this fiduciary obligation 
triggers, then a reviewing Court may exercise broad discretionary powers to “supervise” applicable Crown conduct; 
that is, the fiduciary duty to act solely for the benefit of the First Nation was, in effect, not the only enforceable duty 
observed. 
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Furthermore, some courts appeared to understand the Sparrow mandate as essentially directing 
the Crown to act exclusively in the best interests of an Aboriginal community in applicable 
scenarios, 395  while others interpreted it, correctly in the non-conventional mandate directed 
unequivocally by Sparrow, as intended to be capable of “tolerating conflicts of interest”396 and 
only mandating, fundamentally, honourable conduct.397  
Conversely, some courts understood the Guerin mandate as directing, generally, honourable 
conduct,398 while others understood it as fundamentally mandating the Crown to act exclusively 
in the interest of the applicable Aboriginal group.399 In yet other instances, the two doctrinal 
mandate varietals were simply blended together when courts were talking about 
Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine, and without explicit acknowledgment of the meaningful 
distinction between the two noted here.400 
In any event, and for conceptual context, some examples of specific fiduciary duties that have 
been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in the Crown/Aboriginal context prior to Haida 
Nation include: 
                                                            
395 See, e.g., Blueberry, supra note 332 at para 38 (“obligated to exercise that power or discretion solely for the 
benefit of the [First Nation]”). See, also, Osoyoos, supra note 391 at paras 52 and 53 (in Osoyoos, the Court 
determined that the Crown could not be restrained by fiduciary obligations when making a decision to expropriate 
Osoyoos lands for public purposes).  
396 Squamish Indian Band, supra note 32 at para 473. 
397 See, e.g., Gladstone, supra note 145 at para 63 (“courts should assess the government's actions not to see whether 
the government has given exclusivity to that right (the least drastic means) but rather to determine whether the 
government has taken into account the existence and importance of such rights..”); and Delgamuukw, supra note 13 
at para 190 (“the Crown is subject to a fiduciary obligation to treat the aboriginal peoples fairly”) and at 162: 
The second part of the test of justification requires an assessment of whether the infringement is consistent 
with the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples.  What has become clear 
is that the requirements of the fiduciary duty are a function of the “legal and factual context” of each appeal 
(Gladstone, supra, at para. 56). Sparrow and Gladstone, for example, interpreted and applied the fiduciary 
duty in terms of the idea of priority.  The theory underlying that principle is that the fiduciary relationship 
between the Crown and aboriginal peoples demands that aboriginal interests be placed first. However, the 
fiduciary duty does not demand that aboriginal rights always be given priority. 
398 See, e.g., Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1109 (“the concept of holding the Crown to a high standard of honourable 
dealing with respect to the aboriginal peoples of Canada as suggested by Guerin v. The Queen…”). 
399 See, e.g., Fairford First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 2 C.N.L.R. 60 at para 67, [1998] F.C.J. No. 
1632 (Q.L) (F.C.T.D. per Rothstein J. as he then was) (“its fiduciary duty of loyalty to the Indian band to the 
exclusion of other interests…”). 
400 Mitchell, supra note 29 at para 9 (Crown fiduciary accountability was described there as a duty “to treat 
aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably, and to protect them from exploitation.”). 
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 a fiduciary duty to not act unconscionably when exercising statutory discretionary power 
to manage surrendered First Nation land interests;401 
 a fiduciary duty to correct errors made in relation to a previous land surrender;402 
 a fiduciary duty, where the Crown is allotting reserve lands, to secure for the First Nation 
access to their traditional fishery as part of that allotment;403 and 
 a fiduciary duty to minimally impair a First Nation’s interests when the Crown has made 
a decision to expropriate reserve lands for public purposes;404 
In addition, Chief Justice Lamer noted in Delgamuukw that in scenarios where the Crown is 
attempting to justify applicable infringements of Aboriginal or treaty rights, the Crown may, 
depending on context, owe (a) a fiduciary duty to consult an applicable Aboriginal community 
regarding a proposed infringement,405 and/or (b) a fiduciary duty to give Aboriginal interests 
priority over applicable non-Aboriginal interests regarding a government initiative at issue.406 
Moving on then, and what should now be clear (in addition to the fact that this doctrine had 
become, conceptually, quite unsettled prior to Haida Nation), is that the combined effect of 
Wewaykum and Haida Nation was a dramatic reorientation of the applicable doctrinal 
fundamentals at play here. Certainly, it is evident that the generalized fiduciary obligation (in 
doctrinal form, an abstract principle that calls for honourable conduct) has been replaced by the 
honour of the Crown (abstract) principle which effectively mandates the same thing.407 It is also 
evident that off-shoot obligations seen as flowing from the general Crown honour principle are 
(unless explicitly stated) not to be seen as fiduciary in nature (e.g. the duty to consult ground in 
Haida Nation is explicitly a Crown honour-based duty, not some type of sui generis fiduciary-
based duty). 
                                                            
401 Guerin, supra note 27. Note that in Wewaykum, supra note 33 at para 100, Binnie J. stated that the Guerin-begun 
duty is best conceptualized as a specific duty to “prevent exploitative bargains.” 
402 Blueberry, supra note 332 (per Gonthier in dissent). 
403 R. v. Lewis, [1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 131, 133 D.L.R. (4th) 700. 
404 Osoyoos, supra note 391. 
405 Delgamuukw, supra note 13 at para 168. 
406 Ibid at para 162 
407 Recall that Deschamps J. essentially acknowledged as much in her minority decision in Little Salmon/Carmacks, 
supra note 14 at 105, noting that Crown honour accountability has been “substituted” for (the “paternalistic”) Crown 
fiduciary accountability. And, in any event, it is clear that Crown honour accountability is duplicative in substance 
and is the one the Supreme Court is now following. 
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However, in Haida Nation, again, the Supreme Court left explicit jurisdiction for a type of “off-
shoot” specific fiduciary obligation (i.e. as one of the many off-shoot honour-based Crown 
obligations that may arise). Regarding the content of such off-shoot fiduciary accountability, 
recall that Chief Justice McLachlin stated that, while it may vary depending on context, it will 
fundamentally mandate “that the Crown act with reference to the Aboriginal group’s best interest 
in exercising discretionary control over the specific Aboriginal interest at stake.”408  
This notion that a duty to act in a beneficiary’s “best interests” is itself fiduciary in nature was 
first indicated in Guerin and then, as we noted in the previous section, adopted as part of the 
conventional fiduciary doctrine for a period of time before ultimately being rejected in KLB as 
doctrinally unsound.409 That is, a duty to act in the best interest of another is not, conventionally, 
a fiduciary duty. To the contrary, as noted and as we will consider in more detail in the next 
section, an undertaking to act in the best interests of another is an essential pre-condition to the 
creation of fiduciary accountability in Canada (i.e. in the prevailing conventional test410), as 
opposed to being part of the content of any such accountability.   
In any event, pursuant to the Haida Nation test, this best interests-based duty remains at this 
point the fundamental type of fiduciary obligation in scenarios where sui generis 
Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary accountability is deemed owing (i.e. pursuant to the Haida Nation-
framed test). There are at least three possible ways in which to interpret the content of a mandate 
to act “with reference to the best interests” of an Aboriginal beneficiary (i.e. in situations where 
the Crown has assumed discretionary control over specific interests); that is, three possible ways 
to conceptualize the content of Haida Nation’s sui generis specific fiduciary obligation 
construct: 
1) as a mandate to bring about the best possible outcome (or a sufficiently positive outcome) 
for the applicable Aboriginal group;411 
2) as a mandate to generally act in accordance with a high standard of conduct;412 or 
                                                            
408 Haida Nation, supra note 2. 
409 Supra notes 321--322 and the text surrounding each. 
410 See supra note 345 at para 36 and surrounding text. 
411 This type of results-based analysis (i.e. where a reviewing court has broad after-the-fact supervisory capacity) 
was, in effect, how the Supreme Court ultimately conceived the doctrinal mandate generally in cases like Guerin and 
Wewaykum: see supra note 383. 
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3) as a singular prohibition against acting other than exclusively for the benefit of the 
Aboriginal group.413 
It seems unlikely that the first is what McLachlin C.J. intended, or that this is where the Supreme 
Court will go in developing this sui generis obligation. Recall that she herself wrote the decision 
in KLB where this type of a mandate was rejected as lacking practical utility, as failing to provide 
a “workable (legal or justiciable) standard by which to regulate conduct,” and as mandating a 
doctrinally inappropriate type of result-based analysis.414   
It is slightly more conceivable that the second – a mandate to generally act in accordance with a 
high standard of conduct in scenarios that are deemed to trigger fiduciary accountability – is 
what was intended, or where the Supreme Court will ultimately land.415 This would effectively 
constitute a duplication of (or return to) the fiduciary-based principle that the honour of the 
Crown construct evidently replaced; a return, that is, to something like the Wewaykum mandate 
(act “with a view to” the best interests of applicable Aboriginal interests, while mindful of 
conflicts416) or the Gladstone mandate (act so as to meaningfully “take into account” applicable 
Aboriginal interests417). That is, doctrinally, the fiduciary obligation in this scenario (again) 
would not be a concrete obligation (so not really a specific fiduciary obligation, as it is described 
in Haida Nation); rather it would be an abstract (fiduciary) principle that could give rise to 
different types of specific (fiduciary) obligations in context. And it would, in effect, operate to 
take over the doctrinal role that the honour of the Crown principle would otherwise play (i.e. in 
those specific circumstances where off-shoot fiduciary accountability is deemed to arise).418 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
412 Both Guerin and Sparrow are capable of being interpreted as mandating this type of generalized fiduciary 
content.  
413 This is how the mandate was generally understood in cases like Blueberry and Osoyoos: see supra note 391. 
414 Supra notes 321 and 322 and the text surrounding each. 
415 It appears, generally from cases like Wewaykum, Haida Nation, and Manitoba Metis Federation, that the 
Supreme Court is more likely to continue to align its Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine with its conventional 
doctrine, rather than reverse course and re-embrace a principle-based approach.  
416 Wewaykum, supra note 33 at para 86. 
417 Gladstone, supra note 145 at para 63. 
418 Another way to conceptualize the nexus between the two in this type of scenario is that Crown fiduciary 
accountability would be superimposed on the Crown honour accountability framework, presumably to further 
incentivize the Crown by the threat of more onerous remedial consequences. In Blueberry, supra note 332 at para 
37, for instance, this is how McLachlin J. (as she then was) conceptualized the nexus between Crown fiduciary 
obligations and the other applicable obligations at play (in that case, statutory obligations).   
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Again, this is an unlikely (and surely unwise) outcome here; it would obviously create a very 
muddled doctrinal framework. 
It seems most likely, then, that what is intended in terms of the fundamental content of Haida 
Nation-based off-shoot fiduciary duties or, at least, where it is most likely the Supreme Court 
will land here, is for them to use this specific fiduciary duty to singularly prohibit the Crown 
from acting other than exclusively for the benefit of the applicable Aboriginal group in 
applicable scenarios, forsaking all other interests, including their own.  
This is, recall from the previous section, moving somewhat closer to the conventional nature of 
the content of fiduciary accountability. The conventional doctrine prohibits acting in relation to a 
fiduciary’s own interests (i.e. the mischief regulated is opportunistic behaviour), whereas this 
third conceivable account of Haida Nation’s fiduciary-based mandate (i.e. as an effective 
prohibition against acting other than exclusively in the interests of the applicable Aboriginal 
group), while certainly prohibiting the Crown from acting in their own interests (i.e. acting 
opportunistically), would also be potentially focussed on prohibiting the Crown from taking into 
account the interests of applicable (non-Aboriginal) third parties, which is to say that the latter 
mandate is still capable of regulating more than just opportunistic Crown conduct (i.e. the 
mischief predominantly regulated by conventional fiduciary doctrine). And it is, non-
conventionally, arguably more focussed on protecting Aboriginal groups from third parties, and 
not from the fiduciary, the Crown (e.g. by protecting them against “exploitative bargains” in 
land-surrender scenarios).419 
Contexts in Which Crown/Aboriginal Fiduciary Accountability Arises 
As with the first two incidents of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine, I start this subsection by 
looking to pre-Haida Nation jurisprudence. Here, the focus is on the specific contexts that have 
been seen as giving rise to fiduciary accountability. Essentially, there were two main types of 
factual contexts seen, pre-Haida Nation, as giving rise to Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary 
accountability. The first was the Guerin-like situation where a First Nation surrenders land 
interests to the Crown, putting the Crown to a (typically statutory) duty to act as a private agent 
                                                            
419 This distinction was noted in Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 62. 
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of sorts in relation to those interests. The second was the Sparrow-like situation where the Crown 
is undertaking a public initiative that has the potential to infringe Aboriginal or treaty rights.  
In the latter type of scenario, fiduciary accountability was said to trigger in the form of positive 
(fiduciary) obligations to honourably address, and effectively justify, a potential rights 
infringement (i.e. through some combination of methods such as consulting the potentially-
impacted rights holder, taking steps to minimally impair the applicable Aboriginal interests 
involved, or giving applicable Aboriginal interests priority over non-Aboriginal interests).420  
Note that the former – the Guerin-like scenario – actually does give rise to conventional 
fiduciary accountability (though, as noted in the previous section, no conventional fiduciary 
breach took place on the facts of Guerin421), while the latter – the Sparrow-like situation – does 
not. That is, the latter involved a particularly novel conception of fiduciary accountability, 
bearing little if any resemblance to conventional doctrine. 
As indicated in the previous subsection, subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence at times (mis) 
interpreted the non-conventional Sparrow precedent as mandating that fiduciary accountability 
could only arise in situations where the Crown had undertaken to act exclusively in the best 
interests of an Aboriginal group or when it would be appropriate to say that they should.422 In 
such cases, where the Crown’s public law duties to their applicable electorate were seen to 
conflict with a (claimed) fiduciary duty to act exclusively in the best interest of an Aboriginal 
group, such a fiduciary duty was effectively precluded. In other cases, recall, the Sparrow 
precedent was interpreted to the effect that sui generis Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary obligations 
could “tolerate conflicts of interests”; that is, as a generalized and sui generis form of fiduciary 
accountability (i.e. a mandate to, essentially, act honourably) that could arise even in contexts 
where there were competing (Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal) interests.423   
                                                            
420 This was generally how the Delgamuukw Court interpreted Sparrow: see Delgamuukw, supra note 13 at 162-168. 
421 There was no suggestion that the Crown acted opportunistically. 
422 Supra note 391 and surrounding text. 
423 Supra note 396 and surrounding text. 
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Furthermore, the rhetoric that often accompanied the Supreme Court’s description of 
Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary accountability led many courts424 and commentators425 to conclude 
that it was (or ought to be) a type of “at large” (or plenary) form of accountability. This fact, 
however, appears clearly to have led Justice Binnie, in Wewaykum, to lament the “flood” of 
fiduciary duty claims borne from this (mis) perception, and to explicitly reject the notion of a 
plenary, or over-arching fiduciary principle.426 After listing a number of different types of claims 
that had been based on fiduciary duty (i.e. in lower courts), none of which involved facts that 
would appear to trigger conventional fiduciary accountability,427 Binnie J. stated as follows: 
I offer no comment about the correctness of the disposition of these particular 
cases on the facts, none of which are before us for decision, but I think it desirable 
for the Court to affirm the principle, already mentioned, that not all obligations 
existing between the parties to a fiduciary relationship are themselves fiduciary in 
nature (Lac Minerals, supra, at p. 597), and that this principle applies to the 
relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples. It is necessary, then, to 
focus on the particular obligation or interest that is the subject matter of the 
particular dispute and whether or not the Crown had assumed discretionary 
control in relation thereto sufficient to ground a fiduciary obligation.428 
This focus on a requisite threshold in terms of the sufficiency of Crown discretion assumed in 
relation to specific Aboriginal interests hints at a return to more conventional boundaries for 
fiduciary accountability in Crown/Aboriginal contexts. Despite his refrain, however, Justice 
Binnie still acknowledges, in Wewaykum, a quite generalized and non-conventional notion of 
fiduciary accountability arising in two different circumstances where Indian reserve lands were 
                                                            
424 See, e.g., Van der Peet, supra note 26 at para 24 (“[t]he Crown has a fiduciary obligation to Aboriginal 
peoples”); Delgamuukw, supra note 13 at 162 (“the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples”); and Mitchell, supra note 29 at para 9 (“an obligation to treat Aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably”).  
425 See, e.g., Rotman, Parallel Paths, supra note 47 at 11 (Rotman posits that the Crown’s “over-arching” fiduciary 
obligation applies to “virtually every aspect of relations between the Crown and aboriginal peoples.”) 
426 Wewaykum, supra note 33 at para 81. 
427 Ibid at para 82. 
428 Ibid at para 83. 
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involved (explicitly noting, while doing so, the reality of conflicting non-Aboriginal interests; 
which conflicting interests, he held, did not preclude a finding of fiduciary accountability429): 
1) Circumstances where the Crown is creating reserve lands for a First Nation (in this 
context, he articulates the fiduciary duty as essentially mandating honourable conduct, 
and as a mandate well short of acting exclusively in the interests of the First Nation430); 
2) Generally, in relation to First Nation reserve lands (here, he defines the fiduciary duty as 
prescribing not just honourable dealing generally, but one whose content “expands [i.e. 
upon reserve creation] to include the protection and preservation of the band’s quasi-
proprietary interest in the reserve from exploitation.”431 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Haida Nation effectively took Binnie J.’s lament to heart and 
radically reoriented this area of law (again, without explicitly acknowledging as much). As 
noted, they installed the honour of the Crown as a replacement principle for the non-
conventional fiduciary principle that was, to that point and in its various forms, the doctrinal core 
of Crown/Aboriginal Law. As a result of this decision, it appears it is no longer the case that 
fiduciary accountability is intended to arise in the classic Sparrow scenario where the Crown is 
proposing some public initiative that could potentially impact Aboriginal or treaty rights.432 
Haida Nation arguably had the doctrinal effect of eclipsing the Sparrow precedent in this regard, 
and Crown-honour based obligations such as the duty to consult and accommodate, now 
typically govern such scenarios.433 
                                                            
429 Ibid at para 96. 
430 Ibid at para 86. It has been observed elsewhere that the fact the fiduciary duty articulated here in Wewaykum was 
in the context of reserve creation in an area outside the traditional territory of the applicable First Nation means it 
could be restricted to its facts, and that reserve creation inside the traditional territory of a First Nation ought to be 
attended by a stricter Crown obligation (e.g. an obligation to act solely in First Nation’s interest). See Senwung Luk, 
“Not So Many Hats: The Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations to Aboriginal Communities since Guerin” (2013) 76(1) 
Sask. L. Rev. 1 at 22: 
This explains the reasoning behind the establishment of less onerous content for the Crown’s fiduciary 
obligations prior to reserve creation: the reserve was being created for the applicant Bands outside of their 
traditional territory … In that sense the Crown was exercising a public law function … As such, reserves 
were created for the Bands in the same vein as land grants were being made to non-Aboriginal settlers. 
431 Wewaykum, supra note 33 at para 86. 
432 Cf., however, Elder Advocates, supra note 31 at para 39 where McLachlin C.J., in obiter dictum, speaks generally 
of the Sparrow fiduciary duty without suggesting it has been “substituted” out, replaced by Crown honour 
accountability. 
433 It should be noted that pursuant to the prevailing duty to consult and accommodate framework, it is arguable that 
in certain situations, the full-blown consent of an Aboriginal or treaty rights holder may be required in order for 
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As for the effective test that now forms part of the Crown honour-based “essential legal 
framework” in this area to dictate when fiduciary accountability will trigger, McLachlin C.J. said 
this (speaking in relation in the circumstances of the Haida Nation case): 
Where the Crown has assumed discretionary control over specific Aboriginal 
interests, the honour of the Crown gives rise to a fiduciary duty … Here, 
Aboriginal rights and title have been asserted but have not been defined or 
proven. The Aboriginal interest in question is insufficiently specific for the 
honour of the Crown to mandate that the Crown act in the Aboriginal group's best 
interest, as a fiduciary, in exercising discretionary control over the subject of the 
right or title.434 
So, based on the combined dicta from Wewaykum and Haida Nation, we can articulate the 
current, applicable test as follows: non-conventional Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary accountability 
will arise when the Crown assumes a sufficient amount of discretion over sufficiently-specific 
Aboriginal interests. The interest in question must be “cognizable” and the Crown’s assumption 
of discretion over that interest must be such that it “invokes responsibility in the nature of a 
private law duty.”435 
In terms of the Aboriginal interest that must be the object of the Crown’s assumed discretion (i.e. 
for fiduciary accountability to be said to arise), the explicit indication is that Aboriginal land 
interests are the primary but not necessarily explicit focus.436 We may also note that the interest 
must be linked to an Aboriginal or treaty right (surrendered First Nation reserve land interests 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Crown honour to be upheld before a proposed Crown initiative proceeds. This principle goes back to Delgamuukw, 
supra note 13 at 168 (“Some cases may even require the full consent of an aboriginal nation, particularly when 
provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal lands.”) 
434 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 18. 
435 Wewaykum, supra note 33 at para 85. 
436 See, e.g., Elder Advocates, supra note 31 at para 49:  
where the alleged fiduciary is the government, it may be difficult to establish … The government, as a 
general rule, must act in the interest of all citizens … It is entitled to make distinctions between different 
groups in the imposition of burdens or provision of benefits … In the Aboriginal context, an exclusive duty 
in relation to Aboriginal lands is established by the special Crown responsibilities owed to this sector of the 
population and none other… (emphasis added) 
See, also, Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5 at para 51 (“a fiduciary duty may arise … where the Crown 
administers lands or property in which Aboriginal peoples have an interest” [emphasis added]). Ermineskin, supra 
note 361 constitutes a clear example of where the Crown was administering First Nation’s property (other than land) 
in a context where fiduciary accountability arose. Of course, fiduciary accountability would have arisen in that 
context whether or not the beneficiary was Aboriginal. 
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presumably qualify437),438 and that interests based on asserted Aboriginal or treaty rights (i.e. 
unproven rights) will not suffice.439  
In terms of what will constitute a measure of discretion (i.e. over the specific Aboriginal 
interests) that is sufficient to ground fiduciary accountability, the Supreme Court was 
demonstrably vague in both Wewaykum and Haida Nation. However, in the recent Elder 
Advocates decision, which involved an unsuccessful attempt to use the Crown/Aboriginal non-
conventional conception of fiduciary doctrine in a non-Aboriginal context (i.e. a class-action 
group of elderly patients in long-term care facilities in Alberta were impugning the Alberta 
government for an increase in applicable expenses and basing their claim in, inter alia, Crown 
fiduciary accountability), McLachlin C.J. there spoke to the sufficiency of discretion that would 
be required for the grounding of such an obligation.440 Specifically, she stated that “the degree or 
control exerted by the government over the interest in question must be equivalent or analogous 
to direct administration of that interest before a fiduciary relationship can be said to arise.”441 
This conceptualization of the sufficiency of assumed Crown discretion is likely transportable to 
the Crown/Aboriginal context, and provides some further guidance for how the Supreme Court 
may address this item. 
Finally, there is one other notable component regarding the Haida Nation test for the triggering 
of fiduciary accountability. That is, the resulting duty must be “in the nature of a private law 
duty.”. This component of the framework was rationalized in Guerin, and has been confirmed in 
                                                            
437 On the question of whether or not a First Nation’s “quasi-proprietary” interest in its reserve lands is 
fundamentally distinct from Aboriginal Title-based interests in land, see, e.g., Guerin, supra note 21 at 379-382 and 
Osoyoos, supra note 391 at paras 41-47, 160-170. 
438 Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5 at para 53. 
439 Haida Nation, supra note 2 at para 18. 
440 The Chief Justice’s decision in Elder Advocates is somewhat puzzling from a doctrinal perspective because she 
seems to accept that in certain instances, a duty to act in the best interests of another could be a duty properly 
characterized as a conventional fiduciary duty, even though she otherwise described the doctrinal fundamentals as 
consistent with the reorientation of conventional fiduciary doctrine that was effected in the Galambos decision 
(including the fact that an obligation to act in the best interests of another is a pre-condition of fiduciary 
accountability and, by implication, presumably not the content of the fiduciary accountability itself). Also, recall she 
went to some lengths in KLB to reject the notion that a duty to act in another’s best interests is itself fiduciary in 
nature: see KLB, supra notes 321 and 322 and the text surrounding each. Of course, there is a meaningful distinction 
to be drawn (though it often is not) between a singular obligation to act exclusively in another’s interest and a duty to 
act generally in the best interests of another. 
441 Elder Advocates, supra note 31. 
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post Haida Nation decisions as a prevailing component of the current test.442 In Guerin, Dickson 
J. held that because the applicable Musqueam’s land interest pre-existed Crown sovereignty, that 
had the effect of making the Crown’s duty (i.e. in administering that interest) of a kind that is “in 
the nature of a private law duty.”443 Specifically, he states at page 385 that: 
… the Indians' interest in land is an independent legal interest. It is not a creation 
of either the legislative or executive branches of government. The Crown's 
obligation to the Indians with respect to that interest is therefore not a public law 
duty. While it is not a private law duty in the strict sense either, it is nonetheless 
in the nature of a private law duty. 
He appears here to have effectively conceptualized the Crown-Musqueam relationship as 
something akin to a sovereign-to-sovereign relationship in this context (i.e. in light of the “pre-
existing” nature of the interest), and on that basis held that it was not appropriate to view the 
Crown’s duty as public in nature.444 
I would contend that this component of the test has questionable utility (or appropriateness) in 
the context of the prevailing Haida Nation-framed test for Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary 
accountability. That is, the Haida Nation test is more of an essentialist fact-based test than the 
Guerin and Sparrow tests, not too dissimilar from the prevailing test in conventional fiduciary 
law (as discussed further below). If a scenario arose where the Crown assumed substantial 
discretion over the land or property interests of an Aboriginal community (to such an extent, for 
instance, that it constituted direct administration of that interest, falling within the test articulated 
in Elder Advocates), it would seem applicable fiduciary accountability ought to arise. If the 
Supreme Court is willing to recognize fiduciary accountability on such facts in non-Aboriginal 
contexts (as they stated in Elder Advocates they would be), then there is surely no rational basis 
upon which to deny it in Aboriginal contexts.  
Moving on, the most recent decision of the Supreme Court to address a claim of fiduciary 
obligation in a Crown/Aboriginal context was Manitoba Metis Federation.  The facts of that case 
                                                            
442 Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5; and Elder Advocates, supra note 31. See, also, Wewaykum, supra note 
33. 
443 Guerin, supra note 27 at 385. 
444 Ibid at 380-385. 
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were discussed above.445 The claim of fiduciary accountability was ultimately rejected by the 
Supreme Court.446 The interesting and novel dynamic in this case, for present purposes, was the 
fact that Chief Justice McLachlin held that Crown fiduciary accountability could arise either in 
accordance with the Haida Nation-based non-conventional test, or the prevailing conventional 
test most recently articulated in Elder Advocates (again, by the Chief Justice).   
This creates a strange and circular doctrinal dynamic in the Crown/Aboriginal context. That is, in 
accordance with one of the two operable tests (i.e. the conventional test), a Crown undertaking to 
act exclusively for the benefit of the Aboriginal group is an essential pre-condition to a finding 
of Crown fiduciary accountability while, in the other (i.e. the non-conventional test), a mandate 
to act exclusively for the benefit of the Aboriginal group is the fundamental content of the 
fiduciary accountability itself (assuming, as we concluded in the previous subsection, that this is 
how the Haida Nation fiduciary mandate is to be interpreted).  
As further argued in the next section, this aspect of the Manitoba Metis Federation decision 
brings into particularly stark relief just how confused the Supreme Court’s Crown/Aboriginal 
fiduciary doctrine has become, and supports the more general argument that this sui generis 
doctrine is fundamentally structured around judicial reasoning that clearly takes the form of a 
Dworkinian mistake. 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mikisew is noteworthy here. Mikisew was decided 
approximately a year after Haida Nation (and Taku River) and it set out the framework for the 
application of the duty to consult/accommodate framework in the context of established treaty 
rights (i.e. Haida Nation had previously set out the applicable framework for that duty in the 
context of asserted but unproven rights). In light of the fact that Justice Binnie had held in 
Wewaykum that the Crown may owe both generalized and specific fiduciary duties in 
circumstances where its conduct may impact a First Nation’s reserve lands, there was reason to 
expect in Mikisew – another decision authored by Justice Binnie and in circumstances where the 
                                                            
445 Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5. 
446 Based on (a) the finding that the Metis interest in question was not a “specific or cognizable Aboriginal interest” 
because it was not linked to a collectively-held Aboriginal or treaty right (meaning it did not meet the non-
conventional test from Haida Nation) and (b) because there was no evidence that Crown had undertaken to act 
exclusively in the interests of the applicable Metis children (meaning it did not meet the conventional test from 
Elder Advocates): see Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 5 at paras 51-64.  
124 
 
proposed Crown conduct was indeed going to impact the Mikisew’s use and enjoyment of their 
reserve lands447 – that the duty to consult framework there may have been described as fiduciary-
based instead of honour-based. However, that was not the outcome. Addressing the fundamental 
doctrinal matter in a somewhat perfunctory manner, Justice Binnie stated only that “the duty to 
consult is grounded in the honour of the Crown, and it is not necessary for present purposes to 
invoke fiduciary duties.”448 He made no reference to his Wewaykum dictum. 
Therefore, it appears that Crown fiduciary accountability will not trigger simply on the 
occurrence of Crown conduct that impacts (or potentially impacts) an Aboriginal group’s use and 
enjoyment of their lands. This is evidently the case even though the Crown has assumed 
substantial discretion over reserve lands in Canada, for instance, and that Aboriginal interests in 
relation to such lands are cognizable, proven and constitutional. Rather, such scenarios will 
evidently be governed by Crown honour accountability, as was the case in Mikisew. Further, 
something more than interference with land-use activities will seemingly be required to ground 
Crown fiduciary accountability; evidently, that something will be a greater measure of assumed 
Crown discretion such as that constituting “direct administration” of the land or property interest 
at issue (such as Guerin-like or Ermineskin-like factual contexts). 
I move now to an overview of the demonstrably flawed nature of the Supreme Court’s 
Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary-based construct before, then, ultimately articulating some thoughts 
on what we may expect moving forward in terms of residual doctrinal space for the application 
of fiduciary concepts in Crown/Aboriginal contexts. 
i. Conceptualized as a Dworkinian Mistake 
 
As noted at the outset, a central contention made in this project is that the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine was structured around a materially flawed core; 
on initial judicial reasoning, that is, that takes the form of a classic Dworkinian mistake. I have 
also been arguing that the Supreme Court has been slowly mending their flawed doctrine, 
                                                            
447 Mikisew, supra note 4 at para 51. 
448 Ibid at para 51. 
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effectively detangling themselves from it while, at the same time, ushering in a new construct 
(i.e. the “essential legal framework” structured around the core of Crown honour accountability).   
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated in this chapter that Guerin and Sparrow, taken together, 
incubated a fundamentally non-conventional form of fiduciary accountability. I conceptualize 
this non-conventional form as a principle-based approach (i.e. structured around the notion that a 
general fiduciary obligation mandating only honourable conduct generally – actually a 
Dworkinian abstract principle in doctrinal form – gives rise to specific, enforceable fiduciary 
obligations as tailored to context). I have explained that this principle-based account is 
meaningfully distinct from the conventional rule-based approach to fiduciary doctrine (i.e. which 
involves only a singular rule against self-interested conduct).  
I have also demonstrated that this principle-based approach to fiduciary accountability developed 
for sui generis use in Crown/Aboriginal contexts was, subsequent to Guerin, adopted in 
conventional contexts and that, for a period of time, it actually had the effect of shifting the 
conventional fundamentals of fiduciary law towards the principle-based approach. Finally, I 
noted the Supreme Court has largely resurrected a rule-based construct for its conventional 
fiduciary doctrine, and appears to have jettisoned (or to be in the process of jettisoning) the 
principle-based approach. 
My contention is that the Supreme Court committed a Dworkinian mistake when they installed a   
principle-based fiduciary construct in the core of Crown/Aboriginal Law. Recall from the 
introductory chapter that Dworkin analogizes judicial adjudication to a “chain novel” where each 
common-law judgment is to be the “next best chapter” in an ever-expanding legal novel of sorts. 
In describing the dynamics of the binding nature of legal precedent (i.e. previous chapters in the 
chain novel), he explains that in “hard cases” (i.e. those where no clear doctrinal rule is seen to 
govern the dispute at issue), a judge undertakes a process of creative, but constrained, 
interpretation. That is, they search for possible interpretations of the applicable chain novel to 
date that fit the “bulk of the text” and that could count as, again, the “next best chapter” which, 
of course, is for Dworkin the “right answer” in such cases.   
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Furthermore, he notes that when more than one possible interpretation aligns with “the bulk of 
the text” in such cases, the judge is then permitted (indeed mandated) to have recourse to 
“substantive aesthetic judgments, about the importance or insight or realism or beauty of 
different ideas the novel might be taken to express,” and to choose as the superior interpretation, 
or “right answer,” that with the most substantive appeal to the novel as a whole. 
Furthermore, and most pointedly for present purposes, Dworkin explains that a judge makes a 
“mistake” if his chapter “leaves unexplained some major structural aspect of the text, a subplot 
treated as having great dramatic importance or a dominant and repeated metaphor” and that such 
mistakes are to effectively be “disqualified” by future judges. 
Against this sketch of applicable tenets of the rights thesis, my argument for the Supreme Court’s 
Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine constituting a Dworkinian mistake is advanced on two 
conceptual bases: 
1) The technical mistake: The principle-based approach to fiduciary accountability that they 
created was entirely novel and did not “fit the bulk of the text” (i.e. it was not consistent 
with applicable precedent as fiduciary accountability was conventionally a rule based 
construct; rather, it was constituted “starting anew”). Moreover, Dickson J. in Guerin and 
Dickson J. and La Forest J. in Sparrow left entirely “unexplained” the rule-based 
fundamentals of the conventional doctrine (i.e. this “major structural aspect of the text, a 
subplot treated as having great dramatic importance or a dominant and repeated 
metaphor” was ignored). On these bases alone, the development of the principle-based, 
sui generis fiduciary doctrine in the Crown/Aboriginal context was a classic Dworkinian 
mistake. 
2) The subjective mistake: Even if it could be argued that the Supreme Court’s principle-
based approach fit enough of the previous “text” to be seen as an “eligible interpretation” 
in the Guerin and Sparrow “hard cases,” (which is doubtful in light of the powerful 
arguments in support of the technical mistake 449 ) there were surely other “eligible 
interpretations” available to them (e.g. one is the interpretation that they eventually 
articulated in Haida Nation; framing Crown/Aboriginal Law around Crown honour 
                                                            
449 See, generally, Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37.  
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accountability instead of Crown fiduciary accountability450). The fact that there was more 
than one “eligible interpretation” meant that the Court, in each instance, was permitted to 
have broad recourse to subjective factors in crafting their “next best chapter.” Ultimately, 
my (subjective) contention is that in choosing the fiduciary concept to centrally 
conceptualize the legal regulation of Crown/Aboriginal relationships in Canada, they 
took up an interpretation with repugnant aesthetics and, in so doing, arguably committed 
a second type of Dworkinian mistake.  
I will comment a bit further on each of these two bases in turn. 
The Technical Mistake 
The primary technical mistake the Supreme Court made, principally in Sparrow, was conceiving 
fiduciary doctrine as capable of operating as a Dworkinian abstract principle; that is, as capable 
of legally mandating a generalized form of conduct (i.e. honourable behaviour), enforced 
through specific, off-shoot concrete obligations, tailored to context. As demonstrated in the first 
part of this chapter, and mindful of some conflicting precedent to the contrary, it is relatively 
clear that a conventional fiduciary obligation is itself a mere concrete obligation that seeks to 
regulate a singular type of behaviour in a circumscribed type of factual context (i.e. to singularly 
prohibit self-interested behaviour when one has undertaken to act selflessly in the managing of 
another’s applicable interests). This is to say that conventional fiduciary doctrine follows a rule-
based approach. Further, the unique potential for (and incentive for) concealed opportunistic 
behaviour in such circumscribed contexts (i.e. where one had such unmonitored control over the 
assets of another) is the basis for the historical “draconian,” strict relief that developed to attend 
this type of transgression.451  
Furthermore, on the facts of Guerin, Dickson J. was evidently of the (mistaken) view that once a 
fiduciary obligation triggers, an interpreting judge is then empowered with broad, flexible 
discretion to “monitor” the entirety of the exercise of that discretion, instead of singularly (and 
strictly) mandating that he or she not act in a self-interested manner within the context of the 
                                                            
450 In Sparrow, for example, in articulating the “general guiding principle” that the Crown was always to “act in a 
fiduciary capacity” in its dealings with Aboriginal people, Dickson J. and La Forest J. exclusively cited the honour 
of the Crown concept in support of that finding. That is, it was right there at their fingertips. 
451 Supra note 286 and 287 and the text surrounding each. 
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exercise of that discretion. This was the primary “conceptual error” that Flannigan pointed out in 
his critique of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine in 2004, noted at the outset of this project.452 
Furthermore, a general, fundamental mistake the Supreme Court made in its pre-Haida Nation 
Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine was interpreting it as capable of mandating one party to act 
in the best interests of another party. This is not a conventional fiduciary obligation; rather, it 
was an original doctrinal fundamental recognized in the Crown/Aboriginal context “by assertion 
rather than analysis.”453 Quite to the contrary, and reflecting this mistake, an undertaking to “act 
in one’s best interests” is, as noted earlier in this chapter, an essential precondition for the 
creation of fiduciary accountability under the Supreme Court’s prevailing, conventional rule-
based test.454   
Put another way, it is to read conventional doctrine backwards to view a mandate to act in the 
best interests of another as a fiduciary obligation.  As explained by Brennan C.J. of the High 
Court of Australia:  
It would be to stand established principle on its head to reason that because equity 
considers the defendant to be a fiduciary, therefore the defendant has a legal 
obligation to act in the interest of the plaintiff so that failure to fulfill that positive 
obligation represents a breach of fiduciary duty.455  
As Conaglen recently put it, while “fiduciaries owe a duty to act in the best interests of their 
principals, that is not in itself a fiduciary duty. Contrary to the approach taken in some decisions 
in Canada, Anglo-Australian law contains ‘no proper foundation for the imposition upon 
fiduciaries in general of a quasi-tortious duty to act solely in the best interest of their 
principals.’”456  
Furthermore, it was noted above that the Supreme Court struggled badly to actually apply their 
principle-based approach consistently. The various types of “hard cases” that arose, forced them 
                                                            
452 Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 63. 
453 Breen v Williams, [1996] HCA 57; (1996) 186 C.L.R. 71 (Aust. H.C.) [cited to C.L.R.] at 95. 
454 Supra note 344 and surrounding text. 
455 Breen v Williams, supra note 452 at 137-38, cited in Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 56.  
456 Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 57, citing Breen v. Williams, supra note 452.    
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to vary the doctrinal fundamentals based on the circumstances of each particular case, thus 
leaving a demonstrably unresolved jurisprudence. As noted, they at times interpreted the 
mandate as a fundamental obligation on the Crown to act exclusively in an applicable Aboriginal 
group’s interests, while at other times they interpreted it as a mandate to honourably incorporate 
Aboriginal interests in whatever regulatory initiative they happened to be proposing.  The latter 
interpretation clearly contemplates fiduciary accountability owed as part of an exercise of 
balancing Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests, which obviously meant the Crown was not to 
be held strictly liable for acting in furtherance of such conflicting interests.  
The resulting confusion is unsurprising. That is, for instance, it was never made explicit that the 
non-conventional approach tofiduciary doctrine taken here was to be restricted to the 
Crown/Aboriginal context.457  Further, there was no direction on how the conventional approach 
was to intersect with this new non-conventional approach.  Recall that in neither of the cases that 
effectively incubated the principle-based approach was judicial authority cited or distinguished, 
which is to say (again) that the Guerin and Sparrow Courts left these dynamics entirely 
“unexplained,” something that they were not permitted to do in accordance with the Dworkinian 
account. And subsequent courts, therefore, had no direction on what to do when conventional 
fiduciary authority was cited in the context of this non-conventional framework; and hence the 
dysfunction and doctrinal paralysis that ensued.   
Furthermore, Flannigan essentially argued that the use of the non-conventional was 
fundamentally ill-suited for use in the context of generally regulating Crown conduct in 
Aboriginal Law; that fiduciary doctrine is simply not configured to do what was being asked of it 
here. To this end, he stated that: 
                                                            
457 Dickson J. did refer to Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary accountability in Guerin as sui generis.: Guerin, supra note 
27 at 388 (“I repeat, the fiduciary obligation which is owed to the Indians by the Crown is sui generis. Given the 
unique character both of the Indians' interest in land and of their historical relationship with the Crown, the fact that 
this is so should occasion no surprise.”  However, he did not acknowledge that he was fundamentally altering the 
doctrinal fundamentals. Again, the application of fiduciary doctrine is arguably always sui generis in the context of 
each relationship category to which it is applied (i.e. while the doctrine’s fundamentals remain static), and although 
Dickson J. may well have intended his analysis to be restricted to context, he left much room here for 
misinterpretation (a fact clearly evidenced by subsequent adoption of his analysis in other contexts). In Guerin, the 
fundamentals were themselves altered, but Dickson J. never acknowledged that fact. 
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The main substantive concern with that analytical move [effectively, bringing in 
the principle-based approach that they did] is that the fiduciary concept per se has 
no developed capacity to resolve conflict or adjust political claims. Its function is 
robustly unilateral – to discipline those who exploit their limited access for 
personal gain. Furthermore, the effect of the move is to privilege, by the extension 
of fiduciary status, one political claim over others. Whether such a political 
privilege is warranted, it is not usefully framed as an issue of fiduciary 
responsibility. There is no connection with conventional fiduciary policy. The 
incorporation of the justification test [i.e. the Sparrow justification test] (which is 
really only an invitation to justify) starkly evidences that fact. What remains is a 
fiduciary analysis in name only.458 
Finally, and as noted at the outset, while Haida Nation effectively constitutes the Supreme Court 
conceding their initial error (that is, by fundamentally “disqualifying” Crown fiduciary 
accountability as the doctrinal core of Crown/Aboriginal Law and replacing it with Crown 
honour accountability), they so far have explicitly maintained, as part of their new Crown-
honour based framework, some ongoing, limited role for the application of a non-conventional 
Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary obligation.  
To this, Flannigan warned that the potential for application of both the conventional and non-
conventional approaches to fiduciary doctrine in the Crown/Aboriginal context would prove 
challenging.  He noted specifically that in this context: 
the conventional form of fiduciary obligation continues to apply to augment the 
[non-conventional approach]… That means certain “fiduciary” obligations of the 
Crown [i.e. of the non-conventional varietal] will be suspended if the Crown is 
able to satisfy the [Sparrow] justification test. Other fiduciary obligations 
(conventional fiduciary obligations), however, are strict, and no justification will 
                                                            
458 Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability,” supra note 37 at 65. 
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be permitted. That will plainly exacerbate the confusion. In the end, it is unclear 
how all of this can amount to a tractable regulation.459 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Manitoba Metis Federation nakedly manifests these dynamics 
warned of by Flannigan. As noted above, it brings into stark relief the ongoing incongruence in 
the applicable doctrinal fundamentals; the co-existence of the conventional and non-conventional 
explicitly directed by Chief Justice McLachlin in that case (i.e. the direction that both the 
conventional and non-conventional tests can bring about Crown fiduciary accountability in the 
Aboriginal context) is circular and surely untenable. Again, the Crown mandate to act 
exclusively in the best interests of an applicable Aboriginal community is the pre-condition in 
the conventional test and the actual fiduciary obligation in the non-conventional. 
The Subjective Mistake 
Again, assuming for the moment that the technical mistake was not fatal in accordance with the 
Dworkinian account (i.e. that the Supreme Court’s Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine is not 
effectively “disqualified” on that technical basis), we then move to the second part of the 
analysis, that where the court was permitted to have recourse to subjective, aesthetic judgments 
about “the importance or insight or realism or beauty of different ideas the novel might be taken 
to express.”  And here the question becomes: was their choice of the fiduciary concept a good fit 
for Crown/Aboriginal Law, thinking in terms of the various historical and cross-cultural realities 
at play in Crown/Aboriginal relationships in Canada? Or might there have been other, preferable 
“eligible” interpretations? 
Rotman, for his part, suggests that a virtue of the central use of fiduciary regulation in the 
context of Crown/Aboriginal relationships is that it provides a “new way of thinking about … the 
[Crown/Aboriginal] relationship.”460 He describes fiduciary doctrine as “wonderfully enigmatic” 
and as having much in the way of untapped potential. I agree that adoption of fiduciary concepts 
here did provide a new way of conceptualizing Crown/Aboriginal relationships; and indeed 
                                                            
459 Ibid at 66. 
460 Leonard I. Rotman, “Wewaykum: A New Spin on the Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations to Aboriginal Peoples” 
(2004) 37 U.B.C. L. Rev. 219 at (Q.L.) para 7. 
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reference to Crown/Aboriginal relationships as fundamentally fiduciary in nature became 
ubiquitous. However, I disagree with there being virtue in that conception.  
My subjective, personal feeling about the use of fiduciary doctrine to centrally regulate 
Crown/Aboriginal relationships (i.e. since subjective, aesthetic assessment is precisely the 
Dworkinian task of the Supreme Court in this scenario presented) was always unease. It is clear 
that one of the disasters of Canada’s colonial history is indeed that Crown/Aboriginal 
relationships have come to resemble a classic fiduciary relationship, one where one party is 
uniquely “at the mercy” of the other; where the Crown continues to be in the paternalistic role of 
protecting Aboriginal peoples from non-Aboriginal peoples (e.g. in accordance with legal 
frameworks that preclude Aboriginal peoples from deciding to act in their own best interests in 
dealing with their land and property interests).461 And I always felt it immoral to bring in a legal 
framework that could in any way legitimize or reinforce that power imbalance.  
Furthermore, in the formative years of the development of the Supreme Court’s non-
conventional Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine, some leading commentators expressed 
similar concerns. Professor Patrick Macklem, for instance, was particularly critical of the 
Supreme Court’s invocation of the fiduciary concept as their central tool for governing Crown 
conduct in the Aboriginal context, arguing effectively that it would be counterproductive in 
terms of generally empowering Aboriginal communities.462 Specifically, he argued that the use 
of the fiduciary concept here “reproduces [Aboriginal] dependency in a new form” and that it 
“frustrates rather than facilitates the quest for a greater degree of self-government for Canada’s 
First Nations.”463 And he noted that its use is evidence of the fact that the Supreme Court is not 
                                                            
461 Slattery has pointed out that, initially, it was likely a wise tactical manoeuvre for Aboriginal peoples to align 
themselves with the Crown in this type of arrangement: Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987), 
66 Can. B. Rev. 727 at 753: 
The sources of the general fiduciary duty do not lie, then, in a paternalistic concern to protect a “weaker” or 
“primitive” people, as has sometimes been suggested, but rather in the necessity of persuading native 
peoples, at a time when they still had considerable military capacities, that their rights would be better 
protected by reliance on the Crown than by self-help. 
462 Patrick Macklem, “First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination” (1991) 36 
McGill L.J. 
463 Ibid at 412. See also, Stevenson and Peeling, “Probing the Parameters of Canada’s Crown-Aboriginal Fiduciary 
Relationship,” supra note 51 at 7: “We don’t particularly like the language associated with the concepts used to 
address legal problems in the field of Canadian Crown/Aboriginal Law. The language, while perhaps precise in a 
legal context, does not accurately fit the Crown-Aboriginal relationship. For example, the language associated with 
the fiduciary relationship speaks of power and discretion on the one hand and vulnerability on the other. These 
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willing to move away from a “hierarchical” conceptualization of the Crown/Aboriginal 
relationship.464 
Likewise, Professor Gordon Christie predicted that the use of fiduciary concepts here “may 
ultimately work against the best interests of Aboriginal peoples.”465  Christie’s concern was 
specifically that the Crown should not be entrusted with discretion to determine what is in the 
best interests of Aboriginal peoples. He conceptualized “a radical divide between fundamental 
conceptions of legal interests” as between the Crown and an applicable Aboriginal group (i.e. as 
what counts as something being in the best interests of that Aboriginal group). And he argued 
that fact alone “renders the use of fiduciary doctrine hopelessly inappropriate” in the 
Crown/Aboriginal context.466  
Moreover, and mindful of the fact that weighing one person’s subjective assessment against  
another’s is inherently unscientific (suggesting, for example, that Macklem’s, Christie’s, or my 
own subjective interpretation is superior to a given Supreme Court of Canada Justice), evidence 
that at least one superior “eligible interpretation” was available to both Dickson J. in Guerin and 
Dickson J. and La Forest J. in Sparrow thus confirming their initial, chosen interpretations as 
wrong answers in each instance (recall the “right answer” for Dworkin in such “hard cases” is 
the superior interpretation), lies in the fact that the Supreme Court has now effectively 
“disqualified” their initial interpretation and instead installed Crown honour accountability in its 
place at the core of Canadian Crown/Aboriginal Law.  
It would be helpful, in terms of continuing the project of mending their dysfunctional doctrine, 
for them to go one step further and explicitly acknowledge their error,467 and fully jettison – or at 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
words, typically used to describe the Crown-Aboriginal relationship, do not speak to a relationship of equality but of 
one party under the protection and the discretion of another.” 
464 Macklem, Ibid at 411-412. 
465 Gordon Christie, “Considering the Future of the Crown-Aboriginal Relationship,” in In Whom We Trust: A 
Forum on Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 49 at 269. 
466 Ibid at 288. 
467 Deschamps J. hinted at such a concession in her minority decision in Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 14 at 
105 where she stated:  
This Court has, over time, substituted the principle of the honour of the Crown for a concept — the 
fiduciary duty — that, in addition to being limited to certain types of relations that did not always concern 
the constitutional rights of Aboriginal peoples, had paternalistic overtones … 
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least fully theorize – those residual aspects of Crown/Aboriginal Law that are based on the 
flawed, non-conventional (principle-based) approach to fiduciary doctrine. 
ii. The Residual Doctrinal Space for the Regulation of Fiduciary 
Accountability in Crown/Aboriginal Contexts Post Haida Nation 
 
Finally, then, in order to conceptualize the residual role for fiduciary regulation in 
Crown/Aboriginal contexts post Haida Nation, I will proceed, again, by ordering my analysis 
around the three primary incidents of fiduciary regulation: (1) its function, (2) its content, and (3) 
the contexts in which it arises, drawing from observations made in the first two parts of this 
chapter. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court has been essentially silent on the question of what function 
their fundamentally modified (but still non-conventional) Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary obligation 
articulated in Haida Nation is to serve. Crown honour accountability is now clearly intended to 
serve the function previously served by the Supreme Court’s non-conventional Crown fiduciary 
accountability (i.e. fundamentally regulating the mischief of dishonourable Crown conduct in 
applicable Aboriginal contexts). Yet, and now within Crown honour accountability, there is to be 
some left-over role for a particularized Crown fiduciary obligation: an obligation, which only 
arises in limited circumstances, to act with reference to the best interests of an Aboriginal group. 
Again, the purported function of this residual Crown obligation is entirely unclear. 
I noted in my examination of conventional fiduciary doctrine that, while there remains some 
uncertainty, the Supreme Court’s prevailing doctrine appears to effectively function to prohibit 
the singular mischief of self-interested conduct in trust or trust-like contexts. Materially, it is to 
function as a proscriptive type of legal regulation in that “it tells the fiduciary what he must not 
do. It does not tell him what he ought to do.”468 Ultimately, if the Supreme Court envisions a 
function for its (post Haida Nation) non-conventional Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary obligation that 
is distinct from the doctrinal function of its conventional fiduciary law, it needs to clarify what 
                                                            
468 Attorney-General v. Blake, [1998] Ch. 439 (C.A.) at 455, cited in Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty, supra note 258 at 
202.   
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that is. My contention, of course, is that there is no apparent residual function for a non-
conventional Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary obligation here. 
In terms of the content of the non-conventional Haida Nation-framed Crown/Aboriginal 
fiduciary obligation, it is explicitly a prescriptive (i.e. as opposed to proscriptive) obligation 
which, once triggered, mandates the Crown to act “with reference to the best interests” of an 
applicable Aboriginal community. I noted earlier in this chapter that while there are at least three 
possible ways in which to interpret this mandate,469 by far the most likely is that the Supreme 
Court intended this mandate to be a rule that the Crown must act exclusively in the best interests 
of the Aboriginal community in applicable scenarios.  
Finally, in terms of the contexts in which this non-conventional fiduciary obligation arises, recall 
from the discussion above that although the Supreme Court held in Manitoba Metis Federation 
that fiduciary accountability may arise in either the conventional or non-conventional manner in 
Crown/Aboriginal contexts, I contended that this arrangement was circular and very likely 
untenable. Again, it makes little sense to maintain a doctrine where a litigant may literally plead 
an act exclusively in my best interests concept as both the pre-condition to fiduciary 
accountability and as fiduciary accountability itself.   
However, what also seems evident here is that the Supreme Court’s non-conventional test for 
when fiduciary accountability arises in the Crown/Aboriginal context is starting to align with its 
conventional test. That is, the undertaking to act in one’s best interest precondition in the 
conventional test is close if not effectively the same as the applicable having assumed a type of 
discretion akin to direct administration of one’s interests precondition in the (Crown/Aboriginal) 
non-conventional test. Moreover, the two tests are now each effectively essentialist tests, 
meaning they specify essential facts which, if present, give rise to fiduciary accountability. And, 
arguably, the essential facts specified in each are effectively the same. 
This conclusion, if valid, clearly demonstrates that the non-conventional Haida Nation-framed 
Crown fiduciary obligation to, effectively, act exclusively in an applicable Aboriginal group’s 
best interests is doctrinally unsound; it is hopelessly circular since the pre-condition is effectively 
                                                            
469 Supra notes 410-412 and text surrounding each. 
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the same as the potential accountability itself. Put another way, if fiduciary accountability only 
arises in particular Crown/Aboriginal contexts where it can first be demonstrated that, 
effectively, the Crown has undertaken to act exclusively in the best interests of an Aboriginal 
community in relation to particular interests, the resultant fiduciary accountability in such 
circumstances, self-evidently, cannot (also) be an obligation to act exclusively in the best 
interests of that Aboriginal community in relation to those interests.  
So where does this leave us? First, we have some emerging clarity around the contexts in which 
Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary accountability will arise, going forward. It is likely to arise in, 
effectively, the same doctrinal manner it does in the prevailing, conventional doctrine; where the 
Crown assumes discretion over cognizable interests of an Aboriginal community in a situation 
where they have demonstrably undertaken to act exclusively in the best interests of that 
community in relation to those interests. Second, we then have an empty content incident in the 
Crown/Aboriginal context; that is, the duty to act exclusively in the best interest of an Aboriginal 
community, since it is effectively the precondition to the creation of Crown fiduciary 
accountability, may no longer (again) be the applicable content of that accountability as well 
(contrary to the clear indication in Haida Nation that this is the case).  
I indicated at the outset of this project that the Supreme Court appears to have effectively 
cornered itself into ultimately releasing the last residual vestige of its non-conventional approach 
to fiduciary accountability from Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada. Unless they are going to use 
effectively the same doctrinal test to give rise to a fundamentally distinct (and as-yet unknown) 
type of legal obligation, and particularly taking into account the various ways in which Crown 
honour accountability regulates in this area, it appears irresistible to conclude that the Supreme 
Court will align its content incident in the Crown/Aboriginal context with that of its prevailing 
conventional doctrine. 
Turning then to the content incident in the conventional context (again, pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s prevailing, recently-repaired doctrine), a conventional fiduciary obligation in Canada is, 
essentially, a proscriptive rule against “abuse of power” (or “abuse of trust,” presumably 
synonymous terms). Regarding the meaning of the term “abuse of power” (or “abuse of trust”), 
Chief Justice McLachlin stated the “emphasis [is on] disloyalty and promotion of one’s own or 
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others’ interest at the expense of the beneficiary’s interests.”470 The trend is clearly towards a 
full-dress return to their conventional prohibition against, specifically, self-interested conduct. 
And so we may speculate as to how that prohibition may apply in the Crown/Aboriginal context 
moving forward. 
First, note that the application of the fundamental, conventional prohibition would be tailored to 
the various  circumstances of Crown/Aboriginal relationships. In that sense, and in that sense 
only, it would be sui generis, as it is in each various relationship category in which fiduciary 
accountability arises (i.e. its application would be sui generis but not the fundamental nature of 
the rule itself). Second, it would apply only in limited factual circumstances. Overviewing the 
various types of situations in which Crown liability has been alleged in Aboriginal contexts, two 
emerge as clear examples of where conventional fiduciary accountability would arise: Guerin-
like facts (i.e. where the Crown is statutorily mandated to act exclusively in the interests of a 
First Nation in relation to land interests that have been tactically surrendered to the Crown by 
that First Nation for a particular purpose) and Ermineskin-like facts (i.e. where the Crown is 
statutorily mandated to manage financial assets of a First Nation, exclusively for their benefit).  
The obvious, final question to then pose here in terms of my attempt to conceptualize the 
residual role for fiduciary regulation in the Crown/Aboriginal context moving forward is: what 
type of Crown conduct would constitute a conventional breach of Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary 
accountability in these types of situations? 
The conventional fiduciary prohibition would be breached in Crown/Aboriginal contexts where 
an individual Crown agent or some collective Crown entity put its own self-interest in conflict 
with the interests of an Aboriginal group it has undertaken to manage (i.e. where the undertaking 
is to manage exclusively in the interests of the Aboriginal group). So in the Guerin-like situation, 
for instance, if one of the Crown agents involved in negotiating the land transaction in Guerin 
had had a direct, personal, and undisclosed interest in the private golf course project (i.e. the use 
to which the leased Musqueam lands were to be, and ultimately were, put), that would have 
constituted a prohibited conflict of interest, a classic breach of the conventional fiduciary 
prohibition. Likewise, if the provincial Crown had had an undisclosed interest in the private golf 
                                                            
470 KLB, supra note 59 at para 33. 
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course project (e.g. if a Crown corporation owned part of the project, unbeknownst to the 
Musqueam), that would also have constituted a classic fiduciary breach.   
The Ermineskin-like situation, for its part, is straight-forward. The facts in Ermineskin were such 
that an express legal trust was clearly created. As such, the application of conventional doctrine 
can simply follow conventional precedent. Crown trustees entrusted with the management of a 
First Nation’s financial interests may not put their own interests, or appear to put their own 
interests, in conflict with the entrusted interests of the First Nation. Put simply, they can’t steal 
the First Nation’s money. That is the effect of applying the conventional fiduciary prohibition in 
this context.   
Viewed as such, it is unlikely that Crown breaches of fiduciary accountability in Aboriginal 
contexts will arise often in light of the various regulatory controls in place to guard against such 
conduct. Rather, Crown honour accountability would now purport to regulate the majority of 
instances where Crown misconduct is alleged in constitutional, Aboriginal-related contexts. 
Moreover, note that, in accordance with this account presented, neither the impugned Crown 
conduct in Guerin nor Ermineskin would have constituted a breach of conventional Crown 
fiduciary accountability. Further, if Crown conduct like that which took place in Guerin, for 
instance, were to take place today, the applicable First Nation may well have a meritorious claim 
in Crown honour accountability (i.e. and not Crown fiduciary accountability), perhaps under 
some new specific “off shoot” Crown honour-based obligation, perhaps one largely replicating 
the doctrine set out in Guerin.  
Crown breaches of fiduciary accountability are, likewise, rare in non-Aboriginal contexts, though 
they do arise from time to time.471 It should be noted here that Crown fiduciary accountability is 
owed to the electorate writ large with respect to general public assets (e.g. the public purse) and 
is, therefore, also (indirectly) owed to Aboriginal individuals in this manner. That is, Aboriginal 
individuals are part of the Crown, of each applicable electorate, and so part of a broader 
collective to whom fiduciary accountability is owed. Moreover, elected leaders of Aboriginal 
communities themselves also clearly owe conventional fiduciary accountability to their 
electorates.  
                                                            
471 See, generally, supra note 335. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Court has, over time, substituted the principle of the honour of the Crown for 
a concept — the fiduciary duty — that, in addition to being limited to certain 
types of relations that did not always concern the constitutional rights of 
Aboriginal peoples, had paternalistic overtones … 
- Justice Deschamps472 
In this project, I set out to theorize the emergent Crown honour-based “essential legal 
framework” which now constitutes the doctrinal “core” of Crown liability doctrine in 
Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada. In doing so, I was of course compelled to examine the 
fiduciary-based legal framework that came before it. 
In Chapter Two, then, I began by mining the historical jurisprudence in order to conceptualize 
the jurisprudential roots of the “honour of the Crown” concept and concluded that prior to Haida 
Nation it was little more than a (seldom-invoked) principle of interpretation which dates back 
centuries and which was used in both statute and treaty contexts to essentially regulate against 
interpretations that would ignoble the Crown.  
After detailing the manner in which the honour of the Crown principle was re-oriented in Haida 
Nation (indeed effectively morphed into something fundamentally distinct from its predecessor), 
I then attempted to conceptualize, through the lens of Dworkin’s rights thesis, the main doctrinal 
components of Crown honour accountability in present-day Canadian Crown/Aboriginal Law. 
Ultimately, my account posits the “honour of the Crown” concept as an abstract principle which 
centrally organizes and informs Crown liability doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal (constitutional) 
contexts in Canada, and which is directly enforceable through off-shoot concrete obligations (i.e. 
discreet causes of action) which bind the Crown to particularized types of Crown honour.  
This doctrinal framework supports the over-arching policy goal of reconciling “the pre-existence 
of aboriginal societies with the [de facto] sovereignty of the Crown.” This reconciliation mandate 
is not enforced by the judicial branch of government per se. Rather, judges are only to enforce 
                                                            
472 Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 14 at 105. 
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Crown honour, and they do so, in applicable scenarios, in order to facilitate and protect the 
constitutional reconciliation process that was centrally mandated by section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, and which is to be principally discharged by the executive and legislative 
branches of government. Judges enforce particularized rights in instances where corresponding 
Crown honour-based obligations have been breached. They do not directly enforce broader 
community policy objectives such as the Crown/Aboriginal reconciliation mandate. 
Viewed as such, Crown honour accountability in Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada has 
demonstrable conceptual boundaries; its doctrinal fundamentals have come into view and appear 
capable of consistent application (the form that such application will take is obviously to differ 
depending on context). The main two (i.e. of three) concrete obligations that have been 
developed to date by the Supreme Court of Canada as effective off-shoots of the honour of the 
Crown principle each take classic Dworkinian rule form. That is, they each constitute a rule; they 
specify facts which, if established, necessitate liability in Crown dishonour.  
The first, that the Crown must honourably consult (and, where applicable, accommodate) 
Aboriginal peoples before initiating conduct that could potentially impact Aboriginal or treaty 
rights, has now been substantially fleshed out through a series of decisions subsequent to Haida 
Nation.473 The second, that the Crown must honourably discharge constitutional obligations by 
bringing a demonstrably purposive and diligent approach to the undertaking, is new and requires 
substantial fleshing out. Nonetheless, it is articulated in Dworkinian rule form. 
The third applicable concrete obligation here (i.e. a particularized Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary 
duty), ostensibly also an off-shoot of the honour of the Crown principle, was one of the main 
focuses of Chapter Three. In Chapter Three, I examined the non-conventional use to which the 
Supreme Court has put fiduciary doctrine in the Crown/Aboriginal context in Canada, and I 
ultimately concluded that it has been an ill-conceived doctrinal “experiment,” and one 
demonstrably on its last legs.  
A key conclusion of Chapter Three is that for all meaningful intents and purposes, Crown honour 
accountability has been “substituted” in for (the Supreme Court’s non-conventional) Crown 
                                                            
473 See, generally, supra note 156. 
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fiduciary accountability. Lamentably, however, the Supreme Court has effected this doctrinal 
substitution while, at the same time, both (a) rejecting the non-conventional approach in other 
contexts as doctrinally unsound 474  (i.e. I explained how the non-conventional approach to 
fiduciary doctrine recognized in Crown/Aboriginal Law was temporarily, and confusedly, 
adopted by the Supreme Court as part of its conventional doctrine), and (b) explicitly retaining 
for Crown/Aboriginal Law a fundamentally modified and fundamentally unresolved version of 
their non-conventional varietal of fiduciary accountability. 
Ultimately, I have contended that the third doctrinal off-shoot of the honour of the Crown 
principle – that the Crown owes a (non-conventional) fiduciary duty to act with reference to the 
best interests of an Aboriginal group in circumstances where it has assumed sufficient discretion 
over critical interests of that group – is an untenable residue of the Supreme Court’s 
demonstrably flawed, non-conventional Crown/Aboriginal fiduciary doctrine. Such a duty is 
duplicative of other existing Crown-honour based (and statutory) obligations, and its retention in 
this area is a source of considerable ongoing doctrinal confusion. Furthermore, I explained that 
that there is now little else for the Supreme Court to do but to fully excise this residue, leaving 
only doctrinal space for the independent operation of conventional fiduciary accountability in 
Crown/Aboriginal contexts (i.e. a rule, unlikely to often be invoked, that strictly prohibits against 
opportunistic Crown conduct, such as when a Crown agents translates his access to Aboriginal 
interests into personal gain). 
I conclude, then, with a return to the eclipse metaphor I invoked at the outset. The Supreme 
Court has ultimately orchestrated a type of theoretical eclipse in moving the honour of the Crown 
principle to the “core” of the regulation of Crown conduct in the Aboriginal context.  Early signs 
of the impending eclipse appeared in cases like Marshall No. 1 and Wewaykum where Justice 
Binnie began to use the Crown honour principle to obscure the (misconceived) non-conventional 
fiduciary-based legal construct, which had been formed principally through Guerin, Sparrow, 
and Delgamuukw. Then, in Haida Nation, the eclipse came into full view. In the language of 
astronomy an eclipse is annular when the moon moves in front of the sun but does not 
completely obscure it; a total eclipse, in contrast, occurs where the sun is no longer visible. 
Effectively, a type of annular eclipse began in Crown/Aboriginal Law in cases such as Marshall 
                                                            
474 See, e.g., supra notes 321-322 and 409-410 and the text surrounding each.  
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No. 1 and Wewaykum, and a total (or near total) eclipse effectively came into view through the 
Haida Nation and Manitoba Metis Federation decisions. The non-conventional type of fiduciary 
regulation developed by the Supreme Court in the Crown/Aboriginal context has become nearly 
imperceptible. And, at least from the standpoint of doctrinal functionality, this is a good thing.
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